U. S. S. GILLIGAN (DE-508)

Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Cal.

12 January, 1945.

DE-508/A12
Serial 110

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commanding Officer, USS GILLIGAN (DE-508)
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Task Unit 79.11.1
(2) Commander Task Force 79
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Action Report, submission of.

Reference: (a) PacFlt Confidential letter 2CL-44.

Enclosure: (A) Action Report, dated 12 January 1945, p. 2

1. In compliance with the reference, enclosure (A), is forwarded herewith.

C. E. BULL.

Advance copies to:
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet (1)
Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet (2)
Commander Destroyers, United States Pacific Fleet (1)

co-Commander Escort Division SEVENTY.

ACTION REPORT OF USS GILLIGAN (DE-508) for 12 JANUARY 1945.

PART I.

1. This action report is the result of an attack on this vessel by Japanese planes in Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, Phillipine Islands, on 12 January, 1945. All times used are Item (-9). On 12 January, 1945, this vessel gained radar contact on an enemy aircraft at a distance of twelve miles, and continued tracking it in to a distance of less than one-half mile at which time it appeared out of the clouds and headed directly for this vessel, firing it's machine guns in a strafing attack as it came in. The plane was identified, tentatively, as a Japanese twin engined bomber, type Betty, and all guns opened fire immediately. At about 100 yards from the ship, the plane burst into flame, veered aft slightly, and at 0658 crashed into the ship in the vicinity of the after 40 MM mount, causing fire, extensive damage and personnel casualties. At 0728 contact was gained on another enemy plane, distant three miles. 0730, a Japanese plane tentatively identified as a Val, was sighted in the vicinity of the USS SUESENS (DE-342), which had already taken the plane under fire. This was about 5000 yards distant. The plane appeared to pass over the SUESENS as if driven off by their gunfire and turned as if to dive on this vessel. 0731, opened fire on the plane which then circled back toward the SUESENS and went into a dive, crashing aft on the SUESENS at about 0732. Shortly after, the air was clear of bogies and the action was completed. While the fire power of this vessel was reduced materially by the resultant damage, it's operating ability was not impaired and it proceeded under it's own power and continued to carry out it's regular duties.

2. (a) This vessel sortied from Seeadler Harbor, Manus, on 31 December, 1944, to carry out operation [redacted]; an amphibious assault in the Lingayen Gulf area. For this operation this vessel was assigned to Escort Division 69, Commander I. C. PHIFER, USN. Our particular assignment en route to the objective was as a unit of Transport ABLE Screen, TU 79.11.1, Captain R. H. SMITH, USN. This screen was a part of Task Group 79.1, Rear Admiral I. N. KILAND, USN, and Task Force 79, Vice Admiral T. S. WILKINSON, USN, Transport Group ABLE proceeded without incident to the vicinity of the Phillipine Islands where on January 6, 7, and 8, the convoy was under air attack at various times. This vessel was in a position to open fire twice. On one occasion, 8 January, there were 3 - 4 Japanese planes only about 2000 yards from our AA screening station, astern of the convoy, but they were being engaged and shot down by the CAP so fire could not be opened. On the same day, another Japanese plane passed overhead prior to attempting a suicide dive on the HMAS WESTRALIA and fire was opened, result unknown, due to the large amount of AA fire from the convoy. On 9 January, S-Day, this vessel after the initial approach, was detached and took station 60 in the Screening Plan (See appendix I, Annex I, CTF 79 Attack Plan A-305-44) and began an A/S patrol under command of Commander Escort Division 69, Commander T. C. PHIFER, USN, in the USS SUESENS (DE-342). From this time up to the date of this action report air alerts were numerous morning and evening. Smoke was used to cover the transport area as an air defense, and this seemed to protect that area, but bring the attacks in our direction which was about ten miles outside the transport area. On the morning of January 10, 1945, about 0711 a Japanese plane dove into the USS LE RAY WILSON(DE-414) in station 61, about 4000 yards to the west of this vessel. On 11 January, 1945, a plane was observed diving on the USS SIGOURNEY (DD-643) in radar picket station #1, about 5000 yards to the east of this vessel. The plane either missed or was driven off by gun fire, but it was apparent by this time that the Japanese, frustrated by the smoke in the transport areas,

were concentrating on the A/S screen which stretched out in a single line and ships spaced two miles apart, rendering it particularly vulnerable.

(b) The mission of this vessel, doctrines, plans, assumptions, were as set forth in CANF 17-44, and CTG 79.1 Attack Order A-701-44. The only assumptions determined after arrival at the objective area was that the screen had become an objective of suicide plane attacks. It was also determined that the attacks would develop from the West in the morning, and from the East in the evening, thus silhouetting the ship against the light horizon and rendering the approaching plane difficult to spot until it was within short range. It was also determined that the favorite time of attack and most likely to succeed was in the beginning of morning twilight and the end of evening twilight.

(c) On the morning in question, 12 January, 1945, the GILLIGAN was patrolling station 60, the USS HERBERT (APD-22) in station 61, the USS BLACKWOOD (DE-219) in 62, and the USS OBERRENDER (DE-344) in station 63. The HERBERT had taken the station formerly held by the LE RAY WILSON (DE-414) struck by a suicide plane crash on 10 January, 1945, and the BLACKWOOD had relieved the SUESENS (DE-342) due to Sonar trouble, and the SUESENS was patrolling an inner A/S screen, parallelling the main screen but about a mile inside. The true line of bearing of the screen was 075°. The coast line on both sides of the gulf ran generally at right angles to the patrol line.

(d) The enemy planes encountered were not positively identified. The one which dove into this vessel was definitely twin-engined , and examination of the damage and measurements taken, indicate a minimum wing span of 81 feet which limit it's classification to either a Betty or Nell. All evidence points to a Betty of which several had been seen in the vicinity. The second plane was single engined and tentatively identified as a Val (see action report of USS SUESENS (DE-342) for more positive identification as this plane dove into that vessel). The planes, while not operating together, were evidently in the same vicinity, or the second was attracted by the explosion and flames caused by the suicide dive of the first. Plane number one, the Betty, made it's approach from the West, low and fast coming in just forward of the starboard beam through an overcast sky, a low cloud ceiling, and taking advantage of the cover to close this vessel which was silhouetted against the light eastern horizon. Plane number two, the Val, approached from the Northeast from the direction of high land masses, but when seen by this vessel was at medium altitude, about 2000 feet, good visibility, distance about three miles.

(e) The wind was from the Northwest, force 1, sea calm, moderate northerly swells. Visbility at that time was very poor due to several reasons. The sky was overcast with dark Altocumulus clouds, very low, and Altostratus above them. It was the very beginning of morning twilight. On 12 January, 1945, morning twilight in that location began at 0641 and the attack began at 0645. While the statement has been made that the first plane approached through low clouds, it is entirely possible that the plane was in the clear all the way in but was not seen until close range, even though all eyes and binoculars were trained on the bearing, due to poor visibility. The fact that the plane passed over the A/S screen at low altitude without being fired upon before attacking us is an indication of the poor visibility.

PART II.

Chronological account of action. All times Item (zone +9).

At 0620 on the morning of 12 January, 1945, in anticipation of the usual morning air attack by the Japanese, all hands manned their battle stations. All depth charges were checked to be sure they were set on safe, propeller locks were placed on all torpedoes, and torpedo tubes were trained outboard. All light and heavy machine guns were cocked and magazines loaded. Breeches were open on the five inch guns with powder and projectiles in the loading trays, fuses set to two seconds. All hands were checked for complete clothing, sleeves rolled down, shirts buttoned, and helmets on. Condition ABLE was set. At 0622 AA firing was observed in the direction of the transport area which was covered by smoke screen. 0645 Combat reported a bogie on SA radar bearing 290° T., distance 12 miles, closing. 0650 bogie at 8 miles, bearing 310° T., closing. All engines were ordered ahead full (20 knots). The ship previously was on course 075° T., but was now swung around to 220° T., to bring the bogie on the starboard beam and to allow the maximum number of guns to bear. It was also planned, if the attack developed into a suicide dive, by the use of high speed and heading toward the target it might be possible to make the plane overshoot in the poor visibility. 0656 bogie 300° T., distance 4 miles, pip now visible on the SL surface radar, indicating low altitude. From this point on the plane was tracked by the P.P.I. scope of the SL surface radar and Control was informed it was coming in low and fast. The relative bearings had been constantly relayed to Gun Control and all guns were loaded, trained on the bearing, and ready to open fire on sight. Due to ease of reading ranges and bearings from the P.P.I. scope of the SL, a steady flow of information was sent to Conn, indicating a steady bearing of about 290° T., with the range rapidly dropping. The last radar range received shortly <u>before</u> sighting the plane was 1000 yards, bearing 285° T. 0658 sighted bogie, twin engined plane, bearing 280° T., our course 220° T. All guns instantly opened fire without orders as the plane headed straight for the ship, in an almost horizontal approach with it's machine guns strafing as it came in. At an estimated 100 yards from the ship the plane burst into flame, seemed to swerve aft slightly and with it's guns still firing at 0658½ crashed on the superstructure deck in the vicinity of the No. 2 40 MM gun and director. No maneuver to attempt avoiding action would have been of effect due to the short interval between sighting and crashing. There was only a slight shock felt as the plane struck but instantly there was a tremendous explosion of gasoline covering the ship with flames one hundred feet high from the torpedo tubes all the way aft to the fantail and the main deck aft was covered with blazing wreckage. This large fire was immediately attacked by the repair party while an inspection was begun below decks for possible underwater or engineering damage. A TBS call was transmitted for medical aid and for rescue of survivors in the water. Commander, Escort Division 69, in USS SUESENS (DE-342), without waiting for this transmission was already standing toward us. Speed was reduced to 15 knots. By 0715 the fire was under control and wreckage cleared from the main deck and it was possible to make an estimate of damage and personnel casualties. It was determined that there was extensive damage aft above the main deck, with the 40 MM battery and director completely disappeared. This battery had continued to fire up until the time the plane crashed directly into the muzzles of the guns. When the resultant flame and smoke cleared away there was not the slightest sign of gun, director, mount, or ammunition stowage left. Only one man of the personnel of the

battery, director, and torpedo tubes remained, and he was found on the main deck in a dying condition, with one hand gone, multiple fractures and numerous burns and lacerations. The majority of men on the port side K guns and aft 20 MM guns were badly burned. 0724 stopped long enough to receive aboard doctor from USS GOLDSBOROUGH (APD-32), which due to the landing craft carried and special launching gear, was able to put two boats into the water quickly: one with a doctor and one for rescue of survivors. At 0728 Combat reported bogie 010° T., 3 miles. All engines ahead full, 20 knots, steering 290° T., leaving behind boat with two survivors which had been approaching. 0730 sighted bogie bearing 020° T., distance 5000 yards, already under heavy fire from USS SUESENS (DE-342) in that vicinity. This ship opened fire with all guns. Men who had been burned remained at their stations and continued to man their guns. The plane appeared to be driven off by the SUESENS' gunfire and circled and seemed to start a dive toward this ship but after a short approach through heavy AA bursts from our batteries went into a steep dive, circled back and at 0732 crashed into the USS SUESENS (DE-342). (see SUESENS' action report for more detailed information). The SUESENS suffered only superficial damage and required no assistance, except medical aid which this vessel could not furnish, so at 0732 returned to rescue boat and received aboard two survivors, and continued patrol.

PART III.

1. The ordnance equipment functioned perfectly and without any casualties of any nature. The men had the plane on fire prior to hitting the ship and with better visibility on the first attack so that fire could have been opened earlier, it is believed they would have prevented it reaching the ship. For AA defense, the No. 1 five inch gun is controlled by the bridge director in full automatic, the No. 1 40 MM is controlled by it's own director, No. 2 40 MM and No. 2 five inch are controlled by the after director in full automatic. All directors were Mark 51. 5" ammunition was alternately Mk 18, fused at two seconds, and Mk 32. Fire discipline was perfect and in the case of No. 2 40 MM was outstanding. These men had been drilled in the doctrine of continued shooting until the plane disintegrates as the only method of stopping a suicide plane attack. The fact that they continued firing until the plane crashed into their gun speaks for itself. The following ammunition was expended:

	Total
5"/38 Cal. - - - - - -	14 rounds
40 MM - - - - - - - - -	96 rounds
20 MM - - - - - - - - -	475 rounds

NOTE: The expenditure of 40 MM ammunition does not take into account the expenditure of ammunition by No. 2 40 MM. Since this gun, ammunition stowage, and the entire crew were lost there is no way of knowing how many rounds were expended on the first attack. A breakdown of ammunition expended by attacks is as follows:

No. 1 Attack		No. 2 Attack	
5"/38 Cal.	1 Rd.	5"/38 Cal.	13 Rds.
40 MM	24 Rds. (not counting rds. fired by #2 40 MM.)	40 MM	72 Rds.
20 MM	235 Rds.	20 MM	240 Rds.

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2. One regrettable incident in the first attack occurred when a man, who has not been found, presumably one of the range-finder operators seeing the plane heading directly towards the bridge and being under fire from the plane's machine guns, leaped from the range-finder platform directly upon the main battery director operator's back, knocking him off his feet and throwing the director completely off the target. This accounts for the low expenditure of 5"/38 ammunition in the first attack, plus the fact that since the plane was sighted at less than 1000 yards and closing at 200 miles per hour, the time available for firing was extremely limited, only about eight seconds.

3. As stated previously, the fire was accurate and effective, the first plane being set afire, and it is possible that the plane veered and struck aft due to the fact that the pilot had already been killed by our gun fire. It is believed that the second plane was hit by one of our 5" bursts in the wings and numerous observers, including the gunnery director officer who was spotting with binoculars, substantiates this and claims that immediately afterward the plane picked the nearest ship and dove on it. However, as the USS SUESENS (DE-342) was firing at the same time it would be rather difficult to ascertain definitely that the burst was fired by any particular ship.

PART IV.

1. Our Battle Damage:

(a) The following items were carried away complete, including shields, wiring, stowage, lockers, etc.

(1) No. 2 (twin) 40 MM gun, gun mount and base.
(2) No. 3 Mark 51 director, director stand.
(3) Standard compass and binnacle.
(4) Stub mast.
(5) All radio antennae
(6) Screened speed light.
(7) Two 1 MC speakers.
(8) Back stays for mast.
(9) Two floater nets and racks
(10) One torpedo impulse charge locker
(11) Two tool and spare parts lockers for 40 MM and torpedoes
(12) All stanchions and life lines on superstructure deck aft of frame 103

(b) The following items were extensively damaged beyond repair.

(1) Torpedo crane hoist.
(2) Torpedo tubes (control mechanism).

(c) The following were extensively damaged and require either major repair or replacement.

(1) Entire deck house and superstructure deck from frames 103 to 127 (frames bent, bulkheads crumpled, insulation destroyed, steam and water lines broken, decks ripped open, electrical lines and fuse boxes destroyed or damaged, ventilation system and blower damaged, hot water heater damaged).
(2) Fire control system for main battery and heavy machine gun aft.
(3) No. 2 5" gun mount.
(4) Depth charge impulse locker, port.
(5) Three watertight doors and scuttles.
(6) Damage control shores and equipment aft.

2. Enemy Battle Damage: When the plane hit the ship it appeared to completely disintegrate, at least no part larger than several square inches could be found after the explosion and flames had subsided. The entire superstructure was sprayed with small bits of cast aluminum, bits of the aluminum plating, but nothing else. The force exerted in a horizontal plane evidently carried everything over the side of the ship. Due to this lack of wreckage it is impossible to tell how much damage was caused by gunfire prior to the crash.

There were two Japanese in the plane. All observers were in agreement on this point. One upper half (from the waist up) was found of a Japanese man, but the other body was not found after the crash.

PART V.

Both SA and SL radar functioned perfectly through the attack and gave accurate bearings and ranges. All guns were trained on the bearings obtained from the SL radar and no time was lost getting on the target.

The enemy's tactics were of a standard pattern and highly successful. Almost invariably the enemy planes would wait until too late in the evening for our planes to be in the air, or would come over too early in the morning before our planes arrived. At such time visibility was very poor and a fast moving plane hard to spot. In the attack on the LE RAY WILSON (DE-414) and in the attack on this vessel the planes came from the same direction, the dark western horizon at the beginning of morning twilight and placed their targets against the light eastern horizon. In both attacks the planes came in very low in a horizontal run.

It is not believed that any tactic with the exception of smoke would be of any value in defeating such attack. Even with tremendous fire power you can't hit what you can't see and the radar fire control system for the batteries of this vessel have never been completed, due to lack of certain equipment being allotted. The efficiency of smoke to prevent this type attack was evident in the transport areas. After personally observing (at close range) six attacks by suicide plane method, five of which were successful in that enemy planes struck the target, it is the opinion of this command that smoke is the best protection, a well directed CAP the next best, and gunfire least dependable. Three out of the four original ships assigned to our A/S screen in Lingayen Gulf were attacked and hit by

suicide plane tactics. It is believed that if the screen had been afforded the protection of smoke the resulting casualties would not have occurred and that the ships would have been able to carry out their patrols just as efficiently since all ships were radar equipped and could have kept station and continued search just as well during the critical periods each morning and evening.

It is recommended that this vessel be allotted the quad 40 MM already authorized for this type 5" gunned WGT type DE. The extra fire power might have prevented the casualty. It is realized that each commanding officer has his own ideas but it is desired to express the belief that in the type duty the DE will do and is doing in the Pacific, air attack will far outnumber any other type of above surface action. It is recommended that the torpedo tubes be removed as was the case of the DE's sent to the Mediterranean and that four additional single 40 MM guns be added to the armament in that location. It is also recommended that the radar fire control for the 40 MM batteries, partly installed, be completed.

The fact that our torpedo tubes were trained outboard prior to the beginning of the action proved it's worth in that our tubes were struck by the plane and training control jammed. If damage control had required jettisoning of torpedoes this would have been possible.

One depth charge, Mk. IX. was cut open by the crash and the explosive charge scattered over the deck on the port side. The powder was washed over the side, the pistol removed from the charge, and then the depth charge itself was thrown overboard.

The requirement that all hands keep fully clothed and wear Kapok life jackets is credited with the prevention of many more casualties. In numerous cases, men's sleeves were burned out of their shirts but the main parts of their bodies were unburned due to the protection afforded by the Kapok jacket. More men were hit by shrapnel but the fragments failed to penetrate the jackets. The insistence and demand that all hands wear the Kapok type jacket can not be too highly recommended.

An amusing sidelight was the Japanese press news listened to regularly by the crew. The Tokyo announcer stated that on 12 January in Lingayen Gulf an American battleship had been struck by their special air attack corps and sunk. The crew would have liked to consider it a compliment to the GILLIGAN but realized it only as more propoganda.

PART VI.

The performance of the radar operators and the Combat team throughout the period under air attack was highly commendable. Upon no occasion did an enemy plane approach without warnings being given. The alertness of the SL surface radar operator to immediately spot a low flying plane and take over the tracking from the SA helped tremendously in getting an accurate picture.

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The medical department rendered cool and efficient treatment pending arrival of a doctor and met the problem of numerous battle casualties in a capable and highly satisfactory manner. Only one man died of wounds during the time the casualties were aboard ship, and the cases ranged from bullet and shrapnel wounds to amputations and multiple compound fractures and third degree burns.

The performance of the crew was highly commendable and in keeping with the highest traditions of the naval service. The repair parties promptly met the emergency and controlled damage and removed wreckage in a short time, isolating and cutting out all broken electrical connections, steam and water lines. The fire was fought and brought under control with water from fog nozzles. At the same time the ship was still under imminent air attack, at battle stations, and a second attack did develop but at no time was military efficiency impaired with the exception of the loss of fire power caused by the complete loss of the after 40 MM battery. Several gunners were burned by the spraying gasoline but remained at their stations and fought off the second attack. Particularly outstanding was the conduct of the No. 3 director and No. 2 40 MM gun crews. These crews, under the direction of the assistant gunnery officer, Lieutenant W. K. STEWART, U. S. N. R., delivered a large volume of fire at the enemy and even when it was apparent that the plane would crash directly into their stations, they continued their fire and when last seen at the time the plane crashed into them and exploded, they were still firing. When the flames cleared away, their stations had completely disappeared. The only survivor was the assistant gunnery officer who was found in the water badly wounded. The assistant gunnery officer has been recommended for an award for gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in separate correspondence.

The commanding officer takes pride in the conduct and fighting spirit of the GILLIGAN and feels that it is a pleasure and a privilege to be able to command men of such caliber.

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REPORT OF PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

(1) Killed in Action:

LAMB, Nash Larue, S1c, V-6 USNR, 555 61 56.

(2) Died of wounds or injuries received in action.

POOLE, Edgar Odell, S1c, V-6 USNR, 892 94 30.

(3) Missing in Action:

SUMMEROUR, Robert Ithamar, S2c, V-6 USNR, 893 13 51.
WESOLOWSKI, Emil Joseph, BM2c, M-2 USNR, 403 88 49.
MC WATERS, Hugh Dorsey, S2c, V-6 USNR, 893 17 35.
FLORAMO, Vincenzo Arthur, S1c, V-6 USNR, 802 55 93.
STROM, Arthur Edward, BM2c, V-6 USNR, 618 19 51.
KANE, Clarence (nmn), TM2c, V-6 USNR, 857 45 14.
ARCHIE, Thomas (nmn), StM2c, V-6 USNR, 557 13 19.
CHOMAN, John (nmn), CTM(AA), USN, 368 28 06.
SILVER, John Joseph, GM3c, V-6 USNR, 811 83 99.
MONDAY, Arthur Bruce, GM3c, V-6 USNR, 878 16 96.

(4) Wounded as a result of enemy action:

STEWART, William Kirk, Lieutenant (D), USNR, 128220.
RAINONE, Louis Orlando, S2c, V-6 USNR, 808 29 80.
MAISTO, Alfred Doroteo, S1c, V-6 USNR, 609 37 73.
MALEWICH, Edward Charles, S2c, V-6 USNR, 820 37 06.
BOTTALICO, Luigino (n), TM3c(T), V-6 USNR, 806 83 55.
CORDARY, Earl Francis, S2c(RM), V-6 USNR, 601 55 62.
ADAMS, Percy Franklin, S2c, V-6 USNR, 833 81 33.
MAJORANA, Frank Robert, S2c, V-6 USNR, 814 52 93.
HESTER, "J" "C", S2c, V-6 USNR, 896 89 90.
ANDERSON, Joseph Cecil, S1c, V-6 USNR, 828 57 71.
LUNETTA, Carmen Samuel, S2c, V-6 USNR, 609 37 70.
LUKAS, Joseph John, S1c, V-6 USNR, 245 93 29.
HUTCHESON, Henry Donald, S1c, V-6 USNR, 637 97 14.

C. E. BULL, Lt. Cmdr., USNR.,
Commanding.

1 04312

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SM31

DESTROYERS, PACIFIC FLEET
DESTROYER SQUADRON TWENTY-TWO

FC4-22/A16-3

Serial: 024

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
CO, USS GILLIGAN (DE508) conf. ltr. A12/serial 110 — 10 February 1945.

From: The Commander Destroyer Squadron TWENTY-TWO.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Task Force 79. (Com3rdPhibFor).
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
(3) Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Action Report, submission of.

1. Forwarded.

Robert Hall Smith
ROBERT HALL SMITH.

Copy to:
ComDesPac
USS GILLIGAN

7 0780

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File No. FE25/A16-3(3) THIRD AMPHIBIOUS FORCE J3-6/sn
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER

Serial 0086

6 JUN 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO, USS GILLIGAN (DE-508)
conf. ltr., A12, ser. 110
of 12 January 1945.

From: Commander Third Amphibious Force (Commander Task Force 79).
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Seventh Fleet (Commander Task Force 77).
(2) Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area.

Subject: Action Report - Submission of.

1. Forwarded.

2. The following comments are submitted:

Page 6, Part V, third paragraph.

Screening vessels were stationed outside the smoke cover to prevent torpedo and low level bombing planes, small boats and swimmers from approaching the area unopposed.

Page 7, Part V, fourth paragraph.

Removal of torpedo tubes and the substitution of 40mm guns would greatly augment the AA defense of this type of ship.

T. S. Wilkinson
T. S. WILKINSON.

Copy to:
ComDesRon 22
CO, USS GILLIGAN

(3)

7 0780

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UNITED STATES FLEET
COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

REG NO F-1340
R.S. NO 7 0780
REG. SHEET NO 35

A16-3(1)(F-3-4/bo)

Serial 04185

CONFIDENTIAL

24 JUN 1945

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on:
CO, USS GILLIGAN (DE-508)
Conf. ltr., serial 110,
dated 12 January 1945.

From: Commander Seventh Fleet.
To : Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Action Report - Submission of.

Reference: (b) BuShips ltr. C-DE/S74-1(814), dated 14 November 1944.

1. Forwarded.

2. The stationing of the screening vessels outside the smoke screen is considered sound.

3. With regard to the statements in paragraph 4, Part V, of basic letter, this command concurs in the recommendation that authorized installations of fire control equipment be completed. Reference (b) authorizes the removal of torpedo tubes from WGT type DEs.

4. Attention is invited to paragraph 7, Part V, of basic letter, in which the wearing of the Kapok life jacket is credited with preventing casualties. This precaution should never be neglected in combat zones.

Thos. S. Combs

THOS. S. COMBS
Chief of Staff

Copy to:
Com3rdPhibFor
ComDesRon 22
CO, USS GILLIGAN (DE508)

(2)