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NavSource Online: Submarine Photo Archive

Semi Submersible


Forward by David Johnston (USN, retired) (USNR)

To understand why mini or midget subs were never used by the USN prior to 1945 one must look at the strategic role of the submarine service. In 1900 when the Holland (SS-1) was commissioned submarines were looked upon as nothing more than mobile minefields. Their primary role was harbor defense. Indeed the “limited” technology of the day prevented them from being used in any other way. The Holland, A-class, and B-class were very small with a surfaced displacement of under 145 tons. However, with each succeeding class the boats got larger and the technology improved along with the capabilities. The role of harbor defense was soon turned over to the Army as the USN moved to an ever expanding emphasis on blue water operations. The submarine service shifted to a coastal defense role, then by 1920 with the S-class the USN was committed to open ocean patrol operations. Interdicting the enemy on the high seas and preventing them from ever approaching our shores argued for a large submarine with long range, high speed, and heavy armament. By 1941 the USN had fully developed and was committed to the Fleet Submarine concept, with a boat capable of acting as the eyes and ears of the battle line, scouting ahead of the mighty battleships, reporting on the enemy’s movements and conducting whittling down attacks prior to the grand fleet action between battleships and cruisers.

As you can see, the USN’s strategic operating concept prior to 1945 obviated the idea of mini-subs. Our enemies were thousands of miles away across vast oceans and with our emphasis on blue water operations mini-subs just did not fit. Admittedly, under certain situations mini-subs could provide a useful tactical role. Great Britain’s potential enemies were figuratively right in their backyard. Interdicting the enemy within their own harbors was a much more realistic concept for the RN and thus the role of mini-subs gained more traction with them. A similar situation existed for the Italians and Germans. As for the Japanese, why they squandered such a high level of money and irreplaceable resources on mini-subs is more of a mystery. The IJN was a high seas, blue water operator if there ever was one. I think the concept of the singular combat nature of mini-sub operations appealed to the Bushido colored mindset of the Samurai tradition and thus it held a high degree of appeal. In addition the IJN organization was heavily modeled on the RN and many of the thought lines and traditions directly correlated to RN ideas. The USN, while taking a backseat to no one on bravery, looked upon the midget/mini-sub idea as very nearly suicidal and it was considered only with a great deal of trepidation.

So it is my opinion that the USN did not design, build, or operate mini and/or midget subs in the years between 1900 and 1945. What other organizations like the OSS did I can not say. There were private organizations and companies (i.e. Simon Lake) that did toy with small submarines during this period, but those efforts had nothing to do with any formal USN effort.


Additional Resources and Web Sites of Interest
hnsa.org
cia.gov

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This page is inspired by Darryl L. Baker, David Johnston (USN, retired) (USNR), Ric Hedman, Robert Morgan, Nicholas E. Reynolds, & created and maintained by Michael Mohl.
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