

A16-3

Serial: 00145

S E C R E T

OPERATION PLAN

Atoll Commander, Majuro 4-45.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS:
ATOLL COMMANDER, MAJURO,
MARSHALL ISLANDS.
ROSALIE ISLAND.

30 April 1945.

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) Evacuation Unit #1.

LCI-482 (with 2 LCR); Lt.(jg) E. S. Rubin, USNR.

Military Government Officer; Lt.(jg) J. T. Sinclair, USNR.

Native Scout Parties 1 and 1A (2 canoes). (see Annex D).

5 man native boat party; 5 man enlisted guard (NAB Majuro).

Guides and Interpreters as designated.

(b) Evacuation Unit #2.

LCI-394 (with 2 LCR); Lt. P. A. Wasemansdorf, USNR.

Military Government Officer; Lt. W. G. Nagle, SC, USNR.

Native Scout Party 2 (1 canoe). (see Annex D).

5 man native boat party; 5 man enlisted guard (NAB Majuro).

Guides and Interpreters as designated.

(c) Evacuation Unit #3.

LCI-392 (with 2 LCR); Lt. A. S. Field, USNR.

Military Government Officer; Lt. H. B. Wilson, USNR.

Native Scout Party #3 (1 canoe). (see Annex D).

5 man native boat party; 5 man enlisted guard (NAB Majuro).

Guides and Interpreters as designated.

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(d) Evacuation Unit #4.

LCI-479 (with 2 LCR); Lt. G. (n) Wilkinson, USNR.

Military Government Officer; Lt. J. T. Carpenter, USNR.

Native Scout Party 4 (1 canoe). (see Annex D).

5 man native boat party; 5 man enlisted guard (NAB Majuro).

Guides and Interpreters as designated.

(e) Evacuation Unit #5.

LCI-481 (with 2 LCR); Lt. (jg) P. M. Cospers, USNR.

Military Government Officer; Lt. B. B. Bales, USNR.

Native Scout Party #5. (see Annex D).

5 man native boat party; 5 man enlisted guard (NAB Majuro).

Guides and Interpreters as designated.

(f) Fire Support Unit #1.

USS WINTLE (DE-25); Lt. Comdr. A. Leipper, USNR.

Military Government Officer; Lt. Comdr. L. C. Bergquist, USNR.

Guides and Interpreters as designated.

(g) Fire Support Unit #2.

YMS-354; Lt. R. W. McClure, USNR. (alternate YMS-320).

Guides and Interpreters as designated.

(h) Air Support Unit.

6 two plane sections VMSB (Attack Sections 1 to 6 inclusive).

3 Dumbos (harassing & Patrol Planes 1 to 3).

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(i) Medical & Supply Unit.

Lt. Comdr. W. G. Burkhard, (MC), USNR, and Lt. W. G. Nagle, SC, USNR
Officer and enlisted personnel as needed.

1. (a) INFORMATION.

(1) Intelligence Plan Annex B.

(2) Enemy and own forces; as contained in ComMarGilArea
Operations Plan 2-44 of 29 December and in Annex B.

(3) Enemy forces on Jaluit Atoll are believed to be hard
pressed for food, but food gathering is well organized.
There is a large number of natives (approx. 1200) on
this Atoll, widely distributed from South Point, Jaluit
Island, clockwise around to N.E. Pass. Many of these
natives are from Arno and Majuro. Reconnaissance
reveals that natives are suffering from food shortage
and burdensome restrictions and discipline by enemy
and are very desirous of being evacuated. It is
believed that a certain number of Koreans, Japanese
civilians and military will desert and that some
prisoners may be taken.

(4) There are enemy garrisons on Namoraru Island (Area C)
and on Nalmedj Island (between D and E Areas). On
Pingelap and Bokayan are 300 Japs and on the eastern
half of South Point about 100.

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- (5) Natives from Eastern reef will have been briefed by scouts to proceed at night to designated eastern reef island rendezvous and to proceed out to sea off the reef, if possible, during the night and early dawn.
- (6) Natives from western reef will be briefed to rendezvous at certain designated western islands remote as practicable from Jap concentrations.
- (7) The sea off the western reef is calm and the reef may be approached safely and doubtless in some places offering good holding ground for anchorage. The windward reefs can be worked in calm weather.
- (8) See Annex B1 for location of enemy and probable weapons.
- (9) See Annex B2 for Scouting Areas.
- (10) See Annex B3 for location of native rendezvous points.
- (11) Assignment of scouts and guides in Annex F.
- (12) Experience has shown that enemy (enlisted military) will sometimes respond to haranguing by loud speaker and threats. Koreans will surrender at barest opportunity.

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-----ANNEX ESPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS TO AIR SUPPORT

1. During the first part of the air operation, 0530 to 0700, the mission of the Dumbos is to make the Japs take cover and to keep them there until natives can move out to adjacent safe islands. Runs will be made by Dumbos on Pingelap and South Point and a bomb dropped from time to time, on West side of Pingelap only and on East half of South Point only. Dumbo on northern station will not drop bombs since targets will not be distinguishable and adjacent islands are populated with natives.
2. It is desired not to attack or aggravate enemy during first part of operation or as long as the evacuation is proceeding with success - this to avoid retaliation or interference - orders to shell, strafe or bomb any targets will be given by AtCom according to the situation as it develops.
3. Dumbos after 0700 will maintain patrol as called for by the plan, ready for air sea rescue and particularly alert for any boats with armed enemy parties that might sortie from the main enemy area in the eastward part of the atoll between N.E. Pass and South Point. Any boat activity should be immediately reported and strafed if proven to be enemy.

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7. When scouts land, find dependable local men to send to other islands in areas; men known to Japanese, so if challenged suspicion will not be aroused. Any scout challenged or caught by Japanese should say he drifted over from Mille not revealing he comes from Majuro.
8. People must be told about harassing planes, not to fear them. Planes will only attack west part Pingelap, east part South Point. Planes will be over at 0530. People will be told points where ships will be at daylight. Same applies to plane over Namoraru and Nalmedj.
9. Although certain islands are named as landing points, scouts may and will choose more suitable ones if circumstances at moment show it to be desirable. Scouts must not let themselves be captured if it can be avoided. After locating dependable Jaluit natives to carry the message to the islands in the assigned areas, they should remain hidden, returning to ship or lying off area in canoe, if remaining ashore is too dangerous or exposes our operations to discovery.

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10. Scouts and people must be impressed with importance of surprise. Japanese must not be alerted. If number of Japs on any island is too large to overpower they must be kept in ignorance of what is going on. If number is small and if they can be surely overcome it should be done. No shots should be fired that would start an alarm, before evacuation.
 11. Advise all people on Eastern reef that if they can get canoes or boats to evacuate at night across the lagoon to Ngain, Dagaya or Lijeron, wherever our ships can be seen. This is more desirable than working the east reef.
 12. Advise the people that they will not be fired on while crossing reefs or coming out towards ships. Planes have been instructed to fire only on ~~arrival~~ ^{ARMED} enemy.
 13. As ships approach island evacuation rendezvous points at daybreak the scouts will, if safe, make signals to the ships by flashlights as follows:
 - (a) Blinking white - all clear, mission completed, conditions favorable.
 - (b) Steady white - Have prisoners - all well (intermittant).
 - (c) Blinking red - Mission completed but Japs present - caution.
 - (d) Steady red - Unable to complete mission, proceed with caution - enemy is alert here.

In making signals choose a point concealed from view, from either side but visible from directly out to sea.