
FLEET'S EXERCISES IN THE CARIBBEAN. OUR

Commander J. D. Jerrold Kelley, U. S. N., Outlines the Purpose and Value of This Remarkable Naval Maneuver -Under New Scheme of Defence It Is Proposed to Re-establish American Divisions on Homogeneous Plan and to Carry On War Drills in All Quarters of the World Where United States Ships May Be Stationed.





REAR ADMIRAL J.B.GOGEAN SHOPE DEFENCES

BY COMMANDER KELLEY. At the memorable dinner of the Chamber

of Commerce President Roosevelt declared

that "We need to keep in a condition of

preparedness, especially in regard to the

navy, not because we want war, but be-

cause we desire to stand with those whose plea is listened to with respectful attenthe weakness of sea prowess is so often and sometimes fatally revealed.

The Navy Department is at the moment submitting to test the normal readiness of three of its squadrons for the mobilizations that are imperative in the first demands of war.

In this are included the battleships Kearsarge (flag), Indiana, Alabama, Massachusetts and Texas; the cruisers Olympia.

A.S GROWINSHIELD

REAR ADMIRAL

Though the word "preparedness" has The zone chosen for the fleet exercises definite limited significance, its meaning is

often misunderstood. A well-known authority, on, naval subjects puts it: preparation for war falls un der two heads-preparation and prepared-The first is largely a question of material and is constant in action; the second in

volves an idea of completeness. When at any particular moment the preliminaries are satisfied a nation is prepared, but not otherwise, Indeed, a nation may make a great deal

of necessary preparation for war and yet It is, therefore, not in preparation that the

unreadiness of states for sudden war will be found, for this is chiefly a question of money and manufacture, but it is a want of preparedness employed in its limiting sense of readiness to use this material that

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St. Louis, Mo., July 16, 1902—Dr. E. W. Hall: Dear Sir-I have used you Texas Wonder, Hall's Great Discovery, for kidney and bladder trouble, and I can cheerfully recommend it to ladles suffering in same manner.

war.
It is exerting in least complex form an initiatory effort to muster effective warships and to train the personnel so that both may be able to resist the bullying threats or the sudden assault of probable enember.

"DOMAIN OF SEA POWER."

lies in the great strategic region of the Caribbean that has been defined as the "domain of sea power." These tropical waters with which the Gulf of Mexico is strategically included are the advanced fighting lines whereon the safety of our Eastern seaboard and the control of the Isthmian Canal depend. For many years the navy has been em-

ployed in studying the possibilities of these Never before in peace, however, has such a force been assembled there.

As a corollary never have the opportunities for attacking the vital problems been as favorable. been so favorable.

The American fleet, mobilized in and

The American fleet mobilized in and around Culebra, that little advance post which looks toward Porto Rico on the west and toward St. Thomas on the east, is made up of the three divisions which normally are assigned to the South Atlantic, European and North Atlantic stations.

The last division, called in the old days "the home squadron," is naturally the most important in size and character.

It is the one where the main efforts intraining, mobilizing and maneuvering must be exercised. training, mobilizing and maneuvering must be exercised.

This superfority does not mean that the Asiatic and Pacific squadrons are to be neglected.

Under the reorganized scheme of naval defense it is proposed to re-establish our divisions on a new and homogeneous plan and to carry on war drills in all quarters of the world where our ships may be stationed.

Admiral George Dewey, the senior officer of the active list, has been assigned to the chief command of this temporarily combined force and will be aided by a staff composed of Rear Admiral Taylor (chief) and Captains Swift and Pillsbury, of the general board, and Commander Sargent.

His flagship is the converted yacht Mayflower.

Next in rank is Rear Admiral Summer.

READ THIS.

Its. Mo., July 16, 1902—Dr. E. W. ar Sir-I have used you Texas Hall's Great Discovery, for kidney der trouble, and I can cheerfully and it to ladies suffering in same ruly.

R. M. HERMAN, 3213 Bell Ave.

His flagship is the converted yacht Mayflower. Next in rank is Rear Admiral Sumner, commanding the South Atlantic squadron, which is made up of the battleship Iowa (flag) and the cruiser Atlanta. Then follows, but not in order, of seniority, Rear Admiral Crowninshield, commanding the European squadron, to which belong the battleship Illinois (flag), the cruisers Chicago and Albany and the gunboat Nashville; and finally the North At-

REAR ADMIRAL, T.J. HIGGINSON.

In this are included the battleships Kear-sarge (flag), Indiana, Alabama, Massachu-setts and Texase; the cruisers Olympia, Newark, Cincinnati, Raleigh, Detroit and Newark, Cincinnati, Raleigh, Detroit and Montgomery; the gunboats Machias, Dolliphin and Bancroft; the converted yachts Scorpion, Wasp and Vixen; the torpedo boats Decatur, Bagley, Barney, Biddle, Stockton, Thornton and Wilkes, and various auxiliaries and transports.

To Rear Admiral Cognian, commasding the Caribbean division of the North Atlantic squadron, is intrusted the defense of the shore station, which will be garrisoned by marines and will serve as a base of supplies and operations against the attacking fleet.

The programme drawn up by the General

supplies and operations against the attacking fleet.

The programme drawn up by the General Board of the Navy, by the War College and the Bureau of Navigation provided for the arrival of these ships in West Indian waters during the last week of November.

The North Atlantic was ordered to rendezvous off Culebra and the South Atlantic and European squadrons were directed to combine off the Island of Trinidad.

The first work assigned to these three has been the development of a "search problem" in which the North Atlantic squadron represents the defense and the other the offense.

The attack is expected to selze an ade-

offense:
The attack is expected to selze an adequate harbor and establish a protected base, where, if discovered and confronted by an equal or a superior force, the attack will be considered a fallow. be considered a fallure.

The fictitlous values assumed in the previous search problem are not necessary, as the relative strength can be measured by the actual ships engaged.

This initiatory essay must be finished

as the relative strength can be measured by the actual ships engaged.

This initiatory essay must be finished before December 10, at which date the three squadrons are to assemble off Cu-lebra.

During the succeeding ten days the fleet will be occupied in perfecting the details of organization. will be occupied in perfecting the details of organization.

From the 19th to the 29th of December the ships will be distributed among various West Indian ports in order that the strain of constant work may be eased and all hands be enabled to indulge in the relaxation which after a period of sustained labor is nowhere more necessary than on shipboard.

bor is nowhere more necessary than on shipboard.

Even in these days of steam the denials and hardships of sea life are many, and it is a mistaken zeal to keep the pressure at the upper end of the gauge, for all work and no play surely makes maritime Jack a very dull boy.

At the beginning of the new year the fleet will reassemble and engage in such exercises, maneuvers and gun practice as the Commander in Chief may direct.

This is one of the main objects of the drills, and should excite a rivalry between ships and divisions and create an interest that will be of the greatest profit.

This somewal bald statement of a scheme of the drills may not mean much

templated, such, for example, as are engaged in by most foreign sea Powers.

The season for this has not yet come.

The first essay must be confined to perfecting plans so that the future mobilizing of a large fleet will become a matter of simple routine.

Next the department is seeking to insure in the several squadrons uniformity of routine and to establish such methods of progressive instruction that the units of the fleet shall be welded into a homogeneous service.

service.
Finally, the gun pointers are to be developed by systematic target proctice.
The officers are to be exercised in the tactics of the squadron, and then in what. tactics of the squaren, and then in what, to any important degree, none of them has been privileged to take part—the strategy and taotics of the fleet.

When the search problem and the combined drills of the army were taking place during the late summer a common inquiry often put was: "Is this work of any real use and is it not very costly?"

often put was: "Is this work of any real use, and is it not very costly?"

The answer to this inquiry is not difficult to return. The work is of the greatest value, and, if money expenditure be meant, it is certainly costly.

But if the final reckoning is to be settled the outlay is one the people should welcome.

But it the final recanning is to be settled the outlay is one the people should welcome.

It minimizes if it does not prevent the gravest disasters to national honor and to commercial progress, and if figured in dollars and cents it is nothing compared with the very beginning of the penalty imposed by unpreparedness.

The employment and progressive development of material and personnel are of supreme importance; ships by themselves and crews by themselves mean nothing.

Even combined without the homogeneity that spells success they mean little more; but equipped and ready ships, manned by an energetic, a skilled and contented personnel, are the cheapest and castest insurances known.

What would be thought of a great corporation that, after installing an expensive

What would be thought of a great corporation that, after installing an expensive plant and organizing a trained and educated corps of workers, failed to utilize the awaiting energies and let the machinery and the minds rust for want of practice?

No, the experience of all sea war teaches us that victory is not the sport of chance, but that it is a definite and inevitable result of fitness.

Ultimate success depends on the special ability to handle and manage the single ship, armed with good guns and manned by men that can shoot straight on the open sea.

MEANING OF SEA POWER. In the more extended ability to handle and

In the more extended ability to handle and manage teams of ships, divisions, squadrons, and, in its highest expression, to be skilled in the tactics and strategy of the fleet.

Nor may this peace training be confined to the bluejackets, the subalterns and the commanders of ships acting singly.

The commanders-in-chief must be drilled hard and often.

They must be given the opportunities under stimulated war conditions to learn their instruments, to work out the varying problems of tactics and strategy and to drive home and clinch by actual practice the immutable strategic principles. mome and cliner by actual plactic the im-mutable strategic principles.

Indeed, the burden of an unrelieved com-plaint among the navies of the world is that fleet commanders are intrusted with the most important duties of their lives after a scant experience and few chances of acquiring under way the particular knowledge that must be employed in actual warfare.

warfare.
Thanks to American students, the world Thanks to American students, the world knows something of the true meaning of "sea power," but does even the average reader of history ever think out how much this sea power has done for the world?

At no time has it been so important as since the incoming of steam, steel and high-power guns.

Within fifty-five years four wars have been decided by navies.

In two of these no battle was fought between hostile feets, though in all the dominance and victory have been due to the "command of the sea" possessed by one of the contestants. "command of the sea possessors the contestants.

The first in which no sea fight proper gives a larger filumination to the text is the war of 1848 between Denmark and Germany, when the united duchies of Schleswig and

The Danes defeated the Schleswig-Holstein forces in the battle of Bow, after which, as Spencer Wilkinson tells us, Prussie and other German States in alliance with Schleswig-Holstein put into the field a force which routed the Danes in the battle of Schleswig.

This conflict showed such mastery in the Germans that the Danes never ventured another pitched battle.

GERMANS HAD NO FUEFT

GERMANS HAD NO FLEET.

GERMANS HAD NO FLEET.
They had a fleet, small, yet efficient, and
the Germans had none.
Hence, despite their success on land, the
latter found themselves checkmated by the
hostile force affoat.
Four months after his victory the German Four months after his victory the German commander reported that without the help of a fleet he had no hope of compelling the Danes to accept terms of peace.

Of course, no fleet was available, and the Danes, perfectly guarded, held out for two years, at the end of which Russia interpored and peace was declared.

The Germans were, as a matter of history, sick of the wer long before it had run its course.

The Danes had so complicated their trade and so freely captured their merchant ships

trun its course.

The Danes had so compileated their trade and so freely captured their merchant ships that an immense loss had been inflicted.

Thus, through the existence of a fleet that could not be opposed the Danes remained secure in their Islands, and during two campaigns defled the incomparably superior military force of Germany.

The second war illustrates not the help that the "command of the sea" gives the weaker military Power, but the terrific force it adds to the stronger.

This is our American Civil War.

The usual explanation is that the North overcame the South by the superior numbers of its armies.

But this is less than half the truth. The South was beaten because it had no fleet, and the North commanded the rea.

The conquest of the Mississippi by Farragut and Foote cut the Confederacy in two and deprived its eastern half of the resources of the States west of the river.

After Grant defeated the Confederate Army at Chattanooga, Sherman was left free, in 1864, to push into the heart of the Southern States.

This great raid was possible only because Sherman was certain when he reached the sea to find the Federal fleet, from which he could depend as a sure base when he advanced northward parallel with the coast.

This decisive military blow of the war was due to the existence and support of a fleet.

SOUTHERN COAST BLOCKADE.

What is more. Grant, during his campaigns against Lee, was supplied by sea and had a sea base to rest on.

Even all this would, however, have led to no fimil result had it not been for the blockade of the Confederate coasts.

By closing the sea to the South the Northern fleet starved the Confederacy, cut off its military supplies, and made it a prev to the Northern armies.

When Lee surrendered he had to ask for rations from his captors.

In commenting on these conditions of the great struggle Wilkinson writes:

"It of two states at war having a sea coast one has and the other has not a force of fighting ships the one which has the ships will be able to move troops freely by sea and to land them pretty much where it pleases on the enemy's coast.

"It can blockade hostile ports, and if the enemy be dependent upon sea traffic it may, by preventing this, inflict damage to any extent, amounting in the extreme case, as it did in the American Civil War, to ruin.

"These wars illustrate some of the natural laws governing the operations of force in the conflict of nations.

"It is not meant, for example, that a nation can be struck down and compelled to unconditional surrender by fleets alone.

"Before submission can be forced its armies must be defeated.

"But every civilized nation is so dependent for its wealth and supplies upon its export of and import that its armies will be paralyzed if the avenues of export and import can length the public mind.

They need no further comment than to recall the dominating influence exerted by navies in the Chinese-Japanese War and in the Spanish-American conflict.

It cannot be insisted upon too often that "SOUTHERN COAST BLOCKADE.

I NEVER DISAPPOINT



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1 Cure Stricture Without the Knife or Bougle.
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the creation of material and the organization of personnel must never be postponed until the hour of impending hostilities.

Nowhere can final efficiency be attained in such an equal degree as upon the high seas, under circumstances as analogous to those of war as the opportunities of peace permit. This preparation must be of two kinais, offensive and defensive.

It is a vital truth that a purely defensive war invites defent and that an offensive demonstration off the thresholds of the enemy constitutes the best defense of the home littorals.

The local defense of the shore in its restricted and popular sense is strategically a secondary problem that may well be and should be worked out during the summer in combined drills with the army.

In winter the wind and weather of the northern seaboard are too rigorous to get the best out of such essays.

This is the senson when the southern defenses should be tested and when the mavy can be most profitably employed with its own problems.

The Caribbean Sea, where the present mobilization has been ordered, is an ideal

singe, which is the main route of traffic to Europe, and the second by its wardership over the Windward Passage.

This route opens a broad channelway to and from North American ports, and is the strategic center of the West Indies.

A thorough study of these regions and of the lines of communication extending from

strategic center of the West Indies.

A thorough study of these regions and of the lines of communication extending from the mouths of the Mississippi, from Central and South America and from North America and from North America and from North America and from North America and Europe and converging upon the entrance to the Isthmus Canal is a duty of the first importance for the American fleet.

The possibilities of Porte Rico Into strategic sense are not great, but in Cuba and Jamalca we find strategic bases upon which depends the control of the zone where the great sea battle of the future must be fought to its finish.

To us Cuba is of the greatest importance as a primary base of operations.

The three hundred miles of land barrier reared by Ireland against attack upon the Atlantic approaches to Great Britain are hardly less vital to the security of the great sea power than is to us this chain of islands, particularly the great sweep and fretted coasts of Cuba.

POWERS WEIGH POSSIBILITIES.

POWERS WEIGH POSSIBILITIES.

And it is here that our winter work must be insistent, eager and enduring. But despite all the eagerness inspired by the worthiness of the game, the tasks set should be thorough and progressive. All the sea powers, notably Great Britain, are keen in a desire to discover the stra-

set should be thorough and progressive.
All the sea powers notably Great Britain, are keen in a desire to discover the strategic possibilities of the waters in which their feets must meet an enemy and upon which their national salvation depends. To illustrate the extent of these yearly programmes let the British maneuvers of 1961 be employed.

These exercises took place in the waters west of England and Scotland and in and around Ireland.

The principal effort was directed toward an examination of certain accepted theories of securing information by a fleet composed of vessels of all classes, so that the "command of the sea" may be sought with more than reasonable prospects of success.

This command of the sea, so often used, means, in plainer language, the endeavor to inflict a crushing defeat upon the main line of the enemy, to shut in port his broken squadrons and to clear the seas of his torpedo craft cruisers and raiders.

Other questions to be investigated were the most suitable distances at which a temporary base for a squadron watching a hostile port may be fixed and the ability which cruisers may or may not possess in hunting down and driving torpedo craft into harbor.

MAGNITUDE OF OPERATIONS. MAGNITUDE OF OPERATIONS.

It may give some idea of the magnitude of these operations to state that in the two opposing fleets twenty-five battleships, twenty-six crusers, twenty-five publicates and fifty torpedo craft were assembled. It may not be amiss furthermore to set down the rules by which this war game in the open was played.

The zone of the maneuvers were rigorously defined and the period of hostilities fixed. No vessel of any class was allowed to put to sea at least ten days before the hour named for the beginning of hostilities, and battleships arriving at a base of supply

named for the beginning of hostilities, and battleships arriving at a base of supply had to coal before going to sea again.

No rules were formulated under which ships could be put out of action, each case being decided by the umpires on its merits and on assumptions as similar as possible to those of war.

Every battleship was assumed to be the equal in fighting power of the flagship of the attacking fleet.

When two or more ships engaged the beginning of the action was indicated by the firing of one gun by one of the vessels. During the duel or battle signal guns were fired at five minute intervals by one ship on each side.

When any captain thought he was victorious he signaled, "Propose reference to umpires."

If this reference was accented the action

When any captain thought he was victorious he signaled, "Propose reference to unpires."

If this reference was accepted the action ceased: if not it was continued for a reasonable time, which was determined by the senior officer present.

Under ordinary circumstances one hour was considered a reasonable time in the case of battleships, cruisers and torpedo gunboats, and half an hour in that of destroyers and torpedo boats.

When the proposed reference to umpires had been settled it was the duty of the senior officer to select which ships on either side should proceed to port to await the final decision, the selection being made as far as possible equally from both sides.

Pending this these ships were deemed to be out of action.

When a ship was undoubtedly torpedoed or manifestly overpowered by a superfor force the senior officer present could put her out of action temporarily and order her into port to await the action of the umpires.

In such cases the detained ship took no further part in the maneuvers, and while proceeding to the chosen port had to follow, if possible, a route clear of the zone operations.

Colliers could not be interfered with after

8½ HOURS TO

stations were not open to attack by landing parties.

These maneuvers proved to be of exceptional value.

SEA PRACTICE IS NECESSARY. It has been shown beyond doubt that suforce, and that a theoretical study of such tactics amounts to nothing compared with

force, and that a theoretical study of sact tactics amounts to nothing compared with what practice at sea can teach.

Fixed periods for the duration of hostilities are shown to be so much a poor substitute for war conditions as to constitute a serious disadvantage.

It is true that maneuvers are too costly, especially in coal consumption, to warrant a long period, but as a compensation of these maneuvers puts it: "It is not expedient to encourage Admirals to dawdie over the maneuvers."

If an Admiral knows his coal will last as long as the period fixed it is not unlikely that he will keep at sea to the last moment, finding himself when the mimic war is over with just coal enough to take him to the nearest port.

This is neither manificent nor is it war, as the relation of coal endurance to the source of supply governs all fleet dispositions.

Of all the results none has been more

as the relation of coal endurance to the source of supply governs all fleet dispositions.

Of all the results none has been more convincing than those secured in scouting and searching experiments.

Prompt information is of the first importance, because it will prevent Commanders-in-Chief playing at cross-purposes, misinterpreting motives and movements and taking immense pains to avoid contingencies and conflicts that never threaten.

Experimental and systematic scouting is therefore a vital necessity of all fleet maneuvers, and skill in it cannot come by the light of nature, but must be the result of persistent training.

A feature of special interest in the Carthbean maneuvers is the association of a division of torpedo boats with the battle fleets.


The employment of this type in its legitimate duties, and not as dispatch boats or videttes, offers a chance for valuable training to the officers assigned to this work.

Unfortunately, this country is as yet without a special scouting class, and the regular exploitation of this field of action by special types must be denied.

But when, in two years, the navy is ready to engage in the broad schemes of maneuvers that are pursued so intelligently, zealously and systematically by the other great sea Powers some examples of this valuable class will doubtless be available.

STRENGTH

Is an attribute of manhood universally desired. Few people understand that the only source of physical strength is food, and that every one who has sufficient nourishing food should be strong. But there are thousands of puny people who have plenty of good food. How is that explained? The explanation is



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tion and assimilation of food and thus it makes men and women strong.

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