



WASHINGTON, SUNDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1902.


MIMIC NAVAL WARFARE IN THE CARIBBEAN SEA




THE ILLINOIS.




THE MASSACHUSETTS.





THE MAYFLOWER.



ADMIRAL DEWEY AND HIS STAFF.



THE KEARSARGE.



ness" requisite to an efficient navy. They stood the fire creditably.

Coal Strike a Factor.

Incidentally the coal strike for a moment presented a problem. Would the navy be able to get the great amount of coal needed? But far-seeing minds had provided for just such a contingency as arose as the result of the long-continued tie-up in the anthracite region, which naturally created a stringency in the bituminous market, on which the navy depends for fuel. Immense supplies had been made available in the West Indies—enough for any kind of a campaign.

Finally the warships rendezvoused. The North Atlantic squadron gathered, pursuant to orders, in Hampton Roads. The European and South Atlantic Squadrons combined in the Gulf of Paria, off the coast of Venezuela, under the command of Rear Admiral Sumner, who is Rear Admiral Crowninshield's senior. Then the North Atlantic Squadron sailed for Culebra Island, an important strategic point on the east coast of Porto Rico, within sight of the Danish West Indies, which the United States may some day hold—the key to the Caribbean. Then began the search problem.

"War" in Time of Peace.

This was concluded last week. It was about as near war as it is possible to come in time of peace. Rear Admiral Sumner's squadron represented an enemy, endeavoring to establish a base of operation in our important possession, Porto Rico, intending from there to conduct another naval campaign against the coast of the United States. Rear Admiral Higginson's fleet represented just what it was—a United States naval force guarding Porto Rico from the attempted blow—and the war game took its name, "search problem," from the fact that the enemy was constantly searching to make a landing, while the defending fleet constantly sought to find and destroy the enemy.

This war game was the test of the practical application of the principles of naval warfare already known to officers and men. From now on the watchword in Admiral Dewey's fleet will be "detect." Admiral Dewey did not command the fleet during the search problem. He arrived at Culebra only last week. But now that the search problem is past

with all its picturesque features, he will be commander-in-chief of the fleet and with his staff will direct all its movements.

The Staff.

And it is an able staff that will advise him on the trim flagship Mayflower. The chief-of-staff is Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor, chief of the Bureau of Navigation, one of the brainiest officers in the service, and who in the general board is Admiral Dewey's right hand man. Then there is Capt. J. E. Pillsbury who, as commander of the White, or attacking, squadron in the search problem of the northeast coast last year, kept Admiral Higginson guessing as to his whereabouts for four long days. The other members of the staff are Capt. William Swift, who is attached to the general board, and who was one of the arbiters in the war game on the eastern approach to New York between the navy and the coast defenses. Lastly there is Admiral Dewey's aide, Commander Nathan Sargent. Every man is a capable officer, possessed of a splendid record and thoroughly cognizant of the needs of the navy.

The waters of Porto Rico will now be the scene of more elaborate schooling than was ever before given officers and men in the United States Navy. The war game was the exposition of what was already known. Now there will be instruction in details. Until Christmas time there will be rigorous drill with the boats. Landing parties will be sent again and again toward the shores of Culebra, defended by a garrison of ready marines. This will be continued until

everything in this line goes like clockwork.

Target Practice.

There will be target practice. Of course that can be conducted at any time. It is not necessary to gather a fleet to engage in gun exercise, but the rivalry that is aroused on such occasions is so healthful that it cannot be ignored. Every variety of ship drill will be followed out until the utmost proficiency possible is attained.

The fleet will steam back and forth through the tropical waters in every kind of fleet and squadron formation. The larger the fleet engaged the more extensive the problems opened up. Signal practice will be extensive. New systems will be tried, including the heliograph. It is a source of regret that wireless telegraphy could not be employed at this time. But the progress in tests was not rapid enough to warrant installation now.

The torpedo flotilla will co-operate with the fleet in the exercises. The efficiency of these craft has long been a subject of naval controversy. The utility of the rakish, speedy little boats will be tested both as regards their ability to defend harbors and as dispatch boats and coast scouts for the fleet.

Liberty at Christmas.

The maneuvers are far removed from the character of a junket. The naval contingent—officers from Admiral down to midshipmen, and enlisted men of every grade will have to work harder than they probably ever have had to since the Spanish-American war. Realizing the rigors of the work the Navy Department at the suggestion of Admiral

Dewey has decided the men shall have plenty of liberty at Christmas time. Just before Christmas the fleet will disband, the ships will distribute themselves at various ports in the West Indies where there will be plenty of relaxation for both officers and men.

While the naval maneuvers were in progress last summer "Mr. Dooley" the philosopher, familiar to Sunday newspaper readers, replied to the query of his friend Hennessy as to who won in the war game, "I don't know who won, but I know who lost—the Treasury."

"Mr. Dooley" Refuted.

Mr. Moody, Secretary of the Navy, one of the strongest advocates of the maneuvers, denies "Mr. Dooley's" assertion by showing figures which prove that it costs little more to conduct maneuvers than it does to maintain the fleet regularly, and that the increase of cost is far less than commensurate with the benefits derived. He directed every commanding officer and every chief of a bureau to submit a report as to the additional cost of the summer maneuvers, and the increase was seen to be very small. From Mr. Moody's figures it is easily seen that it costs little more for ships to cruise in fleets than singly, little more for target practice in squadrons than individually.

The great good which it is expected will be derived from the maneuvers is that the navy will have put into practical application the theories it has always had for the rapid assembling of naval forces in time of war. The impracticable features will be thrown out. Better ones will be substituted. What is hard this year will be easier next, and the year after that it will be a mere matter of routine.

NEVER has a great naval power—and the United States fought its way into that category during the Spanish-American war—assembled in time of peace such a great proportion of its navy as has this country for the maneuvers now in progress in the Caribbean Sea. Admiral Dewey's four-starred flag is set at the masthead of the Mayflower, and under his command for six weeks, over fifty warships will be engaged in practical battle exercises, squadron maneuvers, target practice and fleet drill.

In February the work will have been done. The ships will have dispersed to different parts of the globe. Much powder will have been burned, the hulls of the warcraft will be foul, officers will be worn from constant duty, bluejackets will be weary. But unless the opinions of the foremost naval strategists and theorists, and the level-headed, business-like Secretary of the Navy are far wrong, the navy will have benefited much, the lesson taught will be one not easily forgotten, and one invaluable in event of war.

"Preparedness."

Next to national courage and national readiness to strike for the right, "preparedness" is the most potent factor in the growth of a nation; and the surest guarantee that it will maintain its prestige.

"Preparedness" is the keynote of the maneuvers now holding the attention of

naval experts of all nations. Before the Spanish-American war there was in the United States Navy no such keenness as exists now. Fleet drills were indulged in, but the United States trailed far behind other nations in naval progress. Herculean efforts were required to get together the fleet that captured Cervera. There was "preparedness," but it was not much more than enough to cope with a weak naval power like Spain.

The officers who administer the affairs of the Navy Department today, like expert chess players, are thinking two or three moves ahead. First of all, they know that if the United States gets into a war with any foreign power—and most foreign powers have larger navies than ours—the Caribbean will be the scene of battle. Hence it is highly desirable that our fleets should practice on the ground where they may fight. The most likely cause of conflict with European nations would be through their treading on the principles of the Monroe Doctrine by attempting acquisition of territory in the Western Hemisphere. To any such move the United States would protest by a naval demonstration in the Caribbean. Should war come the foe would undoubtedly send its strongest fleet against the Atlantic coast of the United States.

Squadrons Brought Together.

While the North Atlantic Squadron is a powerful fleet, it would be necessary to strengthen it. So the first move in

the maneuvers was to bring into them all the ships of the North Atlantic Squadron, commanded by Rear Admiral Higginson; those of the South Atlantic Squadron, commanded by Rear Admiral Sumner, and those of the European Squadron, under command of Rear Admiral Crowninshield. Added to these were numerous colliers, supply and repair vessels, tugs and coal barges, and last but not least the "mosquito fleet" of torpedo boats, six in number, under command of Lieut. Lloyd Chandler, a total of upward of fifty ships. The mighty force represents all the navy except the Asiatic and Pacific squadrons and those ships out of commission.

Hard Work Needed.

To bring all the ships together the Navy Department had to exert its utmost efforts for months. Immediately after the summer maneuvers on the North Atlantic coast in which, however, only the North Atlantic Squadron was engaged, all the ships that needed repairs were thoroughly overhauled, so that they would be easily able to stand the wear and tear of prolonged mimic campaigning. This strained the resources of the navy yards. It was no easy problem to get the vast amount of labor needed, nor to provide at short notice the material required. Thus the auxiliaries to the fleet were put to the test. They were compelled to show whether they possessed the "prepared-