

FPL-10/115-3(15)/(11)

Serial 01107

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
4 June 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PARCHE Report of
First War Patrol.

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

CONSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 437
U.S.S. PARCHE - FIRST WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of First War Patrol.
(29 March to 23 May 1944).

1. The first war patrol of the PARCHE was conducted in the areas south of Formosa. The PARCHE was one of three submarines forming a coordinated attack group.

2. The PARCHE conducted very aggressive attacks on two convoys which resulted in inflicting severe damage to the enemy. The results of the first attack on the first convoy contacted, using Mark 18 torpedoes, were unobserved by the PARCHE; however, both the U.S.S. BANG (SS385) and the U.S.S. TINOSA (SS283) saw this ship sink. Two attacks were made on the second convoy at night and three ships were sunk as a result thereof.

3. The remarks made concerning coordinated attack group doctrine are of note and are concurred in.

4. This patrol is designated as successful for Combat Insignia Award.

5. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew for this very aggressive and successful war patrol. The handling of coordinated attacks by Captain G. E. Peterson, embarked in PARCHE, was splendid and furnishes a perfect example of the manner in which such attacks should be made. The PARCHE is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy:

S U N K

1 - Freighter (class unknown)	- 6,500 tons (Attack No. 1)
1 - Freighter (RYUYO MARU class)	- 6,700 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Freighter (GNOA MARU class)	- 6,800 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Transport (HAKONE MARU class)	- 10,400 tons (Attack No. 3)

TOTAL - 30,400 tons

Distribution and authentication
on following page

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

Serial 041

Care of Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, California,
26 May, 1944.CONFIDENTIALSECOND ENDORSEMENT to
CO PARCHE Conf. Ltr.
CS384/A16-3 Serial 37
dated 23 May 1944.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of War Patrol Number One.

1. The remarks of Commander Submarine Division 202 are complete and fully concurred in.
2. The Group Commander, Commanding Officer, officers and crew of PARCHE are congratulated on an exceptionally well conducted patrol and for the serious damage they inflicted on the enemy. The coordination of, and mutual assistance given by this attack group reflects great credit on the Group Commander as well as all his Captains.


LEO L. PACE.

Copy to:

CSD-202
CO PARCHE

FF12-10/A16-3(15)/(12)

Serial 01107

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
4 June 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

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TOTAL - 30,400 tons

Distribution and authentication
on following page

C. A. LOCKWOOD, Jr.

SUBMARINE DIVISION TWO HUNDRED TWO

FB5/202/A16-3

Serial 028

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
24 May 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
C.O. USS PARCHE Conf.
ltr. SS384/A16-3
Serial (37) dated 5/23/44.

From: The Commander Submarine Division TWO HUNDRED TWO.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Squadron TWENTY.
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of War Patrol Number One.

1. This patrol covered a period of 55 days of which 30 days were spent in the assigned area. It was terminated in accordance with the operation order. PARCHE was a member of an attack group consisting of two other submarines, BANG and TINOSA. Although this was the first patrol for the PARCHE, the skill of a veteran Commanding Officer is evident in the highly proficient manner in which the attacks were conducted.

2. ATTACK NUMBER ONE.

A daylight periscope attack was made on a ten ship, 10½ knot convoy and two Mark 18 torpedoes were fired from the stern tubes at each of two medium freighters at ranges of 1750 and 2250 yards and tracks varying between 72 and 94 degrees. Either the firing took place on a knuckle or the submarine was detected, as the convoy was observed to turn away on signal before the torpedoes reached their destination. One hit was heard but observation of the damage was prevented by escorting aircraft which subsequently dropped a stick of bombs. Fortunately, the sinking of the torpedoed ship was witnessed by the BANG who had surfaced at a distance to draw off the escorts and thus reduce the effectiveness of the anti-submarine measures against the PARCHE.

ATTACK NUMBER TWO.

This was a night surface attack on a six ship 9½ knot convoy. Four torpedoes were fired from the bow tubes at a heavily loaded AK on 95 degree tracks at a range of 1850 yards. Three hits sank the ship in two minutes. Two minutes later the other two forward torpedoes were fired at another heavily loaded AK on 82 degree tracks at 2250 yard range. Both hit and the target sank.

Serial 028

Care of Fleet Post Office;
San Francisco, California,
24 May 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of War Patrol Number One.

ATTACK NUMBER THREE.

This was another night surface attack and followed nineteen minutes after attack No. 2. Four torpedoes fired from the bow tubes at 1675 yards range on 110 track resulted in two hits and sank a large AK or AP similar to the HAKONE MARU.

3. It is noted that in the first night attack 5 hits were obtained out of the 6 torpedoes fired from the forward tube nest. It is also noted that in both night attacks a total of 10 torpedoes were fired which resulted in 7 hits and the sinking of three large ships in less than an hour. Such success is not accidental. It indicates careful planning and skillful execution of attacks, aided by a well coordinated and highly efficient organization.

4. Attention is invited to the remarks under section (U) regarding the employment of "wolf packs". In addition to those mentioned, there are other considerations which seem to render it desirable to continue the practice of sending out these organized attack groups. It is understood that the size of the Japanese convoys is increasing. It follows that, as the convoy size increases, the sailings or number of convoys decreases. This makes it even more vital to locate those which are at sea and this task can better be accomplished by several submarines cooperating as a unit. An additional advantage lies in the weakening of the anti-submarine measures on the part of the convoy escorts. If an attack by several submarines is known or suspected the Japanese are less apt to detach escorts for "hold down" tactics. This often permits repeated attacks by the same submarine which was the case with the PARCHE.

5. The PARCHE arrived in good material condition and the refit will be accomplished by the U.S.S. PROTEUS in the usual period. It is planned to improve the unsatisfactory ventilation by the installation of a cooling unit and booster blower in the forward ventilation supply line in the control room.

6. The Commanding Officer, officers and crew are heartily congratulated on an outstanding patrol and for inflicting heavy damage to the enemy as follows:

	<u>SUNK</u>	
1 AK - Unidentified		6500 tons (Attack No. 1)
1 AK - Similar to RYUYO MARU		6707 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 AK - Similar to GENOA MARU		6785 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 AK or AP - Similar to HAKONE MARU		10,420 tons (Attack No. 3)
TOTAL		30,412 tons

Copy to: PARCHE

[Signature]
L.S. PARKS

SS384/16-3
Serial (37)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384).
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Division 202.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron 20.
(3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(4) The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384), Report of War Patrol No. ONE.

Enclosures: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart.

1. Enclosures (A) and (B), covering the first war patrol of this vessel conducted in the area south of Formosa during the period 29 March 1944 to 23 May 1944, are forwarded herewith.

L. P. Ramage
L. P. RAMAGE.

(A) PROLOGUE

On February 19, 1944 reported for duty in SubPac and departed Balboa, C.Z. Arrived Pearl Harbor March 5, 1944 and was assigned to SubRon FOUR for four days voyage repairs. Training Period March 10-27, 1944. Convoy exercise March 13-14, 1944. Sound tested, not detected. Readiness for sea March 29, 1944.

(B) NARRATIVE

Assigned to Coordinated attack group consisting of TINOSA, PARCHE and BANG, Captain C. S. Peterson, U.S.N.; ComTaskGroup 17.15 in PARCHE. ComTaskFor 17 Operation Order 109-44.

29 March

1600 VW Departed PEARL in company with TINOSA and BANG, under escort until dark.

30 March

-1 April Enroute MIDWAY. Made daily trim dives, held drills, and exercised wolf pack in tactics, communications and frequency shifts. Fired all guns.

2 April

0622 Y Arrived MIDWAY. Topped off with fuel and provisions. O.T.C. held conference of commanding officers. Received Detailed Plan of Coordinated Patrol and Attack for this group.

3 April

1230 Y Departed MIDWAY. Formed column until clear of 30 mile circle, then formed in line, interval 8 miles.

2330 Y

Crossed 180th Meridian.

5-11 April

Enroute area. Held daily drills, training, and dives. Made sight rendezvous daily with TINOSA and BANG at 1800 L.C.T. Exchanged information by visual.

12 April

1700 K Sighted TINOSA, made rendezvous.
1815 K Sighted mast, dead ahead. Went ahead full.
1817 K Sent contact report on Task Group frequency, TINOSA closed.
1840 K Made first run on target (derelict trawler) followed by TINOSA. Expended 3 magazines of 20mm on hulk which was awash, evidently a victim of some other submarine.
1900 K Secured all guns and informed BANG by radio that the show was over.

13 April

0915 K Aircraft radar contacts at 18 and 32 miles. Near contact closed to 14 miles and was then lost, probably heckling one of the other boats.

0930 K Aircraft radar contact at 36 miles, lost at 30 miles.

- 13 April
1130 K Ran through light fog bank 10 miles in diameter, visibility 2000 yards.
1215 K All clear and bright again. SJ picked up Minami Iwo Jima (3180') bearing 346 T, distance 78 miles.
1240 K Aircraft radar contact 18 miles, closed to 10 miles, lost at 18 miles.
- 14 April
0150 I SJ radar contact 340 relative, range 1900 yards and about 30 seconds later it was picked up again at 045 relative, range 1150 yards.
0151 I Dived. Contact had all characteristics of a low flying plane but was neither seen or heard, apparently a boogie of some sort.
0202 I Sound picked up TINOSA, closing on starboard quarter.
0246 I Surfaced, TINOSA having passed well clear - SJ range 9000 yards, still loud and clear on sound.
- 15 April
1055 I Tested F.T.S. while submerged, was not impressed. Nothing was heard on JK/JP nor was it possible to get an echo range with QB/QC.
- 16 April
0700 I Entered area.
1800 I Failed to make scheduled rendezvous with TINOSA and BING.
1830 I Picked up SJ radar interference and changed course to close.
1925 I Made radar contact with TINOSA and BING at 13,500 yards and 11,500 yards respectively.
1950 I Joined the pack and set course for tomorrow's patrol area in accordance with Task Group Commander's Coordinated Plan.
- 17 April
0600 I Dived. Conducted high periscope patrol, listening in 5 minutes every hour on Task Group frequency. Ground in leaky Bow Buoyancy blow valve.
1900 I Surfaced and set course for next patrol station.
- 18 April
0800 I Dived on station, high periscope patrol, guarding Task Group frequency for 5 minutes each hour.
1500 I Picked up sky lookout - Bird (genus: unknown; sex: undetermined; habits: not altogether proper) which took station on #1 periscope, going round and round and up and down, hanging on with dogged determination for over 4 hours.
1900 I Surfaced with our lookout still perched high up on #1 scope.

19 April

- 0610 I Dived on station and patrolled as before.
1930 I Surfaced, flushed out 1/4 F.B.T. and proceeded westward.
2240 I Radar contact, range 38,000 yards, bearing 300 T.
2245 I Went ahead full to investigate. Our position precluded the possibility of land and the range didn't suggest a surface target.
2350 I Had radar pips from 3000-42,000 yards and bearing from 270-300 T — appeared to be over 40 contacts — the pips were positive but not very persistent. The PPI screen gave indications of a rain squall but there wasn't a cloud in the sky. Further investigation proved these to be "second trip" pips caused by echoes from the high mountain peaks on Formosa 70-80 miles distant and well beyond the normal 80,000 yard sweep range. By varying the transmitter pulse rate these "second trip" pips could be moved toward or away from transmitter pulse which distinguished them from the normal echoes.

20 April

- 0155 I Radar contact - TIMOSA bearing 092 T, range 12,500 yards.
00 I Dived on station, continuous high periscope patrol, with 5 minute radio guard each hour as before.
1930 I Surfaced and proceeded south to next assigned station - Still have land pips as before from 2500 yards out to end of range scale - nothing in sight.

21 April

- 0600 I Dived on station.
1930 I Surfaced and proceeded south to next assigned station.

22 April

- 0600 I Dived on station off eastern entrance to BASHI CHANNEL.
1227 I Sighted mast of small boat bearing 300 T, changed course to close.
1305 I Lost sight of mast bearing 327 T.
1930 I Surfaced and proceeded through BASHI Channel.

23 April

- 0600 I Dived on station off western entrance to BASHI Channel.
1940 I Surfaced, proceeded west to next assigned station.
2320 I Radar contact bearing 121 T, range 9700 yards - tracked, identified as BANG.

24 April

- 0020 I Radar contact bearing 358 T, range 9360 yards. Commenced tracking, came to parallel course and increased speed to 14 knots.
- 0040 I Target slowed to about 6 knots and changed course abruptly to the west, range 6500 yards, nothing in sight, evidently one of the other wolves started a run on us.
- 0600 I Dived on station, due south of TAKAO.
- 0701 I Sighted 4-engine bomber (MAVIS) bearing 089 T, distance 10 miles, course 180 T.
- 0852 I Sighted 2-engine bomber (SALLY) bearing 257 T, distance 7 miles, course 200 T.
- 0932 I Sighted seven 2-engine bombers (SALLY) bearing 255 T, distance 7 miles, course 170 T.
- 1155 I Sighted three single float seaplanes (PETE) bearing 120 T, distance 8 miles, course 270 T.
- 1410 I Sighted 4-engine bomber (MAVIS) bearing 268 T, distance 4 miles, course 000 T.
- 1448 I Sighted 4-engine bomber (MAVIS) bearing 035 T, distance 5 miles, course 340 T.
- 1830 I Sighted another MAVIS bearing 259 T, distance 2 miles, course 260 T.
- 1945 I Surfaced and proceeded to next assigned station.

25 April

- 0335 I Sighted light of fishing boat bearing 180 T.
- 0510 I Sighted light of another fishing boat bearing 275 T.
- 0545 I Dived and patrolled as before.
- 1950 I Surfaced and patrolled on station.
- 2045 I Observed searchlight drill at TAKAO which continued for about one hour.
- 2255 I Sighted light of fishing boat bearing 170 T.

26 April

- 0600 I Dived and patrolled as before.
- 0725 I Sighted medium bomber (SALLY) bearing 285 T, distance 8 miles, course 220 T.
- 1950 I Surfaced and proceeded west to next assigned station.

27 April

- 0600 I Dived and conducted continuous periscope patrol as before.
- 0630 I Sighted small sampan setting out fishing nets.
- 1950 I Surfaced and patrolled on station.
- 2124 I Sighted lights of two fishing boats bearing 315 T, distance 5 miles.

28 April

- 0600 I Dived for submerged patrol.
- 1452 I Sighted 4-engine flying boat (MAVIS) bearing 333 T, distance 8 miles, course 260 T.
- 1950 I Surfaced and proceeded south to next patrol area.

File (37)

29 April

Encountered strong tide rips during night.

- 0600 I Dived for submerged patrol.
 0726 I Sighted TILOSA proceeding on a northwesterly course on the surface.
 1950 I Surfaced.
 2020 I Received contact report from BANG giving position of large convoy bearing 175 T, distance 50 miles from us on course 200 T, speed 8 knots.
 2030 I Set course to intercept convoy, making full speed.
 2355 I SJ radar contact: One large ship with escort, range 19,000 yards bearing 145 T. Commenced tracking. Sent contact report to BANG and TILOSA.

April 30

Target tracking on course 220 T, speed 15 knots with escort on starboard quarter. Making end around on starboard flank in order to gain position ahead for attack. Bright half moon to westward.

- 0020 I Sighted second escort ahead of target bearing 100 T, distance 13,000 yards, appeared to be a CHIDORI type torpedo boat patrolling on starboard bow.
 0022 I Changed course to 290 T to open range on escort as we were silhouetted by the moon. He apparently sighted us at the same time and gave chase. It was a close race for awhile, the range slowly opening. We appeared to have about a half-knot speed advantage.
 0046 I Escort gave up chase and we resumed end around, closing target track in order to regain contact which had been lost during chase.
 0230 I SJ radar contact: One small ship bearing 277 T, range 9900 yards, commenced tracking.
 0245 I Target identified to be either one of our submarines or an escort on course 000 T, speed 16 knots.
 0250 I Gave up chase and resumed search to eastward for convoy.
 0322 I Sent message asking other boats to report position and any enemy information. Nothing further had been heard from the BANG since original contact.
 0330 I SJ radar contact: Small ship bearing 135 T, range 12,000 yards.
 0335 I TILOSA reported results of search negative.
 0350 I BANG reported convoy bearing 045 T, distance 27 miles from us on course 160 T, speed 10 knots. Altered course accordingly.
 0355 I Sighted escort vessel bearing 090 T, distance 7000 yards. Plot showed him patrolling on various courses at 14 knots, passed him at 6000 yards.
 0420 I Sighted column of flame in direction of convoy - BANG was evidently attacking.
 0440 I BANG reported having sunk a transport plus 3 other hits.
 0506 I SJ radar contact: Convoy bearing 086 T, ranges from 16,000 - 23,000 yards. Commenced tracking.
 0513 I Counted 10 large ships in convoy. Plot gave course 090 T, speed 8 knots.
 0526 I Dawn commenced to break and it was impossible to gain an attack position from astern on the surface before sunrise so changed course to 160 T and commenced end around.

30 April -----

0530 I BANG, having expended 20 torpedoes, was directed to take position as trailer.

0600 I Convoy appeared to have changed course to 180 T.

0625 I Sighted TIMOSA, closing from westward.

0825 I Closed TIMOSA and informed her we would attack first and directed her to follow.

0838 I With convoy bearing 000 T and tops in sight, dived and commenced approach from ahead.

0919 I Sighted 4-engine flying boat (M.VIS) over convoy which appeared to be zig-zagging about 40 degrees right and left of base course 200 T.

0936 I Sighted 2-engine bomber (MELL) patrolling ahead of convoy.

0947 I Heard 10 distant explosions.

0952 I Heard 5 distant explosions.

0957 I Convoy disposed in line of 3 columns with PARCHE 20 degrees on port bow of center column, range 3000 yards.

1003 I Maneuvered to fire bow tubes at center column and stern tubes at port column. Made ready all tubes.

1007 I Observed convoy had made sharp zig to left to course 170 T putting us in position for stern shots only on starboard column.

1010-11 I Fired four MK 18 torpedoes, two at each of two leading ships in starboard column. They apparently had sighted the periscope in the flat slick sea for at time of firing they hoisted a two pennant signal and commenced turning away.

1013 I No hits observed on either target. Started down to 200 feet to avoid bombing by the aircraft covering convoy.

1014 I Heard heavy explosion 3 min. 55 sec. after firing last torpedo. Believed to be a hit on one of the other ships as all three columns were now overlapping and all four torpedoes were fired directly into this 10 ship convoy.

1018 I Received first stick of aircraft bombs. Others followed together with occasional depth charges during the next hour and a half.

1035 I Heard several sets of high speed screws. Set course 200 T to trail.

1208 I Came to periscope depth and observed smoke of convoy bearing 020 T indicating convoy had reversed course.

1218 I Sighted 2-engine bomber (MELL) bearing 320 T, distance 2 miles, course 220 T.

1413 I Sighted 4-engine flying boat (M.VIS) bearing 080 T, distance 5 miles course 120 T. Smoke still bearing 020 T.

1600 I Heard several distant explosions. Smoke barely visible at 020 T. Changed course to 020 T to maintain contact as convoy still showed no indication of returning to a southerly course.

1615 I Lost sight of smoke.

1940 I Surfaced and proceeded north to regain contact.

2015 I Requested TIMOSA and BANG to report position, results of attacks and information on convoy.

2035 I TIMOSA reported having lost contact after sinking one MK and damaging two others; giving her position to the eastward of us. No dope from the BANG.

30 April

- 2115 I Group Commander ordered a search with PARCHE and BING scouting to west then south and back to eastward, while the TIMOS. went to the east, then south and west.
- 2120 I Sent urgent contact report to ComTaskFor 71 as we were then operating in his areas.
- 2400 I Still no answer or information from the BING.

1 May

- 0346 I BING reported having been held down and depth charged for seven hours by two destroyers and gave sunset position of convoy way to the eastward and on course 035 T. Convoy apparently closed the coast of LUZON and then headed south after dark.
- 0600 I As chances of regaining contact were very remote from present positions during daylight with certain air coverage, Group Commander directed all boats to return to patrol stations if results of search were negative.
- 0704 I Changed course to 015 T heading back to patrol station.
- 0749 I Sighted 2-engine bomber (NELL) bearing 013 T, distance 10 miles, course 200 T. Dived.
- 0846 I Surfaced proceeding north.
- 0915 I Sighted bomber (NELL) bearing 205 T, distance 5 miles, course 070 T. Dived.
- 1103 I Surfaced.
- 1410 I Sighted 4-engine flying boat (MAVIS) bearing 165 T, distance 7 miles, course 000 T. Dived.
- 1550 I Surfaced.
- 2200 I Entered patrol area.

2 May

- 0130 I Group Commander sent despatch changing the day's patrol stations and directed all boats to rendezvous at midnight for further instructions.
- 0135 I Set course for new patrol area.
- 0600 I Dived and commenced submerged patrol on westerly course.
- 1100 I Sighted 4-engine flying boat bearing 066 T, distance 2 miles, course 040 T.
- 0949 I Surfaced and proceeded west on 3 engines for rendezvous.
- 2320 I SJ radar contact on BING.
- 2340 I SJ radar contact on TIMOS.

3 May

- 0001 I Closed BING, shot over line and passed over bottle containing Group Commander's instructions for next day's patrol.
- 0007 I Cleared BING and closed TIMOS.
- 0030 I TIMOS. came alongside and we passed same dope to her using line throwing guns as before.
- 0034 I Cleared TIMOS. and set course 225 T for patrol area.
- 0055 I Received contact report from TIMOS.: 7-ship convoy bearing 330 T, distance 20 miles, course 050 T, speed 8 knots.
- 0721 I Changed course to north to intercept at full speed.
- 0800 I Sighted smoke bearing 000 T, distance 15 miles.

0825 I Tops in sight, commenced end around on starboard flank.
0915 I SD radar contact: Aircraft at 24 miles.
0930 I SD radar contact: Aircraft at 9 and 11 miles.
0933 I SD radar contact: Aircraft at 5 and 10 miles. Dived.
1000 I Convoy moving eastward, planes patrolling in vicinity.
1419 I Surfaced.
1420 I Sighted flying boat (LAVIS) bearing 000 T, distance 6 miles, course 150 T. Dived.
1537 I Surfaced and went ahead full speed to regain contact.
1647 I Sighted smoke bearing 061 T, distance 20 miles.
1700 I Sighted tops of ships and resumed end around.
1750 I Sighted submarine bearing 155 T, distance 10 miles, identified as B.M.G.
1840 I Sighted ship identified as large escort or CHIDORI type torpedo boat, bearing 300 T, distance 10 miles. He gave chase and we took up course 150 T.
1900 I Range was not closing much so began easing back to course 090 T in order to maintain contact with convoy which was on an easterly course.
1940 I Sunset. Escort not gaining nor was he losing. Range about 9 miles.
2008 I Believed escort had lost sight of us. Changed course to 060 T to make radar contact as we had lost sight of smoke at sunset.
205 I Changed course to 045 T.
2051 I SJ radar contact: Convoy bearing 223 T, distance 29,000 yards.
2119 I Changed course to 015 T. Plot shows convoy on northerly course, speed 10 knots.
2200 I Gaining bearing slowly but have bright three-quarter moon.
2300 I Convoy now on course 330 T; the end around is fast becoming a run around.

4 May

0000 I Convoy bearing 190 T, distance 15,000 yards, on course 300 T, speed 10 knots. All zigs have been away from us. Sky becoming overcast, heavy rain storm and lightning to northward.
0016 I Series of distant explosions; one of the other boats evidently attacking.
0022 I SJ radar contact: Small ship bearing 180 T, distance 6600 yards. Sighted escort and avoided by pulling ahead.
0030 I Estimated situation as follows:
1. After 18 hour chase, there was little improvement in our position relative to the convoy.
2. There was no reason to run further to the westward as convoy was due to change course back to the northeastward at anytime to head for T.M.O.
3. Sky was completely overcast overhead with scattered gain squalls to north and south.
Therefore decided to close convoy and make the best of any situation that developed.
0044 I Changed course to 220 T to close for attack. Ahead full speed. Battle stations.
0048 I Sighted convoy of 6 large ships disposed in approximate line of bearing 045-225 T on course 300 T, speed 10 knots. Changed course to 200 T.

4 Day
0052 I Convoy commenced 90 degree right turn bringing all ships into column on course 030 T, putting us slightly on port bow. Changed course to 180 T and crossed ahead of column.

0100 I Commenced swinging to the right and steadied on course for 80° starboard track on leading AK.

0106 I Fired 4 torpedoes at leading AK, and swung slowly to the left to get set up on second AK.

0108 I Fired 2 torpedoes at second AK. Observed 3 hits on first ship which appeared to blow up, break in two and sink almost immediately.

0109 I Swinging full left to bring stern on third and largest AK.

0110 I Observed two hits on second AK which began settling rapidly by the stern. There were numerous explosions during this period, possibly depth charges.

0113 I Was unable to get favorable set up for stern tubes with AK 13 torpedoes as target was zigging wildly and range was opening rapidly. Full left rudder and came around to close range. Various courses and speeds trying to line up target.

0120 I Second target sank and other ships were firing deck guns at random.

0125 I Steadied on course 090 T.

0127 I Fired 4 torpedoes at largest AK and then commenced swinging left.

0128 I Observed 2 hits; one amidships and one aft blowing out after mast. Target opened up with 20mm down torpedo tracks with fire coming close aboard over our stern.

0130 I Heard numerous depth charges. Target settling by the stern and commencing to list to port, stopped smoking, fires out.

0140 I Observed another submarine on port hand closing for an attack so decided to open out to westward while making reload.

0145 I Steadied on course 270 T and slowed down. Observed 4 pips in target group astern with one escort closing fast from the eastward.

0150 I Pip of our target disappeared from radar at 6000 yards. Target last seen listing heavily to port with deck awash.

0220 I Reversed course to 090 T to close target group.

0225 T About this time heard series of explosions as another boat got in her attack.

0245 I Master gyro compass out of commission.

0255 I BANG reported her attack completed having sunk one AK and one DD.

0303 I SJ radar contact: One ship bearing 060 T, range 13,000 yards. About this time moon broke out from behind the clouds silhouetting us. Sighted escort vessel which turned toward us and commenced closing.

0309 I Changed course to 265 psc. Ahead full to shake escort.

0316 I Range closing so swung around to the south and headed for the darkest rain squall and lost escort.

0330 I Gyro back in commission, headed back to northeastward.

0345 I SJ radar contact: One escort bearing 066 T, distance 9600 yards. Based by astern of this one.

0350 I SJ radar contact: One escort bearing 057 T, range 12,00 yards closing on course 230 T, changed course to 240 T to open out.

0452 I Changed course to 000 T.

- May
- 0515 I Heard another series of explosions, the TINOSA probably attacking.
 - 0524 I Changed course to 030 T.
 - 0540 I SJ radar contact: Small ship bearing 096 T, range 13,000 yards.
 - 0550 I TINOSA reported sinking two MKs and damaging two others, types unknown. This appeared to account for all the convoy with perhaps one exception as far as we could ascertain. This was further substantiated by the fact that all the escorts seemed to be searching the area aimlessly for their ships that were not there.
 - 0550 I Dawn breaking fast with no sign of any ships or smoke of convoy remaining. Dived to avoid detection by the escorts.
 - 0620 I Sunrise, nothing in sight.
 - 0700 I Changed course to 315 T to clear area.
 - 0815 I Japs commenced depth charging area, many heavy reverberating explosions.
 - 1056 I More distant explosions.
 - 1423 I More distant explosions.
 - 2000 I Surfaced and proceeded to northwestward to send despatch.
 - 2025 I Group Commander directed BANG and TINOSA to return home; both having expended all torpedoes.
 - 2345 I Cleared despatch to NPM reporting results of attacks. Changed course to 140 T.
 - 2359 I Sighted light of small fishing boat bearing 200 T, distance 6 miles.

- May
- 0600 I Dived and patrolled on course 090 T about 20 miles south of scene of attack.
 - 0944 I Sighted 4-engine flying boat (MVIS) bearing 020 T, distance 5 miles, circling.
 - 1046 I Sighted 2-engine bomber (WELL) bearing 000 T, distance 3 miles, circling.
 - 2000 I Surfaced on course 090 T, speed 5 knots.
 - 2113 I SJ radar contact: Small ship bearing 337 T, distance 21,000 yards. Commenced tracking, changed course to 330 T.
 - 2020 I Flot showed course 000 T, speed 14 knots, commenced end around at 12,000 yards.
 - 2100 I Gaining bearing slowly, target zigging 20 degrees right and left of base course 030 T.

- 6 May
- 0001 Dead ahead of target, range 14,000 yards, nothing visible in spite of bright full moon. SJ radar giving indications of interference from sweep type radar.
 - 0010 I Went to battle stations and commenced approach.
 - 0017 I Dived on course 210 T, range 10,000 yards nothing visible yet.
 - 0024 I Closed to 6000 yards. Target pinging and identified as patrol boat or subchaser. Radar had steady interference on target bearing indicating he had stopped sweeping and had picked us up, as we had breached and were at 30 feet with decks awash. Looked like a trap as target had slowed to 8 knots.
 - 0025 I Broke off attack, went to 200 feet and changed course to 140 T. Target continued pinging in our direction.
 - 0115 I Surfaced on course 180 T, speed 15 knots. Target bearing 000 T, distance 12,000 yards, still searching.

6 May
0600 I Dived and patrolled to eastward on course 090 T.
1955 I Surfaced on course 090, speed 5 knots.
2115 I Changed course to 120 T.

7 May
0600 I Dived due south of TILLO and patrolled on course 130 T.
1950 I Surfaced on course 270 T, speed 5 knots.

8 May
0555 I Dived and patrolled to westward.
0615 I Heard several distant explosions.
0710 I More distant explosions, nothing in sight.
1950 I Surfaced on course 270 T, speed 5 knots.

9 May
0245 I Changed course to 340 T.
0600 I Dived on course 070 T.
1950 I Surfaced on course 090 T, speed 10 knots.

10 May
0550 I Dived on course 220 T along northbound traffic lane. No contacts.
1950 I Surfaced on course 180 T.
2100 I Changed course to 110 T, speed 10 knots, full moon.

11 May
0545 I Dived on course 340 T on course normal to BASHI Channel traffic.
1950 I Surfaced on course 090 T, speed 15 knots.
2055 I Changed course to 060 T, proceeding through BASHI Channel.
2220 I Sighted lights of 3 fishing boats well to the northward.

12 May
0300 I Cleared BASHI Channel, changed course to 000 T, speed 5 knots.
0600 I Dived on course 000 T, KOTO SHO, YAMI and NORTH ISLANDS all in sight.
1945 I Surfaced and closed KOTO SHO and then proceeded northward.

13 May
0230 I Changed course to 290 T, speed 10 knots.
0430 I Sighted KASHO TO bearing 254 T, distance 15 miles.
0441 I Sighted KASHO TO Light showing normal characteristics.
0550 I Dived and patrolled to the northward six miles off coast of FORLOS, experienced strong northerly current.
0915 I Sighted one sampan and two small trawlers close in to the beach in vicinity of SANSABA.I.
1945 I Surfaced off KALAKO on course 090 T, speed 10 knots.

14 May
0600 I Changed course to 000 T to reconnoiter YAKE YAMA RETTO.
0635 I Sighted IRIO KOTE JIMA and ISHI GAKI JIMA bearing 340-350 T, distance 30 miles.
0945 I Sighted 2-engine patrol plane over ISHI GAKI JIMA. Dived and continued to close islands.
1140 I Sighted two fighter planes over island.
Throughout the entire afternoon there was continuous air activity over ISHI GAKI JIMA including bombing practice. Several large buildings possibly hangars are located about a mile north of the village of OHAMA. Planes were continually circling over this area but none were seen to land or take off indicating that the landing field is probably on the high ground about a mile farther to the north. Two radio towers were observed at Lat. 24°19'50" North: Long 124°10'00" East. Considerable truck traffic was noted along the dusty dirt roads. Photographs were taken of the entire area.
1945 I Surfaced on course 135 T, speed 10 knots.
2200 I Changed course to 105 T..

15 May
Patrolling on surface course 105 T, speed 10 knots.

May
0553 I Made trim dive.
0615 I Surfaced on course 120 T.
0700 I Changed course to 070 T.
0900 I Cleared area, speed 15 knots.
1540 I Sighted periscope and shears on horizon bearing 000 T. Identified as one of our submarines.
1700 I Observed submarine had reversed course and was trailing astern.
1750 I Reversed course and exchanged calls with PERCH.
1825 I Resumed course.
2030 I Sent despatch reporting departure from area.
2330 I Received ComSubPac despatch regarding restricted area to be imposed across our return track. Increased speed to 17 knots in order to clear area before bans are effective.

17 May
2330 I Passed between KITA IWO JIMA and IWO JIMA IN KAZAN RETTO.

19 May
1011 K Aircraft radar contact at 8 miles. Dived to 200 ft.
1014 K received one light bomb.
1052 K Surfaced and proceeded as before on course 075 T, speed 17 knots.

19 May
2010 K Sighted enemy trawler bearing 270 relative, range 1000 yards.
2014 K Reversed course to close target. Manned 20mm and 50 cal. guns.
2023 K Opened fire on trawler. Target replied with 25 cal.
2055 K Secured guns after three ineffective runs due to stoppages and poor visibility. The night was so dark that the target could not be seen at 500 yards while firing. This prevented spotting and precluded the use of deck gun. During the firing the trawler got in two good bursts, obtaining numerous hits in superstructure and conning tower fair-water. By the grace of God no casualties resulted.
2100 K Resumed course. It was not practicable to wait until dawn to get this fellow as we were in the area restricted for our surface vessels which we had been ordered to clear by 0600 the following morning. This required our best speed in order to comply.

20 May
0900 K Cleared restricted area and slowed to 15 knots, proceeding to LIDJAY.

22 May
2000 L Sent despatch reporting position and requesting rendezvous.

23 May
1700 L Made trim dive.
1744 K Surfaced and proceeded as before.
2340 K Crossed International Date Line.

25 May
1000 Y Arrived LIDJAY for refit.

(C) WEATHER

The weather was generally excellent throughout the patrol. Winds were light and variable, never exceeding force 4. Haze at sunrise and sunset was normally to be expected. Daytime visibility was unlimited while frequent rain squalls and heavy low clouds were not unusual at night. No difficulty was experienced in obtaining sufficient sights for regular navigational fixes.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

Variable currents were encountered in the major portion of the area, which was to be expected during this period when the monsoons were shifting from the northeast to the southwest. The Kuroshio was not felt until within 40 miles of the eastern coast of Formosa, but within 10 miles of the coast the set was 2.5 knots northward. Southwesterly currents were encountered in the eastern portion of Bashi Channel, while to the west and extending south to Luzon the set was always ENE. Currents in the area south of Formosa Bank and the Pescadores although unpredictable were generally northward. Occasional tide rips and heavy swells were encountered northeast of Pratas Reef.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS:

The only navigational light observed was Kaseho To, which showed normal characteristics.

Case of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
3 March 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
THIRD Report of
Fourth War Patrol.

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

COMSUBPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 631
U.S.S. PARCHE - FOURTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fourth War Patrol
(30 December, 1944, to 20 February, 1945).

1. The fourth war patrol of the PARCHE, under the command of Lieutenant Commander W. W. McGrory, U.S. Navy, was conducted in the Kasei Shoto areas.

2. The PARCHE maintained thorough and aggressive area coverage throughout this patrol. She entered the 100-fathom curve in the vicinity of Haze No on /Mami O Shima to attack a large tanker and a medium freighter, which were apparently at anchor after having sustained previous damage. Two attacks were delivered which resulted in further damage to these ships. In a third attack the PARCHE sank a small AK. The loss of two men overboard, while converting fuel ballast tanks to main ballast tanks while enroute Midway, is most regrettable.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew for this aggressive, successful patrol. The PARCHE is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

S U N K

1 - Small AK (EU) - 2,000 tons (Attack No. 3)

D A M A G E D

* - Large AO (NISSIN MARU Type) (EC) - 8,500 tons (Attack No. 1)
* - Medium AK (EU) - 2,000 tons (Attack No. 2)

TOTAL DAMAGED 10,500 tons

TOTAL SUNK & DAMAGED 12,500 tons

*Ships had been previously damaged.

Authentication & distribution
on following page.

J. H. BROWN, Jr.,
Deputy ComSubPac.

Submarine Squadron FOUR
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

11/wft

FC5-4/A16-3

Serial: 0185

27 February 1945.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS PARCHE (SS384) Report
of Fourth War Patrol.

From: The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, PACIFIC FLEET,
Administration.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks of the Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FIVE.

2. The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR congratulates the Commanding Officer, officers, and crew of the PARCHE upon completion of this aggressive and strenuous patrol and for the losses inflicted upon the enemy.

3. It is recommended that the PARCHE be credited with the following:

<u>SUNK</u>		<u>DAMAGED</u>	
1 AK(EU)	3,000 tons	1 AO(EC)	16,764 tons
		1 AK(EU)	6,250 tons
		Total Damaged	23,014 tons
Total Sunk or Damaged		26,000 tons.	

W. V. O'Regan
W. V. O'REGAN.

BT-45/416-3

Serial (015)

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
25 February 1945.

C-O-M-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to CO PARCHE (SS384)
Conf. ltr. Serial (1), dated 20 Feb. 1945.

From: The Commander, Submarine Division FORTY-FIVE.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander, Submarine Squadron FOUR.
(2) The Commander, Submarine Force, United States Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of War Patrol Number FOUR.

1. The Fourth War Patrol of the U.S.S. PARCHE was conducted in the NANSEI SHOTO Area. The patrol was of fifty-three days duration, thirty days of which were spent in Area.

2. This patrol was characterized by a dearth of suitable torpedo targets, a multitude of aircraft contacts, and extremely poor weather during twenty-six of the thirty days on station. Of eight surface contacts, only four were worthwhile torpedo targets and three of them were aggressively attacked. In contrast, during the same time, thirty-three aircraft contacts were made, consisting of from one to ten planes each. A summary of attacks follows:

3. TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 - 19 January 1945 - This day periscope attack was made on one of two beached targets in NAZE KO. It is outstanding for the fine courage and tactical ability displayed. These targets were cut in and located just inside the ten-fathom curve. The close-in position and fixed axis of the grounded targets necessitated going one mile inside the 100 fathom curve to obtain a satisfactory firing position. All factors were weighed and the routes of three trawlers entering NAZE KO were carefully noted; then after due consideration of the risks involved and full use of all information available the PARCHE went in to press home her attack. From an estimated range of 5500 yards six bow tubes were fired, using three Mark 23 torpedoes and three Mark 14-3As. Due to errors in internal communications only one of the Mark 14-3As was set on low power. This last torpedo of the salvo was definitely a hit. There is some doubt of the previous fives' ability to hit in such shallow water on a run of 6300 yards. It is recommended that credit be given for the last hit as damaging a previously damaged tanker similar to the Nissin Maru Class.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 2 - 19 January 1945 - Five minutes after attack No. 1, the PARCHE had swung to make her stern tubes bear on the second beached ship. Four stern tubes were fired using Mark 18 torpedoes at an estimated range of 4000 yards. Although no hits were visibly observed, the other evidence supports the recommendation that credit be allowed for one hit damaging an already damaged AK, similar to the Sinano Maru. After these attacks the PARCHE surfaced and retired at high speed on the surface.

Serial (015)

Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California,
25 February 1945

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ TO
C) PARCHE Conf. ltr Serial
(1), dated 24 Feb. 1945.

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHEL (SS384) - Report of War Patrol Number FOUR.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3- 7 February 1945 - This was a day periscope attack on a small unescorted freighter. Due to a last minute zig, four stern tubes were fired. One hit was observed and 6½ minutes later the target sank. Credit is recommended for sinking an unidentified AK of approximately 3000 tons.

GUN ATTACK NO 1 - 11 January 1945 - This gun action was attempted against three small cargo vessels (approximately 400 tons) and their five escorts. The decision to break off the action and retire is concurred in.

4. The numerous air contacts coupled with lack of patrol vessels is unusual. The heavy weather or perhaps few valuable targets passing through the Area at that time may explain the paucity of surface escorts. The excellent sound performance is also noted. The maximum JP ranges were 18,000 yards on two trawlers and 25,000 yards on a convoy. One year ago in the same vicinity similar conditions were encountered. In one case a convoy was heard at an estimated range of 40,000 yards with JK projector. The prompt and efficient maneuvers of the five small escorts during the attempted gun attack on 11 January are worthy of note. Three floating mines were encountered and sunk by gunfire.

5. Once again the need for long range torpedoes is indicated. Had there been more ships in NAZE KO during the first two attacks the disadvantages of short range, one speed torpedoes would be even more apparent. Being completely loaded with Mark 23 and/or Mark 18 torpedoes would have necessitated going further into shallow water or missing an opportunity to wreak tremendous damage on the enemy. The number of "sitting duck" attacks is on the increase and they are capable of inflicting tremendous damage with a minimum expenditure of torpedoes. As the Japanese defensive technique improves longer, or else more risky shots are going to be made.

6. The PARCHEL returned to port in excellent material condition and in a good state of cleanliness.

7. The Commander Submarine Division-45 expresses his deep regret and condolences for the two men lost overboard, and congratulates the Commanding Officer, Officers and men for the aggressive and successful war patrol.

E. W. GREENFELL.

SS384/AL6-3
Serial (1)

U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

20 February 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: (1) The Commander Submarine Division FORTY-FIVE.
(2) The Commander Submarine Squadron FOUR.
(3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(4) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U. S. S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of War Patrol Number Four.
Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart.

1. Enclosures (A) and (B), covering the fourth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the Nansei Shoto Area during the period 30 December 1944 to 20 February 1945, are forwarded herewith.

W. W. Mc Crory
W. W. MC CROXY.

U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384)
Report of Fourth War Patrol

SS384/A16-3

Serial (1)

CONFIDENTIAL

(A) PROLOGUE

Arrived Midway, T.H. from Third War Patrol on 2 December 1944. Commenced normal 14 day refit by Submarine Division 241 Relief Crew and Submarine Base, Midway, T.H. The major items of work accomplished were the removal of 2 main engine mufflers, overhaul of 2 main engines, and installation of a new Bendix log master unit.

4-6 December 1944 - Routine docking in ARD-8.

On 11 December 1944, Commander L. P. Ramage, USN, was relieved as Commanding Officer by Lieutenant-Commander W. W. Mc Crory, USN, former Executive Officer.

The following officers were detached: Lieutenant D. H. Green, USN; Ensign R. W. Ashe, USNR; and Ensign J. H. Parks, USN. The following officers reported for duty: Lieutenant R. M. Wright, USN; Lieutenant J. H. Hennessy, Jr., USN; Lieutenant (jg) M. T. Morton, USNR; and Ensign J. M. Holleran, USNR.

On 16 December 1944 completed refit and started 13 days period for post repairs, training, and loading. Sound-tested, made deep dive, and cavitation tests. Total of 9 days underway training with two nights underway exercises.

28-29 December 1944 - Final loading period, loaded 8 Mark 14-3A and 8 Mark 23 torpedoes forward, 8 Mark 18-1 torpedoes aft. Measured at deperming dock.

(B) NARRATIVE

30 Dec.
1400 Y Underway from Submarine Base, Midway, in accordance with CTF 17 Operation Order No. 427-44, for rotating patrol in Nansei Shoto. Escorted by planes until darkness.
1835 Y Made twenty minute trim dive.

31 Dec.
0117 Y Crossed International Date Line. Started the New Year.

1-11 Jan.
Underway for area. Made daily dives, conducted drills and fire control problems enroute.

1 Jan.
2330 M Received orders from ComSubsPac to new patrol station in Nansei Shoto.

Serial (1).

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

3-4 Jan.

Drove through cyclonic storm, force 6 wind and seas, barometer falling to 29.40. Passed through ^{southern} sector of cyclone, center drawing northeastward. Reduced to 4.5 knots on 3 January, still shipping water down conning tower hatch and main induction, reduction gears taking a beating.

5 Jan.

0626 L

Finally back to two-engine speed, one day behind schedule.

1300 L

The attack periscope was frozen solid in train and could not be lowered three feet from the raised position. Was becoming alarmed at the prospect of making the patrol with a raised periscope, when after 6 hours a loose pigtail was found in the panel. Lowered but still frozen in train (See Defects).

2025 K

The barometer had fallen to 29.70 and another storm was coming in from the southwest. Reduced to one-engine speed.

6 Jan.

1515 K

Back to two-engine speed, barometer up to 29.80 and steady but still had a force 4 wind from the southwest.

1600 K

The attack periscope was back in commission after flushing out the lower bearing several times and repacking, although there were still some rough spots in training.

7 Jan.

Heavy wind and seas continued from the west.

2045 K

Sent message to CGC 17.7 giving position and weather report in case we could render services for the next B-29 raid.

8 Jan.

No let-up in the weather.

9 Jan.

150 miles NNE of Chicha Jima, the weather fair though cloudy.

All subsequent times are Item, unless otherwise designated.

0811 I

Submerged to routine torpedoes, which we found was badly needed after 9 days.

1127

Surfaced, with force 4 wind and sea from the southwest, barometer falling.

1540

Passed through dead center of cyclone. Barometer had dropped to 29.50 and steadied, constant rain, visibility about 3000 yards, wind force 5 from the southwest. Just before passing through the center an area of confused sea and surface fog was seen dead ahead. On entering this area, within two minutes we had gone through a breath-taking calm with no rain and improved visibility and then found the wind shifted 180° to NE, still force 5, and the temperature dropped 8°.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 9 Jan.
- 1557 Wonders never cease: SJ radar contact on plane drawing fast across the bow from starboard to port, range 10,500 yards. (AC #1). Could not see him in the terrific rain and did not dive as he gave no evidence of sighting us. Half an hour later had a doubtful SJ contact on what might have been a plane at 13,500 yards.
- 1700 Heard the B-29's strength 3-5. There was an emergency, but no position or definite details were given. Listened on the lifeguard frequency and 500 kes.
- 1815 Intercepted the following fragmentary message, strength four on 500 kes, through Jap jamming: "CQ DE VII Thursday Island BT At three blank blank dot blank 0900 6MT ASREE." Could not evaluate the message but it was unlikely that any surface ship was close enough for us to receive his distress message on 500 kes.
- 2015 Relayed the message to CTG 17.7.

Considering the plane contact at 1557 and the emergency heard at 1700 there was a possibility that the distress message could have come from one of our planes.

- 10 Jan.
- 0320 Received advise from CTG 17.7 that the message was merchant traffic. Freak reception.
- 0400 Discovered the auxiliary generator grounded out. Inspection showed the bottom inspection plate on the brush housing had not been properly secured after routine inspection during the last refit. Water from the bilges had slushed in past the loose plate. Washed out with fresh water, cleaned brushes, installed two lamp banks, and energized field. The armature resistance began increasing from 300,000 ohms. (See Defects).
- 11 Jan.
- 0300 Started converting No. 4 FBT to main ballast.
- 0315 Entered the area at Lat. 27-20 N, Long. 131-00 E. Headed to pass south of Tokuno Shima for assigned station, patrolling on surface across traffic route running east of Nansei Shoto to the Empire.
- 0546 Dived to flush out No. 4 MBT.
- 0614 Surfaced.
- 1555 Very weak interference on the APR at 81 mc, probably on Amami O Shima.
- 1559 Sighted 8 small ships through the periscope, bearing 010T, range 21,000 yards, course 150T, speed 6, apparently headed from Amami O Shima to Daito Jima. Several of them were under sail (SC #1).
- 1600 Commenced closing.
- 1605 Picked up the largest ship at 13,000 yards on SJ. The ships were strung out in column with one maru of about 400 tons patrolling ahead from side to side. There was another maru of about the same size, one lugger, and 5 smaller vessels, one of which had the cut of an SC.

Serial (1)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

11 Jan.

1610 Went to battle stations surface, manning only the rapid-fire guns, and started in for the last ship in column, hoping a situation could be developed wherein we could pick one off by gunfire.

Not so. As soon as we were sighted, one of the smaller vessels, all of which turned out to be escorts, hoisted signals and started sending with his searchlight. All five of them took up line of bearing, capping one another, while the two small marus and the lugger fled to the northeast. A message went out on 500 kcs. at this time. We finally tested out the 1 and 20MMs. in the direction of the escorts, but the Nips came back with such a hail of fire ranging from .25 caliber to something approximating 37MM, that it was evident this was no task for one submarine.

1646 Turned away at full power to the southwest. The escorts chased, making about 12 shots, and continued firing wildly out to 6500 yards. They got one of our 20MM hit with what was probably 37MM. in the deck over the main engine room.

1759 Now being over the horizon, changed course to 300T, and headed for our area. None of the small ships was worthy of torpedoes.

1759 3d contact on Tokuno Shima at 70,000 yards.

1805 Interference and very strong interference on the APR at 147 mcs.

2211 Passed between Tokuno Shima and Okinoyorabu, entering assigned area.

2308 Strong interference on the APR at 300T, 13,000 yards. Probably PUFFER within 10 miles to exit through the channel.

2330 Distant SI interference at 255T, probably SEAFOX or BLUEBACK.

Patrolled east - west across the traffic route between Tokuno and Tori Shima.

12 Jan.

0430 Strong SI interference at 240T. Probably SEAFOX patrolling northwest of Tori Shima.

0600 Interference on the APR at 153 and 87 mcs, probably from the west side of Tokuno Shima and Okinoyorabu, respectively.

No further mention will be made of APR contacts in the narrative unless they are of particular significance. Had continual APR interference throughout the patrol when within 30 miles of the islands. It was noted that some of the land-based radar was secured between about 2300 and 0500, although this was not a routine practice. A complete synopsis of all enemy radar encountered is given in paragraph (U).

0635 Dived. Patrolled east - west 10 miles northwest of Okinoyorabu. Intermittent bombing or distant depth-charging during the day. Had four plane contacts (AC #2-5).

1823 Surfaced. Patrolled southeast of Tori Shima during the night.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

13 Jan.

0640 Submerged, patrolled to the north 12 miles off west coast of Tokuno Shima.
1826 Surfaced.

Not even a sampan sighted in this area in two days. There was no definite air-borne radar at night.

Headed out north of Tori Shima, then to the southwest corner of our area to cover the approaches to Okinawa Jima the next day. Previous contacts indicate traffic west of Tori Shima for Okinawa, this route being used mostly at night.

14 Jan.

0658 Submerged 60 miles NNW of Okinawa, patrolling at 50 feet.
1421 Surfaced. The sea was increasing from the northwest, visibility very poor. Patrolling eastward until contacting Tori Shima, then across the traffic route west of Tori Shima.

15 Jan.

0547 Dived 12 miles west of Okinoyerabu. Patrolled in to 5 miles during the day, running at 55 feet. Force 4 wind and sea from the northwest. Had four aircraft contacts of various types (AO #6-9), probably routine patrols and embryo fliers from the field on Tokuno Shima. Not sighted.

An alarming knock, sounding like distant bombing, had developed in the superstructure, and its frequency had become so great that something had to be done about it, or we could never escape if detected submerged. Determined to be near the forward loading hatch.

1832 Surfaced and headed west to patrol the approach to Naha west of Tori Shima. Wind increased to force 5 from NNW during the night, barometer steady around 29.90.

16 Jan.

Patrolled on the surface 40 miles west of Tori Shima. Heavy winds and seas continued.

0000 Started testing the auxiliary generator. The armature resistance was back to 6 megohms. Test satisfactory.

0630 At daybreak investigated cause for knock in the superstructure. Found the solid athwartships bulkhead forward of the forward loading hatch to port broken loose from its weld to the hull and partly torn, allowing it to buckle in and out.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

- 16 Jan.
1000 Made preparations for cutting away the loose bulkhead with the oxygen-acetylene torch. Secured the oxygen and acetylene bottles in the forward escape trunk, closed the lower hatch, opened the upper, and led out the lines. Put the sea astern and went ahead standard. Even then the decks were pooped continually and it was necessary to form a bucket brigade at the escape trunk drain in the forward room to keep the trunk dry. The First Lieutenant, Lieutenant J. H. Hennessy, Jr., USN, and the leading auxiliaryman, VAN EPEREN, R. J., MMMLC., USN, cut the plate out in about one hour, working under water half the time. They had instructions to jump down the escape trunk and shut the hatch on order from the bridge in case of diving.
- 1217 Just as the job was finished had APR interference at 154 mcs.
1245 Dived for TESS, distance 10 miles, course 000T (AC #10). No indication that he sighted us.
- 1325 Surfaced.
1425 Sighted medium bomber, distance 10 miles, course 220T (AC #11). Did not sight us, so remained on surface.
- 2100 Received orders from ComSubsPac directing change of area.
2110 Headed north, wind and sea continuing force 5 from NNW, barometer steady.
- 17 Jan.
Patrolled on the surface, covering north - south routes to Naha 60 miles west of Yokoate Shima.
- 0943 Interference on the APR at 150 mcs, saturation strength.
0945 Dived and stayed down to routine torpedoes.
1748 Surfaced.
- Patrolled on the surface between Yokoate and Takara Jima.
- 18 Jan.
0559 Dived 10 miles northwest of Takara Jima, closed the anchorage on the north side of the island to 5000 yards, then circled the island at 5 miles to west and south. Depth control was very difficult but had a good look at the island and anchorage. Nothing anchored. There is a lookout station with barracks on the peak and the town of Mayegomori is clearly visible, but nothing of military significance.
- 1848 Surfaced 10 miles south of Takara Jima. Patrolled across routes between Yokoate and Amami O Shima.
- 19 Jan.
The weather improved over night so decided to take a look in Naze Ko.
0548 Dived 10 miles northwest of Naze Ko and started closing to the east.
0732 Sighted EMILY over Amami (AC #12).

19 Jan.
 0756 Rigged ship for silent running, although no patrol craft had been sighted.
 0850 Sighted two tall masts and stack of a ship at the entrance to Naze Ko (SC #2), heading 160T. Continued running east to get a look down the channel between the steep peaks on Ha Zaki and Borose Zaki, at the same time cutting in the anchored maru. The weather was excellent, just a slight swell from the northwest, a glassy sea, and good visibility except for occasional fog patches in the coves on the island.

1111 Changed to southerly course to close the 100 fathom curve. Had had a good look down Naze Ko from 7 miles out, nothing in sight except the anchored AK. Cuts showed her to be just inside the 10 fathom curve and probably anchored forward and aft, as her heading did not vary from 160T. She was an MFM freighter, light, stack height 80 feet, masts 100 feet, counter stern. Kept hoping the ship would swing so we could get a decent long range shot at it from the 100 fathom curve.

1400 1600 yards off the 100 fathom curve got a better look down Naze Ko. Sighted a large empty tanker outlined against the land to the east of the channel, angle on the bow 70 S (SC #3). His characteristics were a straight bow, counter stern, engines aft with two stocky funnels athwartship, and deck houses forward and amidships with goal post masts. Had all the appearances of a new ship, but the paint on the side of his middle deck house had sloughed off, giving a nice point of aim.

There were several factors to be considered before making an attack. To get within decent firing range would mean going about one mile inside the 100 fathom curve. There are coast defense guns reported on both Borose and Ha Zaki and probably an airfield 6 miles from Naze Ko at Okaogi across Amami O Shima, making an attack at about dark imperative if we were to get away on the surface.

1510 JP contact on two sets of fast screws to the north (SC #4).
 1536 Went to battle stations and started closing, thinking they might be escorts coming in for the two anchored ships.
 1605 Identified the two ships as large trawlers and secured from battle stations.
 1607 Headed south to watch their route into Naze Ko. They passed directly through the point chosen for an attack.
 1646 Unfortunately Naze Ko was now enveloped in fog, but kept closing hoping it would lift. There were several sharp tangents on Amami still well lighted by the sun in the west and navigation was no difficulty.
 1650 JP contact on fast screws to starboard. Another large trawler returning to Naze around Suruko Zaki (SC #5).
 1715 Fog lifting, could see both ships again.

Decided to shoot at about 1815, just after sundown, but wanted to be able to get into firing position by 1800 in case the visibility was again reduced. The current had been checked at .35 knots easterly during the morning, but during the late afternoon cuts had shown no set at all.

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

19 Jan.

- 1732 Visibility still good, so made complete circle to left at 40 turns.
1819 In firing position for bow tubes on tanker. The point of aim on the middle deck house of the tanker was clearly visible.
1821-53 On course 163T at 4 knots, estimated range 5500 yards, angle on the bow 75 S, commenced firing bow tubes, three Mark 23's, then three Mark 14's in low power, depth 5 feet on all torpedoes, using TDC, but gyro angles all within .3 of zero.
1822-45 Completed firing forward, coming left at full and standard.
1826 Around to 005T for straight stern shots on AK.

Heard 5 distinct explosions through the hull and on sound as follows:

- 1826-10
1826-17
1826-23
1826-35
1826-43
1827-10 Commenced firing aft, estimated range 4000 yards, angle on the bow 150 P, four Mark 18's, depth set at 2 feet, gyro angles 178 $\frac{1}{2}$, 178 $\frac{1}{2}$, 179, 173. Used $\frac{1}{2}^{\circ}$ spread on last two.
1827-47 Completed firing aft.
1828-50 Observed through the periscope and heard one hit in the tanker (investigation later proved that the torpedomen had by mistake reset tubes 2 and 4 back to high power, accounting for the five early explosions from the bow tubes). The regularity of the first five explosions from the bow tubes indicates that all five torpedoes may have hit the tanker at a range of about 6300 yards, although none of these hits was seen as the set-up was being made on the AK at the time.
1831 Surfaced off Borose Zaki with 1200 lb. blow on 3 air banks, opened the main induction, went all ahead emergency. From the bridge both targets were observed to be enveloped in smoke.
1831-32 The last Mark 18 was seen to explode just short of the AK. Radio reported the Japs transmitting on 500 kcs.

In the noise of surfacing no explosions were heard from the stern tubes, but it was considered more important to surface than wait to observe results. Smoke was observed from the AK both through the periscope and from the bridge. It is believed that either the first or second torpedo hit the target and that the explosions of the two remaining torpedoes on the beach immediately behind the target could not be seen in the growing darkness.

- 1834 Making 18 knots, zigzagging to northwest from Borose Zaki. Expected gun fire any time, but observed none. There was interference on the APR at 81 and 155 mcs, but these frequencies had both been encountered the night before, so felt we were free from aircraft. Just to be sure, checked on the SD occasionally.

P-N-T-I-A-L

A half moon was getting very bright when a cloud came in from the north-west and covered it. Continued to pull clear at full power, passing south of Yokoate and to the west.

Looking back on our get-away, it is apparent that the Japs are poorly organized and defended at Naze. It is doubtful that they even suspected a submarine; more likely they thought it was an air raid. Slowed and patrolled north and west of Tokara Gunto during the night.

Dived 10 miles west of Akuseki Jima, closed and circled to west and north at 6 miles distance.

Sighted 3 trawlers coming out of Akuseki to the southwest. (SC #6). Three miles west of the line between Akuseki and Suwanose, JP picked up screws just to the right of Suwanose. Shortly thereafter pinging was heard in the same direction.

Sighted two PETES circling 10 miles to the east (AC #13).

Suspecting a convoy, increased speed to get between the islands in case the convoy cut back to the west.

Sound had pinging on 3 frequencies, 19.8, 17.4, and 15.9 kcs. The bearing on screws and pinging was drawing to the right fast.

Sighted the tops of four ships, bearing 135T, angle on the bow 90 S, range about 20,000 yards (SC #7). The convoy was smoking heavily and had just come out of a rain squall so details could not be made out well. Could not close for a submerged attack, so went to 300 feet and set speed at 6 knots to round Akuseki to east and south and trail convoy.

Lost pinging at 225T. Plot showed the convoy to be making large zigs on base course 225T, speed about 12 knots. Could not believe coal burners could make that much speed, but the sea was calm, and later developments proved the speed to be 12 knots or more.

Came to course 180T, continuing at 6 knots, opening out from Akuseki to surface.

Surfaced 11 miles south of Akuseki with a half hour of daylight left and a half moon coming out. Had all sorts of interference on the APR.

Went to full speed on base course 225T, patrolling the probable route of the convoy 15 miles on the port flank.

Estimate of the situation: - The convoy had three choices of routes to take at dark: turn southeast to Amami O Shima for the night, continue on base course, or go wide to the west and then southwest to Okinawa. If either of the latter routes were taken the BLUEBACK and SEAFOX to the south could intercept them, so considered that PARCHE should cover the possibility of the convoy turning toward Amami.

Continued on base course 225T at full speed to pass 6 miles south of Yokoate. Did not send contact report to BLUEBACK and SEAFOX for fear of alerting the convoy.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

- 20 Jan.
- 2104 Still no contact, the convoy had continued to southwest or turned west so sent contact report to BLUEBACK and SEAFox, giving base course 225T, speed 10 knots, and stating that PARCHE was covering all circles to Amami. Sending the message proved to be a mistake, for in the light of later developments, it is believed that the convoy upon being alerted, turned back and took advantage of its speed to return to Takara or Akuseki Jima.
- 2122 Six miles south of Yokoate, sighted two low flares bearing 262T. These flares probably came from the convoy, and it was thought at the time signified a change in base course after our transmissions had been heard. The convoy definitely had night air cover because we had several indications of 155 mc radar differing from any other radar in that frequency range we had had before. We also had a new radar at 256 mc and indications of Jap 10 cm radar on the SJ.
- 2135 Came to base course 260T to make contact as soon as possible.
- 2136 Received message from BLUEBACK that she was heading north from west of Tori Shima. The set-up looked good.
- 2145 Received information message from BLUEBACK to SEAFox directing the latter to take position 20 miles to east of BLUEBACK. The situation looked even better now with all three boats closing in in a pincer at the convoy's probable midnight position for 12 knots. PARCHE should have overhauled them anytime unless a drastic change in base course had been made.
- 2205 Sent message to BLUEBACK and SEAFox giving approximate position of flares.
- 2310 Still no contact so changed base course to 240T. The BLUEBACK's position, course, and speed showed her covering any change of course to the west. Knew now that the convoy speed was in excess of 10 knots, but did not inform BLUEBACK and SEAFox for fear of further alerting the convoy.
- 2345 Had SJ interference ahead. Exchanged calls with SEAFox and requested rendezvous.
- 21 Jan.
- 0035 Closed SEAFox and exchanged information by VHF. It was decided that SEAFox would take course 315T, PARCHE course 340T, based on the possibility that the convoy was north and west.
- 0108 Sent message to BLUEBACK giving position of SEAFox and PARCHE, action being taken, and probable convoy speed of 12 knots. No receipt, believe BLUEBACK had been forced down.
- 0111 Very strong interference on the APR at 155 mc. Intermittent indications of lobing. Turned on the SD to check. Plane at 4 miles. Thought this could possibly be the SEAFox. Checked her range on the SJ; 12000 yards. SD contact at 2 miles (AC #14).
- 0112 Dived. Thought this was it if the Jap was any good at all. PARCHE had stayed up for almost constant APR indications ever since entering the area; to have done otherwise would have meant very little area coverage. But there were no bombs, so at
- 0141 Surfaced and continued on course 340T at full speed.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

31 Jan.

0155 In coincidence received ComSubsPac's despatch recommending use of the SD to check for night radar planes before diving on APR indications.
0205 Having received message from BLUEBACK that she had surfaced, sent my message again giving action being taken by SEAFX and PARCHE.

Estimate of the situation: - It was certain that we were near the convoy, but it had either turned back or slipped through to the southwest ahead of PARCHE and behind the BLUEBACK. If it had turned back it was impossible against its speed to make an end around before it returned to Takara. If the convoy had slipped through to the southwest it was possible to overhaul them before daylight for a submerged attack.
0218 Took course 230T at full power. SEAFX took course 210T. Contact was never regained.

0752 Slowed to one-engine speed and headed west, still hopping for smoke.

01 Took base course 045T returning to area.

1226 Sighted two unidentified planes, distant 10 miles, drawing from astern up our port side. (AC #15). Not sighted, but they were getting closer, so at

1134 Dived.

1255 Surfaced, continued on course 045T.

Patrolled between Yakoate and Takara Jima during the night.

22 Jan.

0608 Dived 14 miles NNE of Naze Ko and closed.

0800 Master gyro out of commission. The master unit was checked, but nothing was out of order. Found trouble in motor generator set (See Defects).

1400 Gyro back in use.

Although the visibility in Naze Ko was poor, both ships attacked the 19th were seen to be in approximately the same positions. The AK was listed 10° to port and the outline of the tanker could just barely be made out. It is possible that both of these ships had been previously damaged and were either grounded or undergoing salvage in shoal water. The drafts of both, however, appeared normal for light condition when the attack was made on the 19th.

006 Surfaced 10 miles north of Naze Ko and headed northwest.

119 Sighted exhaust of night search plane drawing forward on port quarter (AC #16).

2220 Dived.

2248 Surfaced.

Patrolled southwest of Yakoate Shima during the night.

Serial (1)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

23 Jan.

0617

Dived 14 miles west of Yakuchi Wan on Amami O Shima. A 3 knot current from the southwest made closing inadvisable.

1231

Sighted FRANCES on course 220T (AC #17).

1826

Surfaced with barometer down to 29.65, wind force 4 from the south.

Barometer levelled at 29.55 and the wind drew through the east to NNE.

Patrolled north to the west of Tokara Gunto.

24 Jan.

0622

Dived 12 miles west of Akuseki and patrolled the route between Akuseki and Takara Jima.

1203

Sighted about 10 medium bombers circling Akuseki, mission undetermined. (AC #18).

1218

Sighted two 4-engine bombers heading south from Akuseki (AC #19). Possibly E-29's. Could not identify as Jap planes.

1843

Surfaced 12 miles north of Takara Jima.

Patrolled west of Takara Jima during the night. Had occasional flashes of distant Jap 10 cm radar on the SJ. An unusual amount of airborne radar indicated the possibility of a convoy coming through.

25 Jan.

0626

Dived between Yokoate and Takara Jima.

0720

Heard the first of several strings of depth charges lasting until about 1130, probably GREENLING.

1847

Surfaced. Patrolled west of the island chain. There was no aircraft activity but had two weak flashes of 10 cm radar about 2300.

26 Jan.

0630

Dived 10 miles south of Taira Shima. Intended patrolling north toward Nakano Shima between Taira and Suwanose Shima but currents proved too strong and unpredictable.

1850

Surfaced and patrolled west during the night, wind and sea from the north, force 4.

27 Jan.

1005

Patrolling on the surface in northwestern part of area. Sank one rusty floating mine with about 40 rounds from the 20MM.

1028

Position: 29 - 34 N, 123 - 32 E. Dived for BETTY at 8 miles (AC #20).

1237

Sighted FRANCES at 5 miles (AC #21).

1611

Surfaced and patrolled to southwest.

2100

Sent PARCHE first to ComSubsPac requesting authority to patrol area to east vacated by GREENLING.

Serial (1)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

27 Jan. Patrolled to southeast passing between Yokoate and Takara Jima.

28 Jan.
0615 Received authority from ComSubsPac to patrol additional area.
0628 Dived 12 miles off Kasari Wan, northeast Amami O Shima.

The Bendix log speed indicator stuck on diving and it was found that due to misalignment in the master unit a pinion gear between the power motor and the speed unit had been stripped.

1849 Surfaced and patrolled north to the east of island chain.

29 Jan.
0735 Patrolled east covering routes from Bungo Suido and Kago Shima to Amami. Dived for unidentified plane closing from 8 miles (AC #22). Visibility was good and it is likely that we were sighted, although the plane did not close. Patrolled to the west at 50 feet.
1511 Surfaced and headed west toward the island chain at two-engine speed.
1755 Sank another floating mine with the 20MM. It was growing dark and the mine was not sighted until it was 200 yards on the port bow. We were zigging directly toward it. Position: 29 - 19 N, 130 - 33 E.
2110 20 miles east of Takara Jima received message from TRIGGER giving southerly course and speed of 9 knots for convoy she had sighted south of Bungo Suido at 0230 this morning.
2154 Reversed course to east.
2230 Received amplifying report from TRIGGER, via ComSubsPac, giving TRIGGER's position to south of the probable position of the convoy and searching on course 255T.
2232 Sent message to TRIGGER giving PARCHE's position, course 160, speed 18.

We could contact the convoy one hour before it reached Kikai Jima in case it made a landfall on Amami O Shima. However, the seas were increasing from the south and there was a steady downpour of rain so that it was unlikely that the convoy would head for Amami.

30 Jan.
0140 Passed 10 miles east of Kikai Jima.

Continued south for 30 miles, then reversed search to the north.
0621 Dived 10 miles east of Kikai Jima, wind and sea now force 5 from the east, rain continuing, barometer at 29.70. Patrolled north at 60 feet.
1700 Bendix log back in full commission.
1815 Surfaced, wind and sea continuing but shifted to northeast.

Had rolled as much as 20° at 100 feet today and had SJ echoes on waves out to 10,000 yards on surfacing.

Patrolled east and then west toward Akusaki Jima.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

31 Jan.

0650 Dived 13 miles southeast of Akuseki Jima.

Sighted a total of 6 planes (AC #23-26) during the afternoon around Akuseki, the second day numerous aircraft had been sighted in this vicinity. The significance is not apparent, since neither time did they precede convoys. It is possible that bombing practice is conducted on the island.

1837 Surfaced. Patrolled east of Akuseki Jima during the night.

1 Feb.

0622 Dived 12 miles east of Suwanose Shima.

1839 Surfaced. Rain, heavy wind, and sea from the northeast.

1940 Exchanged calls with JALLAO enroute area.

Patrolled toward eastern part of the area during the night, riding out another storm from the north.

2 Feb.

0028 Exchanged calls with BARB departing area.

Patrolled on the surface during the day in northeastern corner of the area. Visibility good, but heavy wind and seas continued from the north. Patrolled back toward Tokara Gunto at sundown.

1700 Test fired 40MM. Found the pawl engaging the star wheel was frozen due to corrosion.

1830 Exchanged recognition and calls with SUNFISH entering area.

3 Feb.

0628 Dived 15 miles off Suwanose Shima. Patrolled at 60 feet but depth control was difficult.

For the third day sighted numerous aircraft in the vicinity (AC #27-29). Several of them being low-flying float type planes would indicate an anti-submarine sweep ahead of a convoy, but it was doubtful that a convoy would run in such heavy weather.

1840 Surfaced, force 5 wind and sea continuing from the north.

2300 Had SJ interference bearing 090T, but could not exchange recognition.

Patrolled west during the night passing north of Takara Jima.

4 Feb.

Patrolled on the surface 40 miles west of Tokara Gunto. Heavy weather continued from the north. Intermittent rain, temperature 45°.

2358 Dived for two medium bombers crossing our track from the north at 15 miles (AC #30). Do not believe we were sighted.

1607 Surfaced, weather greatly improved.

324/A16-3
Serial (1)

U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fourth War Patrol.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

4 Feb.

1700 40MM test fired satisfactorily after changing automatic loader and rammer tray. Patrolled west of the island chain.

5 Feb.

0611 Dived 12 miles west of Yokoate Shima.
1015 Sighted 8 fighter planes going south (AC #31).
1842 Surfaced.

Patrolled west, then back toward Amami O Shima.

6 Feb.

0645 Dived 20 miles west of Yakiuchi Wan, southwestern Amami. Closed the island to 10 miles.
0745 Sighted one low-winged fighter headed south (AC #32).
1415 Sighted unidentified planes going north (AC #33).
1831 Surfaced in heavy rain and increasing wind and seas from the north.

Patrolled west, east, then northeast on a line between Yokoate and Amami.

7 Feb.

0632 Just prior to diving 18 miles north of Sandon Rocks had SJ contact on a single ship at 020T, range 13,950 yards (SC #8). The weather was from 320T, wind force 5, seas 10-12 feet, continual drizzle, barometer at 29.40.
0634 Started tracking target on southerly courses, determined base course to be 190T, speed 5 knots.
0702 Went to battle stations submerged.
0738 With the range at 11,000 yards, there was a break in the rain to the north and the target was sighted. Looked to be a minesweeper or small freighter, smoking heavily, angle on the bow 10 P.
0740 Dived and commenced pulling into the sea across the target's bow to insure shots down sea. Target had zigged from 200T to 160T to 210T when first contacted but soon settled down to small zigs of 10-15°.

Roughly checked the target's masthead height at 62 feet from the generated range shortly after diving. Raised this estimate to 70 feet later to make range check with observed bearings.

0810 Target zigged left giving an angle on the bow of 10 S. Played his star board bow from here in to be certain of shooting with the sea.
0823 Sound made contact at a range of 3200 yards. Turn count was checked at 90 RPM.
0831 With the range at 1800 yards and getting in position to fire the bow tubes on a starboard track, the target zigged 15° toward.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

7 Feb.

0833 Started swinging left for straight stern shots.

The target was seen to be a small LFM freighter with high masts and funnel, two well decks, raised forecastle, after deck house, and counter stern. The bridge was quite large with the Japanese flag painted on the wing and just above the flag the numerals 657. Two new trucks were loaded on the forward well deck.

0837-02 On course 300T, commenced firing aft, 4 Mark 18's set at 2 foot, range 1050 yards, track angle 90 S, target speed 5 knots. Fired 2 torpedoes to hit, one ahead, one astern.

0837-39 Completed firing aft.

0838-32 Heard and observed one hit about 75 feet inside the stern. The target turning toward, oddly listing to port, her stern already under.

As the freighter continued sinking by the stern, Japs were abandoning ship in all directions, but no life boat or raft was seen put over. Fifteen to twenty coils of manila were thrown over forward.

0845 Target disappeared, headed straight down stern first.

Either the freighter's screws or engines were heard on sound for 30 seconds after the target disappeared.

0847-54 Heard the last of three end-of-run explosions, all within 40 seconds. This uniform performance for a period of over 10 minutes speaks well for the Mark 18-1 torpedo.

0918 Heard the last of innumerable sharp explosions from the target, sounding like collapsing ping pong balls. The sound was too sharp for breaking up noises.

The failure of the three torpedoes to hit is difficult to explain. It is believed that the second torpedo hit for a run of 1100 yards which checked within 50 yards of the generated range at firing. The fact that this torpedo hit aft of the MOT leads to the conclusion that the target was probably making 6 knots as against 5 knots used. But assuming that the second torpedo hit, there is no clear explanation for the first and third torpedoes missing, these being spread zero and 1.0R. The target looked to have an unusually large beam for a small freighter, but the draft was at least 12 feet, as observed when the ship was sinking. The only logical explanation is that the first torpedo passed under the shallow stern of the target as it pitched and that the third torpedo ran under the target forward when it took the fast up angle from the hit astern.

0959 Surfaced at full power, heading northeast in a blinding rain.

1033 Slowed to one-engine speed and patrolled to eastward, visibility improving, seas increasing.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

7 Feb.
1601 Dived to routine bow torpedoes, which were flooded for the attack.
1958 Surfaced and patrolled to the west.

8 Feb.
0742 Dived and patrolled the northwest approach to Amami and Kikai Jima.
1836 Surfaced in force 5 wind and sea from the northwest.

Patrolled northwest toward Akuseki Jima.

9 Feb.
0915 Patrolled on the surface to the east, weather improving.
Sunk another floating mine, this one with the first burst from the 20MM.
Position: 29 - 20 N, 130 - 30 E.

Put the mine about 300 yards on the beam across the sea. This seems to be the best set-up for sinking them.

1458 Made deep dive to 510 feet. Absolutely no gradient.
1600 Surfaced.
1610 Departed the area in accordance with Operation Order at Lat. 29 - 15 N, Long. 131 - 30 E.

9-16 Feb.
Enroute Midway.

10 Feb.
0030 Sent departure report to ComSubsPac on 4235 kcs. Did not get receipt direct or on Fox schedule.
1300 Sent one officer and four men on deck to convert Nos. 3 and 5 Fuel Ballast Tanks to Main Ballast. Put wind and sea, force 3, and moderate swell, on the port quarter. Position: 29 - 24 N, 138 - 15 E.

The men had entered the deck lockers as Ensign J. M. Holleran, USNR, went aft to No. 4 vent.

1307 A short, quick swell from the port side threw Ensign Holleran overboard to starboard.

Stopped and threw over life ring. Ordered all men on the bridge.

1308 Swung left to recover Ensign Holleran from up sea.

It was thought that all men in the party had returned to the bridge, but LEFFLER, Harris Palmer, 603-38-37, MoMM2c., V-2, USNR, had gone back down from the bridge to get the last man, VAN EPEREN, Raymond John, 300-60-41, MoMMlc., USN, who was just abaft the conning tower.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

10 Feb.

Just after Ensign Holleran was sighted on the port bow, a lookout reported the two men overboard. Threw over another life ring. Saw them about 25 yards astern close together, LEFFLER swimming toward VAN EPEREN, but decided to go ahead and recover Ensign Holleran as we were up sea from him and he had been in the water longer. Several lookouts and both periscopes were put on the two men. Recovered Ensign Holleran and headed for the bearing on which the two men were last seen, but lookouts and periscopes had lost them.

Neither man was sighted again although they were not more than 1500 yards from Ensign Holleran. Continued searching the area but nothing was sighted except the life rings.

Abandoned search and proceeded. This tragic loss is deeply regretted. Sent PARCHE second to ComSubsPac giving departure report and names of men lost overboard.

7 Feb.

Crossed International Date Line. Changed date to 16 February.

16 Feb.

Rendezvoused with THREADFIN preparatory to entering Midway, T.H.
Moored at berth S-3, Midway.

Fueled.

1522 Y Departed Midway enroute Pearl Harbor.

20 Feb.

Rendezvoused with U.S.S. PC-580 off Oahu.

1156 VW Moored at berth S-7, U. S. Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

(C) WEATHER - In the area there were only four days of good weather. The prevailing wind and sea was from the northwest, although several times the wind shifted fast from south through east to north, indicating a storm center was near. There were several periods of continual rainfall, day and night, for as long as three days. Average cloud cover was from .8 to overcast.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION - The general current in western and northern Nansei Shoto was 040T, 1.2 knots. In the northwestern part of the area the current is influenced considerably by the Kuro Shio and averages 2.4 knots. It is doubtful that much shipping moves south through this part of the area. Near the islands, Tokuno Shima, Amami O Shima, and those of Tokaro Gunto the currents are unpredictable.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS - No navigational aids were observed. An aero beacon was frequently seen on Tokuno Shima. With only occasional opportunities for star sights it was necessary to navigate almost entirely by SJ radar and dead reckoning.

Serial 0124

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
7 February 1946.

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: U.S.S. PAROKE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.
Reference: (a) ComSubPac third end. AF12-10(A)/A16-3(18) serial 01141
of 16 May 1945.

1. On 9 April 1945, in position 39-06 N, 141-57 E, PAROKE attacked, simultaneously, what was believed to be an enemy destroyer of the MINERAE class (1,300 tons) and a medium sized transport estimated at 5,000 tons. The escort vessel was hit with one torpedo and seen to sink; the ship believed to be a transport zigged away at moment of firing and it was thought that all torpedoes missed.

2. Reliable intelligence, subsequently received, indicates that the ships attacked by PAROKE on this occasion were in fact the AM 3 of 700 tons and the AM 35 of 700 tons, and states that both of these ships were sunk.

3. Please modify reference (a) as follows:

(a) Delete all after the word "patrol" in the second sentence of paragraph 4 and substitute therefor:

SUNK

1 - AM (AM-3)	700 tons
1 - AM (AM-35)	700 tons
1 - AM (TAIETI MARU Class)	3,200 tons
1 - Small coastal Freighter	200 tons
TOTAL SUNK	5,400 tons

DAMAGED

1 - AO (Type 55 HLF)	3,200 tons
1 - AO (Type 55 HLF)	3,200 tons
1 - Trawler	200 tons
1 - Sea Truck	200 tons
TOTAL DAMAGED	6,800 tons

TOTAL SUNK & DAMAGED	12,200 tons
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Frank T. Watkins,
Chief of Staff.

Distribution & authentication
on next page.

Serial 01141

CONFIDENTIAL

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
16 May 1945.

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PARCHE Report of
Fifth War Patrol.

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

CONSUSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 754.
U.S.S. PARCHE - FIFTH WAR PATROL.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol
(19 March to 30 April 1945).

1. The fifth war patrol of the PARCHE, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander W. W. McGrory, U. S. Navy, was conducted in the area east of Honshu. The PARCHE coordinated her patrol with the SUNFISH, the commanding officer of the PARCHE being group commander.

2. This aggressive and well conducted patrol resulted in several contacts mostly hugging the coast. Five torpedo attacks and three gun attacks resulted in the sinking of one destroyer, one freighter, and a small coastal freighter. Damage was inflicted on two small tankers, a trawler, and a sea truck. A large naval auxiliary evaded torpedoes fired at her after the destroyer had been sunk. Area coverage was thorough.

3. Award of Submarine Combat Insignia for this patrol is authorized.

4. The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, congratulates the commanding officer, officers, and crew of the PARCHE for the completion of this most aggressive, interesting, successful patrol added to her previous illustrious record. The PARCHE is credited with having inflicted the following damage upon the enemy during this patrol:

S U N K

1 - DD (MIKAZE Class) (EU)	-	1,200 tons (Attack No. 1A)
1 - Small AK (TAIJI MARU Class) (EC)	-	3,200 tons (Attack No. 2)
1 - Small Coastal Freighter (SMC) (EC)	-	800 tons (Gun Attack No. 1)
TOTAL SUNK	-	5,200 tons

Serial 01141

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
16 May 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to
PARCHE Report of
Fifth War Patrol.

NOTE: THIS REPORT WILL BE
DESTROYED PRIOR TO
ENTERING PATROL AREA.

COMSUBSPAC PATROL REPORT NO. 754
U.S.S. PARCHE - FIFTH WAR PATROL.

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol
(19 March to 30 April 1945).

D A M A G E D

1 - Small AO (Type 55 MEF) (EC)	-	3,200 tons (Attack No. 4A)
1 - Small AO (Type 55 MEF) (EC)	-	3,200 tons (Attack No. 4B)
1 - Trawler (SMC) (EC)	-	200 tons (Gun Attack No. 2)
1 - Sea Truck (SMC) (EC)	-	<u>300</u> tons (Gun Attack No. 3)
TOTAL DAMAGED		- 6,800 tons
TOTAL SUNK & DAMAGED		- 12,000 tons

MERRILL COMSTOCK.

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E. L. Hynes
E. L. HYNES, 2nd,
Flag Secretary.

Serial: 098

Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
7 May 1945.C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-LSECOND ENDORSEMENT to
USS PARCHE - Report of
Fifth War Patrol Dated
30 April 1945.

From: The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, Subordinate
Command, Navy No: 15041

To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(2) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of War Patrol Number Five.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the remarks in the first endorsement.

2. It is recommended that the U.S.S. PARCHE be credited with the following damage to the enemy in her fifth war patrol:

SUNK

1 - DD (MINEKAZE Class) (EU)	- -	1,200 tons	(Torpedo Attack No. 1-A)
1 - AK (TAIEI MARU Class) (EC)	- -	3,200 tons	(Torpedo Attack No. 2)
1 - SMC (Coastal Freighter) (EC)	- -	800 tons	(Gun Attack No. 1)
TOTAL -		5,200 tons	

DAMAGED

1 - AO (Type 55 MMF) (EC)	- -	3,200 tons	(Torpedo Attack No. 4)
1 - AO (Type 55 MMF) (EC)	- -	3,200 tons	(Torpedo Attack No. 4)
1 - SMC (Wooden Steam Trawler) (EC)	- -	200 tons	(Gun Attack No. 2)
1 - SMC (Picket Boat) (EC)	- -	200 tons	(Gun Attack No. 3)

3. The commanding officer, officers, and crew of the U.S.S. PARCHE are heartily congratulated upon the completion of this active, aggressive, and well conducted fifth war patrol, and for the damage inflicted upon the enemy in continuance of this submarine's excellent record.

K. C. Hurd
K. C. HURD.

Serial: (002)

c/o Comsubpacsubordon, Navy 1504,
Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
30 April 1945.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS PARCHE's Report of
Fifth War Patrol.

From: The Administrative Commander, Submarine Advance
Training and Relief Crew No. ONE.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet,
Subordinate Command, Navy No. 1504. - - - - -
(2) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(3) The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific
Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS 384) - Report of War Patrol
Number Five.

1. The fifth war patrol of the PARCHE, conducted in the
area East of HONSHU, was of forty-three days duration, twenty of
which were spent in the patrol area.

2. This area proved quite fruitful. Numerous contacts
were made, which included small fishing craft, small pickets, and
various Yard and Coastal craft. Five torpedo and three gun attacks
were made.

TORPEDO ATTACK #1A and #1B (April 9, 1945)

A day periscope attack was made on a naval transport
(estimated tonnage - 5000) escorted by an old type destroyer, similar
to the MINERLEN Class. Fired (1), three Mk. 18-2 from the stern
tubes, range 1000 yards, 140° port track angle, 25° left gyro, depth
set 5 feet, at the destroyer, then fired (3), four Mark 14-3A from
the bow tubes, range 800 yards, 130° starboard track angle, 60° R
gyro, depth set 5 feet, at the transport. One hit in the destroyer
finished her off, but the transport, alerted by the torpedo explosion
in the destroyer, turned away and avoided all torpedoes fired at her.

TORPEDO ATTACK No. 2. (April 12, 1945)

A night surface attack on a small, unescorted freight-
er, similar to the TEIJI MARU (3200 tons). Fired three Mk. 14-3A
from the bow tubes, range 1650 yards, 95° port track angle, small
gyro angles, depth set 5 feet. One observed hit caused the target
to disintegrate with a tremendous explosion and disappear in 90
seconds.

TORPEDO ATTACK No. 3 (April 13, 1945)

A day periscope attack made on a small unescorted
MFN freighter (estimated 1200 tons). Fired three Mk. 18-2 from the
stern tubes, range 1200 yards, 80° starboard track angle, small gyro
angles, depth set 3 feet. All torpedoes missed, probably because of
fire control errors.

Serial: (002)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS PARCHE's Report
of Fifth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. 'PARCHE' (SS 384) - Report of War Patrol
Number Five.

TORPEDO ATTACK No. 4A and 4B (April 22, 1945)

... day periscope attack was made on two of three small unescorted tankers in column (type 55 MEF of 3200 tons). Fired (A), Three Mk. 14-3A from the bow tubes at the second ship in column, range 2200 yards, 120° starboard track angle, 15° right gyro angles, depth set 4 feet, then fired (B), three Mk. 14-3A from the bow tubes at the last ship in column, range 2400 yards, 110° starboard track angle, small gyro angles, depth set 4 feet. Two timed hits were heard in the first tanker (A) and one in the second (B). Temporary loss of depth control after firing prevented further observation or results.

TORPEDO ATTACK No. 5 (April 24, 1945)

... day periscope attack was made on a small MEF freighter (estimated tonnage 2000), escorted by a small patrol boat. Fired three Mk. 14-3A from the bow tubes at the freighter, range 1550 yards, 110° starboard track angle, 12° left gyro angles, depth set 3 feet. One torpedo, seen to breach, alerted the target, which turned away and avoided all torpedoes.

GUN ATTACK No. 1 (April 11, 1945)

Sank a small coastal freighter of 800 tons. Ship exploded from a 40 MM hit. Probably loaded with gasoline.

GUN ATTACK No. 2 (April 13, 1945)

Severely damaged and probably sunk a steam trawler of 200 tons. Numerous 5", 40 MM, and 20 MM hits left target settling and burning.

GUN ATTACK No. 3 (April 13, 1945)

Severely damaged a 200 ton picket boat. Action was broken off because of the untimely arrival on the scene of two Jap planes. One close bomb caused minor damage to PARCHE.

RECOMMENDED ASSESSMENT:

SUNK

1 destroyer (MINIKAKE Class)(EU)	1200 tons
1 freighter (TAMBI MARU Class)(EO)	3200 tons
1 SMC (Coastal Freighter) (EC)	800 tons.

Serial: (002)

C-O-M-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
USS PARCHE's Report of
Fifth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS 384) - Report of War Patrol
Number Five.

DAMAGED and PROBABLY SUNK:

1 Tanker (Type 55 MMT) (EC)	3200 tons
1 Tanker (Type 55 MMT) (EC)	3200 tons
1 SMC (steam trawler) (EC)	200 tons
1 SMC (picket boat) (EC)	200 tons.

3. The remarks of the Commanding Officer regarding the recommended use of Mark 18 torpedoes in this particular area warrant serious consideration by future submarines patrolling in this area.

4. The first edition of the PARCHE "PRATTLET" is a commendable step in the right direction.

5. The PARCHE returned from patrol clean and in very good material condition. It is expected that her refit will be completed in the normal period. The health of the crew was excellent. As would be expected of a fighting ship, morale was exceptionally high.

6. The Administrative Division Commander takes great pleasure in congratulating the Commanding Officer, officers and crew of the PARCHE on this aggressive patrol, which adds another chapter to the already illustrious record of the fighting PARCHE.

J.W. DAVIS.

SS384/A16-3
Serial (026)

U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L


Care of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
30 April 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) The Commander Submarine Division TWO HUNDRED FORTY TWO.
(2) The Commander Task Group SEVENTEEN POINT FIVE.
(3) The Commander Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet.
(4) The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) — Report of War Patrol Number Five.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart.

1. Enclosures (A) and (B), covering the fifth war patrol of this vessel conducted in the area east of HONSHU during the period 19 March 1945 to 30 April 1945, are forwarded herewith.


W. W. MC CRORY.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

(A) PROLOGUE

On February 20, 1945, arrived Pearl Harbor from Fourth War Patrol. A normal refit was started the following day by Submarine Division 45 Relief Crew and Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, and completed on March 7, 1945. The refit was the most extensive and best the ship has had. Thirty-eight alterations were completed, the most important of which were installation of a 5-inch gun aft, installation of the ST radar periscopes, and modification of the bow planes to permit rigging out on 15° dive. Two main engine mufflers were replaced and a thorough job of cleaning and re-painting all main ballast tanks was done.

An underway training period of 7 days was started on March 9, 1945, with Commander D. F. Weiss, USN, as training officer. Material deficiencies which developed were all of a minor nature. Personnel replacements were excellent and very definitely showed the effect of the training schools being maintained by Comsubtrainpac. A great number of the regular crew and officers also attended these schools during the training period and the results were quite beneficial. In training four torpedoes were fired and life guard exercises with planes were held one day.

During the final loading period from March 17-19, 1945, the ship was depermed. Mark 14-3 torpedoes were loaded forward and Mark 18-2's aft.

(B) NARRATIVE

Officers on board

Number of War Patrols

Lieut-Comdr. Woodrow W. Mc Crory, USN	4
Lieut-Comdr. Bricker M. Ganyard, USN (PCO)	0
Lieutenant Churchill J. Campbell (DE), USNR	4
Lieutenant Robert L. Erwin (DE), USNR	4
Lieutenant John H. Hennessy, Jr., USN	5
Lieutenant Robert T. Stevenson (DE), USNR	3
Lieut(jg) Max T. Morton (D)L, USNR	1
Lieut(jg) Francis O. Gadd (DE), USNR	1
Ensign John M. Holleran (E)L, USNR	1
Ensign Dean L. Axene, USN	0

Chief Petty Officers

Number of War Patrols

BARNETT, Percy E.	CRM, USN	4
DINGMAN, Warren E.	CY, USN	5
GRAY, John C, Jr.	CRT, USNR	4
HUGHES, William A.	CJM, USNR	4
JENSEN, Dana C.	CMoMM, USN	10
KINKEL, Carroll E.	CTM, USN	11
PLUMLEY, James L.	CGM, USN	8
WALTERS, Donald E.	CTM, USN	7

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

March 19, 1945

1357 VW Departed Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T.H., in company with USS TRUTTA and USS LIONFISH enroute SAIPAN in accordance with ComsubpacAdComd Operation Order Number 41-A-45, Group Commander Commanding Officer USS TRUTTA, Commander A. C. Smith, USN

1455 VW Joined up with TRUTTA and LIONFISH and escort, PC 580.

2045 VW Escort departed.

March 19-30, 1945

Underway in accordance with Operation Order, maintaining visual contact on TRUTTA from her port quarter, speed of advance 15 knots. Conducted daily dives, tracking and fire control problems, made submerged and surface approaches on other boats in company. Did extensive training in Wolf Pack Communications and search doctrine. Enjoyed pleasant weather with moderate and following winds and sea the first six days enroute.

March 20, 1945

1200 VW Position: Lat. 20-50 N, Long. 163-18 W.

1337 VW Battle surfaced and test fired all guns.

March 21, 1945

1200 WX Position: Lat. 20-42 N, Long. 169-26 W.

March 22, 1945

1200 XY Position: Lat. 20-37 N, Long. 175-58 W.

March 23 (24), 1945

0218 Y Crossed International Date Line. Changed date to March 24, 1945.

1200 M Position: Lat. 20-19 N, Long. 177-28 E.

March 25, 1945

1200 M Position: Lat. 20-03 N, Long. 171-04 E.

March 26, 1945

1200 L Position: Lat. 20-01 N, Long. 164-05 E.
Weather increased to state 5 from astern, TRUTTA delayed rendezvous at SAIPAN from March 29 to March 30, 1945.

March 27, 1945

1200 L Position: 19-21 N, 157-43 E.

March 28, 1945

1200 K Position: 18-19 N, 152-09 E.

1435 K Sighted friendly submarine, probably DEVILFISH, six miles to south on opposite course.

U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

March 29, 1945

1200 K Position: 17-05 N, 137-06 E.

1915 K Passed between SARIGAN and ANATAHAN ISLANDS.

March 30, 1945

0530 K Rendezvoused with LCI 1062, set course for SAIPAN, in company with TRUTTA and LIONFISH. Heavy wind and seas from east continuing.

1233 K Moored in nest on port side of USS FULTON in TANAPAG Harbor, SAIPAN, with SUNFISH, TRUTTA, and LIONFISH.

Started voyage repairs, took on board provisions, ammunition, and fuel to capacity.

1400 K Attended conference of Commanding Officers with Group Commander, Commanding Officer USS TRUTTA.

March 31, 1945

1400 K Attended conference of Commanding Officers with Commander N. G. Ward, USN, Staff, Comsubpac. Received final instructions for routing and coordinated patrol between TRUTTA, LIONFISH, PARCHE, and SUNFISH in YELLOW SEA Area.

1747 K Underway from alongside USS FULTON after TRUTTA and SUNFISH. Had been delayed one and one-half hours in replacing modulation network of SJ transmitter. LIONFISH did not depart due to broken window in ST periscope.

All subsequent times item unless otherwise designated.

1750 Rendezvoused outside TANAPAG Harbor with TRUTTA and SUNFISH, escort LCI 1054. Proceeded in accordance with Comsubpac Operation Order 72-45 and CTC 17.7 despatch 300630 of March, 1945, enroute YELLOW SEA for patrol, Group Commander in USS TRUTTA.

2130 Escort departed.

1 April 1945

0230 Received message from TRUTTA by VHF that she was returning to SAIPAN because of excessive shaft vibration, instructing PARCHE to proceed in accordance with original plan.

0645 Rendezvoused with SUNFISH informing her that we would proceed with original routing and plans for patrol until rejoined by LIONFISH and/or TRUTTA. Gave her daily 0000Zebra positions until crossing TOKARA GUNTO.

1200 Position: 15-08 N, 142-39 E.

1220 Exchanged greetings with PUFFER on opposite course.

1255 Exchanged recognition and calls with PIETO on opposite course.

1727 Dived for trial.

1749 Surfaced.

1900 Received Comsubpac despatch 010506 directing change of area for our pack. In compliance, went to three-engine speed and cancelled all zig plans, taking some comfort in the heavy weather making up astern. Informed SUNFISH of my speed and proceeded independently for area east of HONSHU.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 2, 1945

1200 Position: 19-02 N, 137-51 E.
1600 Received Comsubpac despatch 020014 clarifying routing instructions.
2000 The heavy winds from astern had drawn left to east and it looked as if we were crossing the track of a typhoon. Continued at three-engine speed but started taking water in engine rooms. Heavy and continuous rain, pitch dark.

April 3, 1945

0007 Forced to slow to two-engine speed. The wind had shifted fast from east to north-northeast, and increased to 40 knots, barometer dropped to 29.35. Sent all lookouts below, conning tower hatch shut half the time, pumping engine room bilges.
0618 Radar interference from friendly submarine at 300 T, opposite course.
0647 Went back to three engines. Wind had decreased and shifted to east-northeast, barometer slowly rising, heavy overcast.
1200 Position: 25-16 N, 137-49 E.
1315 West of IWO JIMA, started guarding lifeguard frequency.
1330 Results of last night's weather began to show up. Armatures of both Kleinschmidt compressors and feed pump grounded out.
1435 SJ contact on plane at 340 T, 14,000 yards, approximate course 125 T for IWO JIMA. No IFF response, did not sight. If it was friendly, at least we were in our lane as he did not investigate. No sights in two days.
1515 Another plane at 22 miles on the SD, opening. IFF Response.
1837 Dived for trim. Suspected a leak in forward trim manhole since the gauge reading had increased considerably since last dive. Leak not detected at 200 feet.
1849 Surfaced.
2025 Harassed by planes again, three of them coming in as close as 1,500 yards, but kind enough to turn on running lights. IFF response, did not dive. Probably too much faith in our Zoomies. Although overcast, the weather was greatly improved tonight. Proceeded at 17 knots.

April 4, 1945

0209 Went to four-engine speed. Seas were almost calm, with only a force 2 wind from the east, but still overcast. During the early morning four flights of from three to six planes crossed our track headed south. Most of them gave early warning on the APR and all showed IFF, but several came within four miles. It would make staying up much easier if they would only put the rudder over a little.
1135 Made landfall on SUMISU ROCK, NANPO SHOTO, bearing 000 T, 15 miles.
1200 Position: 31-18 N, 140-10 E.
1800 Both evaporators back in commission after rinsing and baking out the armatures.

I-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 4, 1945 (Continued)

1930 Slowed to three-engine speed and headed north for area off east coast of HONSHU, northeast of TOKYO area.

2134 Forced to slow to one-engine speed in the face of another storm which had come up suddenly, barometer dropping to 29.40, temperature to 45°. Wind was from the north, force 6.

April 5, 1945

Continued storm and cold, skies clearing in the morning.

1200 Position: 35-29 N, 141-59 E.

1244 Weak interference on the APR at 158 megacycles, our first inkling of a Jap and we were 100 miles off HONSHU.

1519 Trim dived. Only 6° negative gradient to 425 ft. No leak detected in forward trim.

1546 Surfaced.

The weather was considerably improved and clear with the barometer rising and the temperature dropped to 42°.

1739 Sighted an unidentified plane, distance 15 miles, patrolling off the east coast of HONSHU. No indication on the APR. Undetected, so remained on the surface.

Planned to close SHIOYA SAKI and patrol there submerged the following day. Believed SUNFISH was behind us and assigned no patrol stations as radio silence was deemed important until we found out more about our assignment.

2100 Entered the area at 37-00 N, 141-54 E.

2200 Received Comsubspac despatch 050737 extending the area for the pack to 40° N and giving general instructions for the patrol.

April 6, 1945

Patrolled east-west off SHIOYA SAKI to the 100-fathom curve, then north along the 100-fathom curve.

Detected three shore radar stations, all of 500 pulse rate frequency, 80 m.c. and 103 m.c. near SHIOYA SAKI and 76 m.c. north of SHIOYA SAKI. None reached saturation strength.

Experienced several bogeys during the night due to phosphorescence and probably large fish. Injection varied between 36° and 58°, air temperature dropped to 36°, but the weather was clear and the seas calm.

0451 Dived 30 miles north of SHIOYA SAKI and patrolled south with the current along the 100-fathom curve.

1200 Position: 37-10 N, 141-34 E.

Experienced abrupt changes in injection temperature up to 12° with little effect on trim.

1635 Surfaced. Headed north along the 100-fathom curve to patrol off TODO SAKI the following day.

1915 A new APR contact, probably near KINKASAN, 190 m.c., 1300 pulse rate, sweeping.

1945 Sent message to SUNFISH twice on pack frequency that we would patrol between 39-10 N and 39-35 N the following day. No receipt.

J-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 7, 1945

0457 No APR contact on shore-based radar north of KINKASAN.
Dived to conduct submerged patrol 11 miles east of TODO SAKI,
both injection and air temperatures down to 33° but the weather
clear. Started closing 100-fathom curve.

0645 JP contact on screws at 96 rpm bearing 265 T. Finally caught a
glimpse of a small steam trawler hugging the coast headed south for
OZUCHI WAN.

0655 Heard the first of about 15 long, weird, rumbling sounds in regular
succession. Believe now these were distant depth charges, the sound
being drawn out by reverberation from the shore. However, they may
have been subterranean disturbances.

0710 Several more weird rumbles.

0815 Another rumble.

1010 Continued submerged patrol south along the 100-fathom curve.
Sighted RUFE at six miles patrolling south along the 100-fathom
curve.

1200 Position: 39-22 N, 142-12 E.

1215 Sighted two patrol boats standing out of OZUCHI WAN, pinging. They
searched out beyond the entrance and returned. (SC #1)
Sighted three more trawlers during the day in the vicinity of
OZUCHI WAN. All were hugging the coast. Could not get a look in
KAMISHI KO due to fog.

1807 Surfaced 12 miles east of O SAKI. Had SJ interference to the south.
Could not exchange recognition but probably SUNFISH.

1840 Patrolling to east, started converting No. 4 FBT to main ballast.

2005 Completed converting No. 4 FBT, headed south for rendezvous.

2055 Sent message on pack frequency to SUNFISH for rendezvous at 38-45 N,
142-30 E. No receipt.

2120 Received message from SUNFISH requesting instructions reference
Comsubpac despatch 050737.

2130 Sent message again directing rendezvous for VHF communications.
Received receipt after about five minutes.

2340 Rendezvoused with SUNFISH and gave her following instructions:
PARCHE would patrol 100-fathom curve between 38-30 and 39-30 N,
SUNFISH to patrol on the surface north of 39-00 N and between
142-30 E and 143-00 E, interchanging stations every third day and
guarding pack frequency first five minutes of each hour while
submerged.
SUNFISH reported she had sighted three small freighters one mile
off shore in the vicinity of KESENNUMA.

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 7, 1945 (Continued)

The following facts and considerations had developed by this time:

1. There was a possibility, though small, that Jap combatant units would retire from the fleet action in progress along this coast toward TSUGARU KAIKYO. The disposition of the two boats for the time being was based on this consideration.
2. There were no radar stations and few patrol planes between KINKASAN and TODO SAKI, making it easy to approach the coast for patrol and attack.
3. Most of the shipping was small and hugged the coast. A study of the Japanese transportation set-up and industrial activity in this section shows no necessity for large ships with the possible exception of a few tankers and ore carriers. All the principal ports, MATSUSHIMA, ISHINOMAKI, KESENNUMA, IMAIZUMI, KAMAISHI, and MIYAKO are connected by rail. A confidential chart produced by the 30th Engineers and dated 3 March, 1945, shows several rail connections which are not shown on H.O. Charts. There is little industrial activity in the area besides iron ore and coal from KAMAISHI.

8 April 1945

Patrolled east-west off the 100-fathom curve east of KOBE SAKI.

0435 Dived 11 miles east of KAMAISHI KO and crossed 100-fathom curve, closing O SAKI.

0945 Observed PC boat coming out of the smoke in KAMAISHI KO. He rounded O SAKI to the south, pinging, so concluded the harbor was not mined. (SC #2)

1105 Observed small oiler round SANGAN SHIMA, cut in to KAMAISHI KO, then round O SAKI just off the beach. (SC #3). Not worth the chance of alerting the harbor, considering the range. Headed northeast toward the entrance to KAMAISHI KO.

1200 Position: 39-16-N, 142-03 E.

1225 Sighted small JAP boat headed south along SANGAN SHIMA (SC #4)

1245 Went to battle stations. JAP was zigzagging on base course 180 T so thought he would round O SAKI. With the range at 4,000 yards, ready to shoot, target turned sharp right up KAMAISHI KO. The resultant JSC track did not warrant shooting at the range.

1333 Secured from battle stations. Sighted several fishing craft during the day, none of them alert for submarines, but making periscope observations risky in the calm water. All contacts were invariably made first on JP.

1817 Surfaced 12 miles east of O SAKI.

Patrolled south and east during the night.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 9, 1945

0030 Received Comsubpac despatch 060703, extending area for PARCHE and SUNFISH north to HOKKAIDO.

0112 Received message from SUNFISH on pack frequency that she would patrol submerged off KONE SAKI if further scouting by one boat to north and east was not necessary.

0159 Sent her affirmative.

0403 11 miles off O SAKI, ready to dive, had SJ radar contact bearing 020 T, range 35,500 yards. (SC #5)

0412 Went to battle stations and started closing on surface. Plot showed base course 200 T, speed 12. Day was breaking, but had clear horizon behind target and obscured horizon behind us so remained on surface. Did not send contact report as SUNFISH should have been directly ahead of target.

0426 SJ contact at 330 T, range 12,400 yards. (SC #6) Distant target had closed to 23,500 yards but could not be seen from the bridge, and when SJ returned to it from closer target it had disappeared. In the light of later experiences believe this disappearance was due to a skip distance on the SJ between 12,000 and 25,000 yards caused by unusual atmospheric conditions.

0440 The PCO sighted the closer target at 10,000 yards, very small so dived in the growing light to escape detection and started approach. The target when finally seen on the periscope was identified as a very small power-driven barge loaded high with rough lumber. He started cutting across the 100-fathom curve and we could not close without expending the battery so gave up the chase and secured from battle stations. Chose KOBE ZAKI for a patrol station and headed in to a position 6,000 yards from the point. Contacted numerous fishing craft during the morning.

1200 Position: 39-06 N, 142-00 E.

1215 Sighted two sizeable ships bearing 219 T, range 14,000 yards, headed up the coast about 4,000 yards off shore, zigzagging, the one to the seaward smoking. (SC #7)

1222 Went to battle stations and started approach, 6,000 yards off KOBE ZAKI, just a light ripple on the water. Identified the leading ship as a medium transport, short, fat, about 400 feet long and the smoker to seaward as a 1200 ton destroyer with tripod masts. The destroyer was about 1,500 yards to seaward from the AP, pinging at random. The AP was zigging as much as 70° on 3-6 minute logs, speed checking at 13 knots for 80 foot mast. The destroyer was zigging only 20°, heading directly for us. Continued approach on AP, gaining firing position for bow tubes at 1500 yards, destroyer headed directly for us at 1200 yards, the sorriest escort imaginable, as he did not detect us, beam on, under perfect sound conditions.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) -- Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 9, 1945

1222 (Continued)
Upped scope to shoot AP, torpedo run 1,500 yards, 70 starboard track. A quick check on the destroyer showed that he was zigging away and would pass 800 yards astern. Shifted set-up for 18's aft, hoping to get both of them in multiple firing.

1303-40 Commenced firing 3 torpedoes at DD, range 1,000 yards, 140 port track. (Torpedo Attack 1A)
Shifted set-up for 14's forward.

1305-04 Commenced firing 4 torpedoes forward at AP, range 800 yards, track 130 starboard. He had zigged also, crossing our bow very fast to give 60R gyros. (Torpedo Attack 1B)

1305-35 With 3 out forward heard a terrific explosion which rocked the ship. Saw the AP zigging left just after the explosion. A quick check on the destroyer showed a column of smoke and steam 1,000 feet high, with his bow standing vertically 100 feet in the air. The torpedo had hit a fire room. Swung back to the AP to fire two more torpedoes, but he was fish-tailing wildly away from us, having undoubtedly sighted the periscope. Decided it would be a waste of torpedoes.

1315 Went deep and made 70 turns on course 135 T, taking advantage of a half knot southerly set to evade. No pinging. At 300 feet forward trim was flooding steadily from sea at about 10,000 pounds an hour. We could control it easily with the trim pump but there was a loud hissing noise from the leak which could be heard clearly in the forward room and all around the dials on all sound gear. The leak was in the top of the tank, most likely the manhole cover, so pressure could not be used in the tank to stop the flooding. This leak had been suspected enroute the area from SAIPAN but had not appeared on deep submergence the first day in the area. Came up to 150 feet to reduce the leakage.

1450 The only counter measures, 6 aerial bombs at 3-5 miles, the last one a dud.

1923 22 miles east of KURO-SAKI came up to radar depth. SJ contact to the right of TODO SAKI at 30,000 yards. Phenomenal.

1928 Surfaced. Another SJ contact at 46,000 yards in the same direction. (SC #8) Tracked these two at 5 knots along the 100-fathom curve, one heading in toward the beach. Did not consider investigation advisable until we did something about forward trim. Continued toward the eastern part of the area to get outside probable range of air search to remove manhole cover on forward trim the following day.

2241 Radar contact on the SUNFISH.

2400 Sent message to SUNFISH on pack frequency telling her to patrol area north of 39-15 N, PARCHE to patrol south, and to exchange stations on April 22nd. Got receipt by SJ.

U-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 10, 1945

- 0512 Dived in eastern part of area and conducted submerged patrol.
1200 Position: 39-17 N, 144-22 E.
Heard many distant depth charges during the afternoon.
- 1548 Surfaced to effect repairs on forward trim manhole cover and service guns. Had compensated ship so forward trim was almost full. Barometer was dropping, light wind and swell from southeast, fog setting in.
- 1658 Gasket renewed on manhole cover, air test satisfactory, dived to deep submergence. Tank held. Manhole cover had been re-installed during last refit with dish up instead of down so it did not seat properly.
- 1834 Surfaced and headed west toward KINKASAN at one-engine speed.
2108 Took this opportunity off usual patrol station to send PARCHE first to Comsubspac giving patrol areas for PARCHE and SUNFISH. Had difficulty with Jap jamming and authentication and NPM did not receipt although we had been given a go ahead.

April 11, 1945

- 0335 30 miles northeast of KINKASAN had SJ contact at 020 T, 11,000 yards. (SC #9)
Target tracked at 6 knots, running a box-like patrol with half-hour legs. Had decided to patrol submerged off KESENNUMA, hoping the weather would clear, so dropped contact, ran south and then northwest, closing the 100-fathom curve off KESENNUMA.
- 0412 20 miles from coast, SJ contact at 000 T, 9,400 yards. Target tracked on 040 T at 6 knots. (SC #10)
Barometer was dropping fast, passing 29.10, visibility under 1,500 yards, so decided to develop contact for daylight attack instead of conducting submerged patrol.
- 0433 Went to battle stations surface and started closing target.
With the range at 4,000 yards had another contact beyond the target at 9,500 yards, closing, probably SC #9. Thought there were two patrol boats and hoped we could get them both.
- 0510 The farther target disappeared from the radar screen at 7,000 yards and was never contacted again. Either submarine or skip distance at work again. Could not see the first target until the range had closed to 1,400 yards. He had been on course 070 T but as soon as he sighted us changed course toward. He was not a patrol boat, but a small freighter of about 800 tons, straight high bow, counter stern, high bridge structure amidships, diesel-driven, short well decks forward and aft.
- 0513 Commenced firing with the range at 1,000 yards (Gun Attack No. 1), paralleling to put him on the port beam. He returned fire with a small calibre machine gun in his bow. Our 20 and 40 mm's were hitting but started no fires and the 5-inch would not shoot so opened the range to 2,000 yards to get the 5-inch firing. It test fired after removal of heavy grease behind the firing pin so started in for the second run. Opened fire at 900 yards, target turning toward.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 11, 1945 (Continued)

0529 The 20 and 40 mm's were hitting at about 75% and the 5-inch just getting off a shot when at 600 yards the target blew up in our faces in a tremendous red ball of fire, probably a gasoline explosion. From the concussion all hands below though we had been hit. Radar reported the target disappearing, then a large pip, then completely disappeared at 1,100 yards. As the pall of smoke cleared, nothing could be seen from the bridge. On completion of the attack the barometer had levelled at 28.94 and the temperature was 36°. Heavy swell from the south.

0905 Dived, visibility improving.

1200 Position: 39-02 N, 142-48 E.
Heard many distant depth charges during the late afternoon.

1846 Surfaced, sky clear, state 5 wind and sea shifted to the southwest. Patrolled west back toward KINKASAN.

April 12, 1945

0453 Dived just off the 100-fathom curve south of KESENNUMU, weather fairing but visibility reduced.

1200 Position: 38-32 N, 141-46 E.

1259 Sighted 800-ton patrol boat running south, pinging at random. (SC #11) Could close range to only 6,000 yards as he passed us west. More distant depth charges during the afternoon.

1620 Sighted small AK similar to TAI EI MARU, bearing 010 T, range 10,000 yards, base course 160 T. (SC #12).
Went to battle stations and started closing track. Range closed to 7,000 yards but then started opening.

1650 Target disappeared in the surface haze. He had been zigging wildly, was evidently lost, and had probably headed north or east. Could not regain contact with ST or SJ.

1729 Surfaced and headed north to cut him off from the coast. Intermittent APR contact at 150 mcs reaching saturation.

1740 SJ regained contact to southeast. Closed range to 10,000 yards where the target could barely be seen in the haze and maintained position ahead awaiting darkness, target zigging radically on base course 250 T, speed 7.

1813 Finally sighted plane to west above the haze, distance 8 miles. Not sighted, continued tracking.

1916 Reached attack position at 1,400 yards, just abaft the target's port beam. Did not shoot, as he was seen to increase speed, smoking heavily. Shortly after he gave us a 180° angle. Undoubtedly sighted us.
Pulled out ahead to wait for more darkness, but it was going to be no easy job roping and tying this Jap. He steered every course on the card, changing speed from 6 to 10 knots, but finally decided to head west.

2013-25 Reached attack position on his port beam at 1650 yards and commenced firing 3 Mk. 14's forward, good set-up, target speed 7. (Torpedo Attack No. 2).
The track to the AK was lighted from the phosphorescence set up by the torpedoes. He should have sighted them but did not. The first two torpedoes barely missed astern but at

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 12, 1945 (Continued)

2014-47 The third torpedo caught him amidships and the hit accompanied by a violent explosion which spread the length of the ship blew him to smithereens. The target disappeared completely from sight and the radar screen in 90 seconds. Retired to the east an hour, then made a sweep north and south just outside the 100-fathom curve.

April 13, 1945 (Friday)

0527 Dived southeast of KESENNUMA and went inside the 100-fathom curve, visibility low.

0740 Sighted what appeared to be the foremast of a destroyer or PC to north. Closed and finally concluded it and another marker beyond were stakes for a fishing net. Finally sighted a trawler in the distance to confirm it. Had what was probably a misgiving of imagination and thought for over an hour that we were caught in the net. Could not lose the nearest marker, there was a strange tugging sound in the superstructure and the marker continually lay over in the water as if we were tugging it. Believe now the trawler was hauling his line in instead of us towing the marker, as both stakes soon disappeared and the trawler started closing us at slow speed. (SC #13) Had been using the ST scope, No. 2 being out of commission, and thought perhaps we had been sighted in the slick water. Besides, we were already at battle stations surface in case we had had the marker in tow, so decided to shoot the trawler.

1051 Battle surfaced at 3,500 yards on his starboard quarter. He was a clean-cut wooden steam trawler of 200 tons, 150 feet long, clipper bow, high bridge amidships, two tall masts, and mounted 2 machine guns.

The target maneuvered fast, continually presenting a small angle. Opened fire at 2000 yards (Gun Attack No. 2) and shortly got enough 5-inch hits in him aft to stop his engines and start him sinking by the stern. Two men abandoned ship in a life boat and others were seen scurrying back and forth on deck. He opened up twice with his forward machine gun but the fire was ineffective. 1057 Sighted another trawler or patrol boat closing from the northeast at about 5 miles.

1103 With him stopped started closing to 500 yards.

1104 Lookout and OOD reported periscope shears 4,000 yards to north. Probably another fishing stake.

At 500 yards the 40 and 20 mm's started several fires, but the 5-inch had a habit of blowing them out. With his stern under water, concentrated on his bow and got a good fire started. His masts were down and the superstructure a shambles. Started to circle to come in closer but noted a long net astern.

1115 With the target sinking by the stern and a good fire going in the bow, knew he was a loss to the Japs and decided to save our ammunition, so opened to the east.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. FANCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 13, 1945 (Continued)

1147 Radar contact at 32,000 yards to south, range closing slowly but difficult to track. (SC #14)
Started closing and tracking.

1200 Position: 38-35 N, 141-53 E.

1213 At a range of 28,000 yards the target disappeared. Either a bogey or a small target beyond the skip distance. Continued closing last true bearing on 150 T.

1245 Sight contact on a small ship resembling a sea truck at 12,000 yards. (SC #15)

1313 Went back to battle stations surface and closed on target's starboard quarter on course 230 T. Target was on course 260 T, making 1 knot with all his canvas up, and apparently did not detect until we opened fire, when a few men showed themselves on deck. He had a steel hull, box-like in construction, bridge set aft, long well deck forward, high forecastle, two masts, fairly high free board, two machine-guns mounted, and the Japanese triangular pennant along with the name in Japanese characters painted on the hull. Probably an observation boat.

1333 Commenced firing with the range at 1,200 yards (Gun attack No. 3) and completely wrecked his sails and superstructure. The 40mm had a good fire started in the bow and the 5-inch was holing him repeatedly, although it was difficult in the increasing swell to get hits at the water-line.

1340 Closed in to 600 yards. Had him a raging fire from stem to stern when at

1350 Two Jap Zoomies muscled in. Cleared the decks, leaving all guns loose, much ammunition exposed, and watched the planes circling in toward us, low at about 4 miles.

1351 Dived. What a marker we left with the ship ablaze. Started deep keeping the rudder full left to reverse course and pass under the burning ship.

1400 At 300 feet a very close explosion directly overhead, hard on the light bulbs. Hoped it was not our 5-inch ready locker, which had not been tightly shut.
Went to deep submergence and pulled clear on course 045 T at 70 rpm. Would defy Friday the 13th no further.

1645 Two bombs, not close.

2124 Surfaced and headed east. Threw overboard a lot of water-soaked ammunition, including 9 rounds of 5-inch.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 14, 1945

0020 Sent PARCHE first to Comsubspac, giving results to date and patrol stations for PARCHE and SUNFISH. NPM receipted for the message on the first transmission. Used 8470 kcs.

0035 Changed course to south.

0453 Dived on course 225 T. Routed torpedoes.

0615 More depth charges in the distance.

1200 Position: 37-48 N, 143-17 E.

1736 Surfaced and headed toward SHIOYA SAKI at one-engine speed

April 15, 1945

Patrolled south along the 100-fathom curve north of SHIOYA SAKI. Closed the point to 15 miles then patrolled north along the 100-fathom curve. Remained on surface, visibility reduced by surface haze.

1016 Dived for BETTY patrolling on a parallel course at 3 miles, just above the haze. No bombs.

Weather clearing, remained submerged.

1200 Position: 37-34 N, 141-42 E.

1532 Surfaced, proceeded north. Visibility closed.

1606 Dived for LILY on opposite course at $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Still no bombs, but a definite indication of increased air patrol.

1815 Surfaced and patrolled north along the 100-fathom curve to KESENUMA, sea flat calm, visibility poor.

Had interference on the MR at 75, 93, 103, 163, 193, and several at 146 mcs. with indications of lobing on the last frequency. Occasionally got bogeys all around on the SJ and had second-trip echoes on land to 150,000 yards.

April 16, 1945

Patrolled south along the 100-fathom curve toward KINKASAN.

0445 Dived on the 100-fathom curve northeast of ENOSHIMA ROCKS and patrolled submerged heading west, visibility poor.

0650 Sighted the upper works of a trawler bearing 025 T, heading east. (SC #16) The trawler later put his nets out in a north-south line about 5,000 yards to east of us, so changed course to south to get clear of him. Heard heavy bombing and depth-charging all day, mostly aerial bombs and over half of them small.

The visibility did not improve during the day and although we patrolled inside the 100-fathom curve, land was not sighted.

1200 Position: 38-26 N, 141-50 E.

1325 Sighted two SC's patrolling south about 5,000 yards to west of us, stopping occasionally to listen. (SC #17) went to silent running and opened to the east.

1800 Heard the last of the bombs for the day.

2024 Surfaced and patrolled east and then north. Had SJ interference to the north.

J-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 17, 1945

Patrolled west toward KOBE ZAKI.
0240 Exchanged recognition and calls with the SUNFISH.
0305 Started tracking a bogey to the north, loosing at 48,000 yards.
0446 Dived and patrolled inside the 100-fathom curve southeast of KOBE ZAKI.
1200 Position: 39-04 N, 141-58E.
1202 Sighted small freighter inside the bay at YOSHIMAMA. Started approach but lost him in the fog hugging the coast to northward (SC #18)
1627 Sighted a trawler headed south along the 100-fathom curve. Started closing his track, but he reversed course and was lost in the haze.
1853 Surfaced.
1857 SJ contact on a plane closing to 9,500 yards on the starboard bow. No APR interference and he drew aft, so stayed up.
2204 Sighted exhaust of a plane at 4 miles crossing the bow. No APR indication, but dived, since the night was clear and he might have sighted us from the phosphorescence.
2238 Surfaced and patrolled east.

April 18, 1945

Patrolled west back toward KOBE ZAKI.
0441 Dived and closed the 100-fathom curve.
0935 Started approach on small 1200 ton freighter headed north along the 100-fathom curve. (SC #19)
1020 Started firing 3 Mk. 18's aft, SOS track, range 1,200 yards, depth set at 3 feet, spread for 400 feet, target speed 7 knots. (Torpedo Attack No. 3)
All torpedoes missed due to the combination of firing Mk. 18's at a small target with probably poor data. The ST scope was out of tune and could not be used.
1027 End of run explosions. Cleared the scene to northeast, then patrolled at periscope depth.
1200 Position: 39-05 N, 142-08 E.
1853 Surfaced and patrolled south toward KINKASAN, state 5 seas developing from the south.

April 19, 1945

0449 Dived 20 miles east of KINKASAN and closed 100-fathom curve, heavy seas, visibility about 7 miles.
1200 Position: 38-13 N, 141-52 E.
1620 Sighted an unidentified plane flying low over the water. A surface patrol would have been in order for us in the reduced visibility except for these patrol planes.
1852 Surfaced and patrolled north toward TODO ZAKI, weather moderating.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 19, 1945 (Continued)

1921 Received message from SUNFISH that she had expended torpedoes and was departing area. That explained a lot of bombs and depth charges we had heard the last few days.

April 20, 1945

0500 Dived 12 miles southeast of TODO SAKI and closed 100-fathom curve, visibility just enough to see a few tangents and the light on the point.

1200 Position: 29-27 N, 142-09 E.

1305 Detected pinging to the south and sighted a medium tanker headed north off OKAMA SAKI with an ASASHIO type destroyer patrolling one mile ahead, range 10,000 yards by ST. (SC #20)

1315 Went to battle stations and started closing. Closed destroyer and tanker to 6,000 and 7,000 yards, respectively, as they passed TODO SAKI but considered range too great for shooting low power torpedoes.

1352 After passing us, destroyer turned toward and closed to about 5,000 yards, pinging intently. Believe he heard a high sound level from our high speed. He then rejoined the tanker.

Decided to open TODO SAKI, surface, and make a sweep to the north, hoping they would go wide in proceeding north.

1781 Surfaced and made sweep to north along 100-fathom curve at 3-engine speed. Did not regain contact.

April 21, 1945

Made sweep to south back toward TODO SAKI, still a heavy swell from south, visibility improved.

0439 Dived 8 miles off KONE SAKI and closed.

0646 Sighted a dilapidated picket boat patrolling north-south off KONE SAKI. Do not believe that he ever detected us, at least no portable sound gear could be seen over his side, but we spent the day playing hide-and-seek with this patrol boat and another similar one.

0716 Sighted coastal freighter proceeding south from TODO SAKI into YAMADA KO. (SC #21)

1200 Position: 39-25 N, 142-06 E.

Closed KONE SAKI to 4,000 yards during the afternoon, the two patrol boats still pestering us. Saw nothing large enough to shoot.

1937 Surfaced and patrolled northeast and reverse.

April 22, 1945

Decided to try KONE SAKI again, the weather having calmed, visibility good.

0430 Dived 8 miles southeast of the point.

Closed shore to 4,200 yards and patrolled north. The two patrol boats were already on station.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 22, 1945 (Continued)

0835 Sighted first of three small standard tankers in column, light condition, proceeding north along the coast just south of OKAMA SAKI. Went to battle stations and started closing for attack position off KONE SAKI, with one of the patrol boats 3,000 yards north of us. There was a slight swell from the south, no wind, and the visibility was good.

0856-25 On course 310 T, 3,400 yards from KONE SAKI, commenced firing 3 Mk. 14's at second tanker in column, range 2,200 yards, track 120S, gyro angle 15R, target speed 7 knots. (Torpedo Attack No. 4A)

0856-33 Fired second torpedo.

0856-40 Fired third torpedo.

Shifted set-up to third tanker.

0856-55 Commenced firing 3 Mk. 14's, same range and speed, track 109 S, gyros 5R (Torpedo Attack No. 4B)

0856-04 Fired second torpedo.

0857-14 Fired third torpedo.

Heard explosions as follows, all muffled, the first explosion being followed immediately by a secondary explosion:

0858-07

0858-15

0858-47

Had fired with one foot of scope out and was unable to see due to change in trim forward during first two explosions. Saw third tanker in column immediately after last explosion covered with a cloud of smoke, turned 30° toward, and down by stern. Swept right and could see only one of the leading tankers, both of which were identical. It is believed that this tanker turned after being hit so as to be lost in the background of KONE SAKI. The firing intervals as taken by both the QM and Plotting Officer check for torpedo runs of 2,400 yards and the explosions were characteristic for empty tankers. Only three explosions were heard. After the explosions sound had only one set of screws from the original set of three.

0900 Turned right and went to 250 feet, 70 turns, to clear area. Opened to southeast to take advantage of southerly set.

0945 Heard first of the pingers astern.

1117 One random depth charge at about 3 miles.

Had several patrols pinging astern as we evaded, but none made contact. Expected aerial bombs but it was proved later that the Japs were going to use some trickery instead.

1200 Position: 39-25 N, 142-14 E.

2032 Surfaced and patrolled south toward KINKASAN.

2118 SJ contact bearing 296 T, range 51,000 yards. Tracked him for a while, but getting very little speed gave it up as a bogey.

2312 SJ contact bearing 252 T, range 43,000 yards, plotting just a little south of the last distant contact. This was no bogey since he tracked nicely on base course 195 T at 9 knots. (SC #23)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 22, 1945 (Continued)

2342 Started end-around to south and west, bright moonlight, good visibility. Hoped for a surface attack just after moonset at 0300 when we would be ahead of target. No radar had been detected from the target and he was not pinging.

April 23, 1945

0230 With the range at 10,000 yards, target started steering crazy courses and varying speed. Decided he was lost, trying to make a daylight landfall on KINKASAW, so got west of him for a daylight submerged attack.

0334 Heard several transmissions on 500 kcs. from a nearby ship. Knew now he was lost and thought he may have detected our phosphorescence at high speed with a high lookout and was calling for help.

0402 In growing light sighted target to the east, a small ship with built up superstructure, zigging radically to west.

0411 Dived on his track. Heard pinging immediately. Target was soon identified as a PC, speeding up to over 200 turns. This was a trap, pure and simple, and not knowing the extent of the plot, evaded to north and east. The PC was not aggressive, but continued his sweep to the west.

0521 One small sono-bomb. Discovered an unexpected 5° gradient and got beneath it at 450 feet, so the PC had no chance of making contact. Stern tubes leaked excessively, with packing taken up to the danger point, and could not get suction on maneuvering room bilges. Had a 12° up angle and resorted to bucket brigade to keep the water down until we could ease back up.

1017 A string of depth charges.

1200 Position: 38-46 N, 142-00 E.

1551 Another string of depth charges.

1839 Surfaced and patrolled north.

April 24, 1945

0442 Patrolled south toward O SAKI, weather calm, very poor visibility. Dived 8 miles southeast of O SAKI. Closed to 4,000 yards, visibility about 4 miles all day, oil slick sea. One patrol boat and several trawlers were near so few periscope observations could be made. Sighted a tug and several barges going in and out of KAMASHI.

1200 Position: 39-13 N, 142-01 E.

1230 Sighted a small freighter with one small escort, bearing 218 T, range 8,000 yards, proceeding north hugging the coast. The escort was 1,500 yards to seaward of the freighter, not pinging. Obtained ST range at 7,000 yards. (SC #24).

1232 Went to battle stations and started closing track of the freighter, escort's bearing steady.

1245 Went to 90 feet and continued closing track at 4 knots.

1256 Escort passed overhead.

Q-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Subject: U.S.S. PARCHE (SS384) - Report of Fifth War Patrol.

April 24, 1945 (Continued)

1303 Back at 65 feet, commenced firing 3 Mk. 14's forward at freighter, range 1,550 yards, track 110 S, target speed 8.5 knots. (Torpedo Arrack No. 5)

One torpedo broached, but settled down, all three going out in a perfect spread. Just before torpedoes should have hit, raised periscope to see target turn away 90°. All missed. Turned right and went to 200 feet. The escort showed no interest, running away, so went to 300 feet and cleared area to southeast. Heard several sets of screws and two pingers during the afternoon, but none of them were aggressive.

1955 Surfaced and headed south, torpedoes expended.

2338 Received message from CERO, who had been ordered to this area, giving position and time of arrival.

April 25, 1945

0035 Sent message to CERO for rendezvous at 36 N 143-30 E at 0830(I), April 25, 1945.

0217 Sent PARCHE second to Comsubspac, giving additional results and proposed rendezvous with CERO.

0935 Rendezvoused with CERO. By line-throwing gun gave her copy of our track chart in the area and a list of all ship contacts. Also gave her general information on traffic, attack positions, and anti-submarine measures. Weather had grown too rough to take his remaining prisoner, another having died of wounds.

0945 Proceeded southeast.

1200 Position: 35-20 N, 144-10 E.

1550 Received orders from Comsubspac to proceed to MIDWAY for refit after rendezvous with CERO.

April 25-30 Enroute MIDWAY. Uneventful.

April 26, 1945

1200(I) Position: Lat. 33-42 N, Long. 151-18 E.

April 27, 1945

1200(K) Position: Lat. 32-25 N, Long. 158-29 E.

April 28, 1945

1200(L) Position: Lat. 31-06 N, Long. 165-26 E.

April 29, 1945

1200(L) Position: Lat. 30-04 N, Long. 172-36 E.

April 30(29), 1945

1200(M) Position: Lat. 28-59 N, Long. 177-38 E.

2035(M) Crossed International Date Line at Lat. 28-29 N. Changed date to April 29, 1945.

2235(Y) Exchanged recognition and calls with STERLET on opposite course.

April 30, 1945

0906(Y) Entered channel at MIDWAY.

1007(Y) Completed sound test.

1035(Y) Moored Pier S-9, Submarine Base, Midway, T.H.