COMMANDER TRANSPORT SQUADRON TWELVE
(CoNAGASAKI Group and C.T.G. 16-3)

ACTION REPORT
Landings of Occupation Forces
NAGASAKI
JAPAN
September - 1944
CONFIDENTIAL

COMMANDER TRANSPORT SQUADRON TWELVE
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

30 September 1945

From: Commander NAGASAKI Group (Commodore H. B. KNICKLES, USN; C.T.G. 54.3 and ComTransRon 12, U.S.S. CAMBRIA, Flagship).

To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Via: (1) Commander Task Group 54.1 (ComPhibGrp 4).
(2) Commander Task Force 54 (ComFIFTHPhibFor).
(3) Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Action Report, Landings at NAGASAKI, 18-23 September 1945.

Reference: (a) PacFlt Conf. Ltr. 101-45 dated 1 January 1945.
(b) ComFIFTHPhibFor Operation Plan No. A1101-45.
(c) ComPhibGrp 4 Operation Plan No. A411-45.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Action Report.

Enclosure (A) is forwarded in compliance with references (a), (b), and (c).

H. B. KNICKLES

Distribution:
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CinCPac (3 Advance copies)
ComPhibPac (Advance copy)
ComTransDiv 60
ComTransDiv 13 (Temp) (U.S.S. WAYNE)
ComLSTFlot 23
ComLSFNFlot 16

Ed. H. BROWN
Liet. Comdr., USNR
Flag Secretary.
COMMANDER TRANSPORT SQUADRON TWELVE
(ConNAGASAKI Group and C.T.C. 54-3)

ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART I - BRIEF SUMMARY

1. Task Group 54-3 (NAGASAKI Group) embarked the SECOND Marine Division at SAIPAN and commencing on 23 September, landed troops and equipment in the NAGASAKI Harbor area without enemy opposition.

2. The SECOND Marine Division was embarked in ships of this group as follows: 6th RCT on ships of TransDiv 24 (Temp), 2nd RCT on ships of TransDiv 60 (Temp) and 8th RCT in ships of TransDiv 13 (Temp). Artillery Battery, Pioneer Co., LCT Transport, Shore Party, Tank Bn., 43rd C.B., and miscellaneous engineering equipment was embarked in LCT's of LCTFlot 22 (Temp) and LST's of LSTFlot 16.

3. Unloading of transport types was completed on 28 September, prior to which date most LST's and LST's had completed unloading and had departed from the area.
ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT HAGASAIN

PART II - FIRST NIGHT

1. T.G. 54.3, HAGASAIN Group, was a part of the Southern Occupation Group (T.G. 54.1) under Rear Admiral Reifsnider, which in turn was a part of T.P. 54, FIFTH Amphibious Force, under Vice Admiral Hill.

2. The composition of this group was as follows:

T.G. 54.3 HAGASAIN Group - Commodore Knowles

54.3.1.2 SECOND Marine Division - Lt. Gen. Hunt, USMC

54.3.1 Transition 12 (Temp) - Commodore Knowles

54.3.11 Transition 34 (Temp) - Commodore Knowles

- CARONIA (SP) (APA-36)
- RICHARD (APA-26)
- APPLING (APA-91)
- FREDERICK (APA-167)
- LEXINGTON (APA-155)
- ALBACORE (APA-15)
- CAPTICORNE (APA-57)

54.3.12 Transition 60 (Temp) - Captain Loom

- CREEL (F) (APA-172)
- LEAFLETTER (APA-155)
- LEXINGTON (APA-156)
- LEAFLET (APA-133)
- LENDER (APA-125)
- LADERA (APA-63)
- TYPHILL (APA-60)

54.3.13 Transition 13 (Temp) - Captain Cooper

- VANCE (F) (APA-54)
- REMIT (APA-262)
- RENSHAW (APA-163)
- RUSHMORE (APA-59)
- LEX LEAVES (APA-129)
- LEXINGTON (APA-16)
- COTTON (APA-101)
54.3.2 LST Flotilla 23 (Temp) - Captain Woood

Flotilla Flagship - LC(PP) 790

54.3.21 LST Group 13 (Temp) - Comdr. Lea

LST 431 (P), 166 (Cly Sst), 571 (PB)
734, 785, 788 (Cly Sst), 817,
829, 671 (Cly Sst), 887 (Cly Sst),
953, 975, 1073 (PB), 1123 (PB),
1140 (Cly Sst)

NOTES:
(Cly Sst) - Causeway Sst on board,
(PB) - Pontoon Barges on board.

54.3.3 LSH Flotilla 16 (Temp) - Comdr. Hicke

54.3.31 LSH Unit ONE - Comdr. Hicke

LSH 498 (PP), 507, 309, 439, 641, 94,
170, 78, 253, 227

54.3.32 LSH Unit TWO - Lt. Cdr. Lane

LSH 450 (P), 448, 465, 263, 452, 452,
122, 466, 193, 286

54.3.4 LCT Flotilla (Temp)

LCT's as assigned from T.O. 54.2.4

54.3.5 TransRon 12 Control Party - Lieut. Stone

54.3.51 TransDiv 34 Control Officer -

54.3.52 TransDiv 60 Control Officer -

54.3.53 TransDiv 13 (Temp) Control Officer -

54.3.6 TransRon 12 Beach Party - Lt. Cdr. Cook

54.3.61 TransDiv 34 Beach Party -

54.3.62 TransDiv 60 Beach Party -

54.3.63 TransDiv 13 (Temp) Beach Party -
This group load the 2nd Div at SHIP, each of the loading having been completed under the direction of ConTransDiv 60 (Temp) prior to the assumption of control of this group by ConTransDiv 12. Assumption of command was on 150243 Z September.

4. Personnel, vehicles and cargo scheduled for loading in ships of this group were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>PERSONNEL (Number)</th>
<th>VEHICLES (Number)</th>
<th>CARGO (Short Ton)</th>
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### Preliminaries

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### LSM's

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5. Departure from SAIPHI was originally scheduled by operation plans of higher echelons for 21 September and arrival at the target scheduled for 26 September. Division and Corps plans for times and places for the landing at MAGASAKI were revised frequently, and on the morning of 17 September word was received from higher authority that the
Landing date for NAGASAKI had been changed from the 26th to the 23rd, necessitating hurried completion of loading of the ships and revision of landing plans.

6. LST's and LSM's of LSTFLOT 23 (Temp) and LSMFLOT 16 (Temp) sorted from SAIPAN during the afternoon of 17 September as T.U. 54.19.2. One LST (617) with hospital evacuation unit embarked had not arrived at SAIPAN from GUAM and one DE was ordered to rendezvous with it and proceed independently to the target as T.U. 54.19.4. LSM's 441, 448, 450 carrying motor transport equipment were subsequently ordered detached to proceed ahead of the remainder of the tractor group as T.U. 54.19.3.

7. Transports completed loading and topping off and sorted from SAIPAN on the 18th as T.U. 54.19.1. Movement to NAGASAKI was made in accordance with ConTransRon 12 Sortie and Movement Order No. 7-45. 

8. Because of the limited time and information available and last minute changes in planning, it was not possible to prepare extensive and detailed Landing Plans. An outline plan, ConTransRon 12 Landing Plan No. 16-45, Enclosure (A), was prepared in conjunction with ConGen 2nd MarDiv and details were perfected during the movement to the objective.

9. The mission of this group was to land troops, equipment and supplies of the 2nd MarDiv in the NAGASAKI Area. Landings were commenced at 1200, 25 September, RCT 2 landing on the east side of NAGASAKI Harbor and RCT 6 on the west side. RCT 8 landed on the east side on 24 September.

10. Departure of ships of the NAGASAKI Group from the NAGASAKI Area was affected in echelons. Fifteen LSM's had completed unloading and were ordered to depart at 1400, 25 September. Seven LST's completed unloading and departed NAGASAKI at 1600, 25 September, and eleven transport types were unloaded and sorted by 1900 the same day. Three LST's and five LSM's were unloaded and departed at 0300, the 27th. ConTransRon 12 and all remaining transport types had completed unloading and departed NAGASAKI at 1300, 26 September, as of which time all other units of the NAGASAKI Group had completed unloading except the LST 617 (the LST which had not arrived from GUAM until the 27th). Remaining unloaded LST's were scheduled to depart immediately after ConTransRon 12.

11. No enemy opposition was encountered.
COMMANDER-TRANSPORT SQUADRON TWELVE
(ComMACASAKIGroup and C.T.O. 54.3)

ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART III - CHRONOLOGY

SECTION (A) - MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE (times as stated)

17 September 1945 (Times minus TEN Zone)

1400 T.U. 54.19.2, consisting of 14 LST's, 1 LC (FF), and 20 LSM's, escorted by ROBERTS (DE-749), departed SAAIPAN for NAGASAKI, JAPAN; 80 N 9 knots.

18 September 1945 (Times minus TEN Zone)

1600 Squadron (Temporary) underway to sortie for movement to NAGASAKI, JAPAN. Proceeded as T.U. 54.19.1 with C.T.O. 54.19, ComTransNo. 12, O.T.C. and guide in COLUMBUS. Cruising disposition 3 W; Standard Speed 14 knots; SNYDER (DE-745) and GLEAVES (DD-423) as escort.

1030 Changed clocks to minus NINE Zone time.

2000 Position: 15°-59-6 North, 144°-52-1 East.

19 September 1945 (Times minus NINE Zone)

0705 MUNIFEE (APA-202) lost steering control and sheered out of column.

0709 MUNIFEE (APA-202) regained steering control.

0900 Position: 17°-44-7 North, 142°-43-9 East.

1200 Position: 19°-32-3 North, 142°-17-8 East.

1300 Commenced exercises at ship handling by watch officers.

1430 Ceased exercises at ship handling.


20 September 1945 (Times minus NINE Zone)

0730 TILLS (DE-748) reported from SAAIPAN that LST 817 departed GUAM for BUCKNER BAY for onward routing NAGASAKI. Requested instructions.

0800 Position: 22°-25-9 North, 140°-11-1 East.

0900 TransNo. 12 exercised at sea position buoys.

1000 TransNo. 12 exercised at flag hoist drills.

1021 TILLS (DE-748) ordered to sail for BUCKNER BAY, join and escort LST 817 prior arrival, if possible. To form T.U. 54.19.4 with LST 817 and proceed to NAGASAKI.

1118 C.T.O. 54.19.2 ordered to form T.U. 54.19.3 consisting of LSM 461, 466, and 450 and detach same immediately at best speed for NAGASAKI; to await arrival of transports at point DOGFOOD unless passed at sea.

(III) - 1
C-O-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

ConTransaction 12

Action Report - MAGALAKI - PART (III) - CHRONOLOGY

1147 C.T.U. 54.19.2 reported destruction of Jap 4 horned mine by gun fire. Lat. 23° 39' North, Long. 139° 15' East.
1200 Position: 23° 39' North, 139° 15' East.
1505 Ship bearing 086° T, distant 12.5 miles identified as HARVEYON (DE 316) with group of LST's.
2000 Position: 24° 0' 45' North, 138° 16' East.

21 September 1944 (times minus W.T.E. zone)

0315 Passed T.U. 54.19.2 abreast to port distant 3 miles on course 30°, speed 9.6 knots.
0500 Position: 26° 35' North, 135° 21' East.
0912 GAMS (APA 168) reported steering casualty; keeping station with emergency gear.
0930 GAMS (APA 168) reported steering gear repairs completed.
1000 Commenced flag hoist drills, CTU 69 leading.
1025 Ceased flag hoist drills.
1200 Position: 27° 0' 30' North, 134° 52' East.
1314 McIntyre (APA 129) reported temporary breakdown.
1317 McIntyre (APA 129) reported loss of vacuum, recovery of same, and rejoined formation.
2000 Position: 27° 0' 61' North, 132° 51' East.
2113 Ottawa (APA 101) reported steering casualty.
2132 Ottawa (APA 101) reported steering casualty repaired.
2330 Identified ships on port bow as HJ 376 and HJ 125, course 05°, Speed 9 knots.

22 September 1944 (times minus W.T.E. zone)

0127 C.T.U. 52.6.7 (32.6.7) contacted C.T.U. 54.19 by radio: Composition 13 LST's and COGS (DE 444), distant 12.5 miles, bearing 01° 30', course 230° T, Speed 10 knots.
0200 Lant picked up on 85° radar bearing 320°, distant 101 miles.
0800 Position: 27° 29' North, 130° 13' East.
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ConTranson 12
Action Report - KAMAŠKI - PART (III) - CHRONOLOGY

1200 Position: 29°33'16" North, 129°22'14" East.
1405 OTTAWA (ABA-101) reported steering casualty; steering with emergency gear.
1445 OTTAWA (ABA-101) reported steering casualty repaired.
1752 ComfortDiv 53 reported exploding by gunfire & horned, type 93 Japanese mines - Lat. 29°36'1" North, Long. 128°35'5" East.
1330 Radar contact identified as C.T.U. 55.7.57 on CHICAGO (CVE-23) with CHICAGO (LST-662), being part of P.O. evacuation unit.
1654 T.U. 56.1.57 passed clear on port beam.
2000 CIC reported radar contact with LSM's bearing 173° T., distant 175 miles.
2150 Sighted DIV-35 (DD-357).

23 September 1945 (Times minus HKE Zone)

0050 Identified three ships off starboard bow as TOLMIDGE (LCC-11); TACOS (L-63) and HAGH (DE-23).
0427 Contacted HELI (DD-383) by radio, proceeding toward us on course 120°; speed 15 knots.
0450 HELI (DD-383) reported speed and course as above and that BIGLEY (DD-366) was stationed at point LEBON.
0501 Notified ConTranson 24; T.U. 54.19.1 would arrive at point DOUGHER at 0540.
0524 HELI (DD-383) instructed to C.T.U. 54.19.1 wanted swept channel cleared and could make up to 14 knots.
0635 SUNDER (DD-745) reported passing buoy 8 to starboard.
0650 SUNDER (DD-745) reported passing buoy 7 10 yards off starboard.
0755 Ships of Transition 12 (Temp) in assigned berths eastward of CK370 as follows: CUSHING - 8; TULLOWER - 2; CLEWS - 3; MAYHEW - 6; ELYS - 9; KEMPER - 57; LANDER - 7; CAGE - 52; LERMON - 4; AUBRINE - 57; HELM - 5; Lc INTREY - 53; MACON - 3; AQUINUS - 52; OTTAWA - 55; SHERIDAN, LYTTEL, APLO, ANDROMEDA, PRISTONE and C.HICORHUS in the channel.
0800 Weather: barometer 29.76; wind force 7 knots from 240° T., heavy rain squalls.
0850 Remaining ships of TransDiv 34 assigned berths as follows: HENRY - 22; PRISTONE - 20; LYTTLE - 43; LYTTEL - 24; ANDROMEDA - 45.
1140 CUSHING Hour confirmed by ConTranson 12 as 1300.
1201 CUSHING and TULLOWER underway for inner harbor.
1200 First waves RO23(R12 1/2) alongside Dajan Wharf.
1203 CUSHING moored in berth 1 HAGH inner harbor.
1336 Hit 1/6 from TransDiv 60 sailor to beach.
1446 LANDER directed to stand into inner harbor.
1447 Requested FID of USS SPEAKER and USN MILUX, which were occupying much needed berthing space in the inner harbor, and advised no definite FID had been established.
1448 MENTIFE direct to stand into inner harbor 30 minutes after
LANIER entered.
1359 BLT 2/6 dispatched to beach from GAGE.
1401 All BLT's from GAGE boated and enroute to beach.
1405 CAMELLIA and TYRELL in inner harbor; TYRELL at dock unloading.
1421 BLT 36 from WYNE enroute to beach.
1431 BLT 32 from MERRILL other enroute to beach.
1509 Japanese surrender delegation headed by Lt. Gen. Hailie Tooguchi
and Governor of NAGASAKI came aboard.
1515 Formal instructions issued to the Japanese delegation, which left
the ship shortly thereafter.
1516 LANIER standing into inner harbor.
1524 TYRELL ordered to commence general unloading.
1600 LMS's 444 and 448 unloaded.
1605 CAMELLIA, TYRELL, LANIER and MENTIFE in inner harbor; CAMELLIA
standing in.
1630 GIMMS scoured starboard side to TYRELL at Customs Wharves.
1631 ComtransDiv 60 and BLT 2 ordered to commence general unloading.
1634 GAGE ordered to stand into inner harbor.
1709 MERRILL other ordered to stand into inner harbor.
1933 OTTAWA in drydock No. 3.
2000 C.T.O. 54/3 dispatched the following (paraphrase):
Situation Summary: Arriving at point LUDLOW C730 I, started
preparation for landing in consultation with representatives
of the FIFTH Amphibious Corps; about 7000 troops were landed
without incident beginning at 1300. Started general unloading
of TransDiv's upon getting nine ships into inner harbor at
berths, docks and one in dry dock 3. The Governor of NAGASAKI
and party received instructions from General HINE of the 2nd
HartDiv. I51's and LMS's with shore party equipment due to arrive
21st September. Found unloading situation much less favorable than
anticipated due to fire support ships, evacuation shipping and
wrecks.
2037 TransDiv beachedmaster requested every effort be made at high tide
to clear wreckage from Area E57Y 3 so I51's could land in the
morning.
2230 GCPA (C.T.G. 55/7) ordered ComtransDiv 12 to move BRAXTON (APA-
138) from berth in inner harbor by daylight to make room for
IKKEN (AH-12).

24 September 1945 (Time Minus Nine Zone)

2235 Ships of TransDiv 12 (Temp) continued unloading from following
wharves, docks and anchorages:
Comtransition 12
Action Report - MAGASAKI - PART (III) - CHRONOLOGY.

1st District: CAMERLA - 1; BRAXTON - 6-8; LANTER - 2-3; HENRY
3-5; OTTAWA in dry dock.
2nd District: MERLINGTON - 12-13; CAGE - 15-14.
3rd District: WAYNE - 15; MC INTYRE - 9; AUDRAIN - 7.

OLIVE HEALEY: CAPRICORNUS - 2; ANDROMEDA - 9; WAIKESHA - 3;
AQUARIUS - 4; MELLETTE - 5; APPLING - 6; LYCOMING -
7; FREESTONE - 8 and MENARD - 52.

0915 LANTER reported vehicles completely unloaded.
0930 Transcan beachmaster reported 30 loaded LCVs at Dejima Wharf.
0945 FREESTONE dispatched first wave HLT 1/8 to beach.
0615 BRAXTON underway clearing berth to make room for HAVEN (AH-12).
0620 HLT 8 commenced landings at finger pier north of Dejima Wharf.
0625 Transcan beachmaster reported HLT 8 landing satisfactorily.
0629 FREESTONE reported HLT 1/8 disembarked.
0714 AUDRAIN berthed in inner harbor.
0758 CAPRICORNUS directed by C.T.G. 54.2 to proceed at 0900 to inner
harbor and moor at Dejima Wharf astern of TYNNEIL.
0808 WAIKESHA directed by C.T.G. 54.3 to proceed at 0900 to inner
harbor and moor to Dejima Wharf astern CAPRICORNUS.
0815 FREESTONE directed by C.T.G. 54.3 to proceed at 1000 to inner
harbor and berth at Dejima Wharf alongside CAPRICORNUS.
0825 ComtransDiv 60 and Transcan beachmaster directed by C.T.G. 54.2
to unload LSMs at YOKO SAKI.
0830 LSMs of T.U. 54.29.2 under control of lot 23 berthed in outer harbor.
0832 MC INTYRE proceeded to assigned berth in inner harbor.
0832 Transcan beachmaster requested 2 LSMs with towing equipment to
clear beach of hulks (slip beyond Fisherman's Wharf).
0855 MERLINGTON reported all vehicles unloaded.
0900 CAPRICORNUS proceeded to berth in inner harbor as directed.
0926 MC INTYRE moored at north end of Mitsubishi Shipyard.
0930 LSMs of T.U. 54.29.2 berthed in outer harbor.
0930 WAIKESHA underway for assigned berth in inner harbor.
1000 HENRY reported cargo completely unloaded; now unloading troops.
1006 FREESTONE moored alongside CAPRICORNUS at Dejima Wharf ordered to
send control officer and beach party to Fish Market Wharf and to
unload all available vehicles there.
1010 HENRY ordered to Dejima Wharf after disembarking troops, and to
moor alongside WAIKESHA to unload all available vehicles at
Fish Market Wharf.
1026 LSMs 677 and 734 ordered to berth 1 in First District.
1047 LYCOMING directed to stand into inner harbor at 1130 and moor
bow and stem to buoys in berths 3-5, First District.
1100 APPLING completed discharging vehicles of reserve battalion.
1110 Rear Admiral REDFERN and members of his staff came aboard
CAMERLA to confer with Commodore KNFL.
1145 Major General SCHMITT (USMC) came aboard for conference with
Major General HUNT and Commodore KNFL.
Commander 12
Action Report — NAGASAKI— PART (III) — CHRONOLOGY.

1147 Rear Admiral FAHRION (ComCruDiv 4) came aboard for conference with Commodore KNOWLES.
1235 Rear Admiral HELPSIDDER, Major General SCHMITT and Rear Admiral FAHRION left ship.
1240 HENARD standing into inner harbor.
1309 TransDiv's ordered to commence general unloading, giving highest priority to needed vehicles.
1310 LYCOMING moored bow and stern to mooring buoys berths 3-5.
1320 Transon beachmaster reported moving Beach to the cross water ways due to bridge on road being too weak to carry load.
1346 HENARD instructed to moor bow and stern to buoys in berths 9-10, inner harbor, First District.
1425 2nd Marine B.T., Company enroute from LST1234 to shore.
1455 LSM 973 unloaded and retracted from Customs Wharf.
1456 LSM 405 enroute to Customs Wharf.
1500 HENARD standing into inner harbor to moor bow and stern to buoys in berths 13-14.
1545 CAGE completely unloaded and standing out to berth 5 east of OKIN SHIF.
1546 APPLING standing into inner harbor to moor bow and stern to buoys in berth 13-14.
1600 HELPSIDDER, KNOWLES and CAGE; LST's 786 and 797 — 100% unloaded.
1644 CAGE anchored east of OKIN SHIF.
1700 LST's 498, 448, 451, 403, 450, 465, 16, 240, and 405 completely unloaded.
1822 Marines reported that it was not practicable to unload LST's on East side with gear for East side because roads were too poor and one way traffic existed in many places.
1842 Transon beachmaster reported boats piling up and not being discharged due to lack of shore party.
1908 Transon beachmaster reported it impracticable to unload trailers from LST 439 because of congested road conditions.
1957 LST 133 unloaded 100%.
2000 C.T.C. 54-3 dispatched the following:
Situation Summary: Continued landing troops and supplies with no incidents. Three ECT's ashore plus additional division troops. Total about 12,000 troops and 10,000 tons cargo. Have 17 transports at docks and berths in inner harbor which is very congested. Tractor groups arrived 0830 and unloading included in above summary. Unloading facilities improving but traffic congestion with poor roads now determining factor. Adequate office space and billeting of Navy personnel to be based here will be difficult.
2045 LST 724 unloaded 100%.
2221 AURORA unloaded 100%.
2239 Port director requested C.T.C. 54-3 to assign 2 LST's to assist in unmooring U.S.S. VICTORUS at 0600 25 September.
ComTransRon 12
Action Report - MAGASAKI - PART (III) - CHRONOLOGY.

2400  LST's 78, 94, 103, 122, 253, 307, 441, 448, 450, 465, and 498
and LST's 734, and 463; - 100% unloaded,

25 September 1945 (Time minus NDM Zone)

0000  Assignments of ships of TransRon 12 inner and outer harbor.
MAGASAKI:

1st District:
  CAMELIA - 1; LYON - 2-3; LASTER - 2-3;
  GILBERT - 3-10; B.C INTIXUS and AUDRAIN moored
docks; OTTAWA in dry dock; ORCHIS, TYRRELL,
  FREEMOUNT, CAPRICE and EMERY moored at Customs
  Wharves.

2nd District:
  PRINCE EUGENE - 12-13; APPLING - 13-14.

3rd District:
  BRAXTOM - 7; WAYNE - 10

East Okinawa Shiu:
  ANDROMEDA - 2; MINERVA - 3; AQUARIUS - 4;
  G.C.E. - 5.

0652  TransRon beachmaster reported unloading of LST's delayed by
traffic difficulties due to narrow road entrances. Unloading
progressing as fast as trucks available.

0700  U.S.S. WICHITA underway and standing out.

0817  AQUARIUS directed to stand into inner harbor and moor bow and
stern in berths 6-8, astern ANDROMEDA.

0830  Assumed duties as SOPA (Admin). Issued directive to all ships
as follows:

"C.T.G. 54, 3 and ComTransRon 12 assumes duties of Admin SOPA
at MAGASAKI. There will be no shore leave or liberty for any
personnel embarked on Navy ships in this area until further
orders. Officers having official business ashore have permission
to conduct such business but shall not use this as a
pretense for sightseeing and shore leave,"

0900  Personal ordered to CORONADO (LST-27) to assist setting up tem-
porary F.P.C.

0900  ComGen 2nd MarDiv assumed command ashore.

0912  C.T.G. 54, 3 directed all group, division, and flotilla commanders
and the commanding officers of all ships in the MAGASAKI Area
(except LST's and LST's, whose group and flotilla commanders were
directed to disseminate the instructions to those ships) to report
aboard CAMELIA between 0900-1100. Commanding officers and group,
division, and flotilla commanders were warned that the ComGen 2nd
MarDiv and ComTransRon 12 had agreed that no naval personnel was
to be permitted ashore except officers on official business (and
boat crews and beach parties who were restricted to the immediate
vicinity of their beaches and boats), and that any violations
would be reported by the ComGen 2nd MarDiv and would be severely
punished.

1000  Officer and enlisted personnel and equipment assigned to port
director to assist in setting up Officer Messenger Mail Center
on beach.
CRIMES, WAYNE and CAMERIA directed to send their fire fighter boats to report to OMAHILL at buoy 8.

MEMPHIS ordered to send beach party to Area GEORGE 4 to relieve FREETHORN's beach party.

GAGE and AUDRAIN beach parties granted permission to secure.

AUDRAIN reported all planes unloaded and dispatched to Dejima Wharf.

AC INTYRE 100% unloaded.

LST's 390, 1022 and 828 ordered to anchor in Area ROGER, outer harbor.

TransDiv 60 beachmaster reports that situation on 3C Beach is not good. No unloading for last hour. Cranes not operating.

C.T.G. 5L2 dispatched the following Situation Summary:


The following completely unloaded: CRIMES, BRAXTON, TARNER, WAYNE, MEMPHIS, GAGE, AUDRAIN, AC INTYRE, AQUARIUS.

26 September 15.45 (Time minus NINT Zone)

All LST's of C.T.G. 3L2 100% unloaded except 735 70%.

1073 90%; 888 80%; 837 90%; 571 55%.

ComTransDiv 60 ordered to form task unit with Commander No ROK in LST 498, LST 78, 94, 103, 122, 170, 227, 253, 286, 307, 309, 452, 462, 465, and 466 in company, and ROBERTS (DE-749) as escort, and when ROK's depart MAGASAXI at 1400 26 September for OKINAWA, via routes indicated, to load 10th Army Corps and onward routing to NIN NIN reporting to ComPhibCgrp ELEVEN.

TransDiv 60, LST's 412, 112, 113, 114, ordered to execute boat pool plan, sending boats to CAMERIA. In addition MELIETHE, MILLETT and AC INTYRE ordered to leave one LCP(I) each.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

ComTransRon 12
Action Report - MAGASAKI - PART (III) - CHRONOLOGY.

1100 AQUARIUS completed unloading.
1120 C.T.G. 54.3 issued the following orders:
Form task unit number to be assigned later, consisting of GRIJES (F) (Captain JENK, ComTransDiv 60 (Temp)) BRAXTON, LAIBER, HERTH, ORIBI, LEE, WATTS, MATHIEU, GAGE, AUBRAI, R.C. LAMU, and AQUARIUS with SNYDER as escort; when RFS 1900 I 26 September departed MAGASAKI for WAKATA via points and routes as indicated in dispatch; SOA 12.5 knots; ETA 1 October.
1219 LST 5971 and 1073 ordered to launch pontoon barges and LST 166 launch causeway for use of Port Director.
1237 ComLSTCorp 13 ordered to form task unit and be ready for sea at 1600 as follows: Comnader LST in LST 166, 734, 705, 788, 953, and 975 to proceed to LEE, via routes indicated; SOA 9.5 knots; ETA 1300 I, 2 October.
1332 TransRon 12 beachmaster ordered to report aboard CAMERIA.
1354 Medical teams 1, 2, and 3 less medical officers ordered to report to FIRESTONE for temporary duty.
1526 TERRILL ordered to clear wharf and moor bow and stern in berths 4-6 and AMERLEEDA ordered to go alongside in spot vacated by TERRILL.
1600 CAMERIA completed unloading.
1708 TransDiv 60, less TAUNIESHA and TERRILL, and TransDiv 13, less AQUARIUS and OTTAWA underway in accordance with previous instructions.
1742 TransDiv 34 plus TAUNIESHA, TERRILL and OTTAWA ordered to send boat pool boats to CAMERIA when unloaded.
2000 C.T.G. 54.3 dispatched the following:
Situation Summary: Continued unloading with no incidents. Total landed to date 13,236 troops, 25,653 tons of cargo. Ten transports remaining average 75% unloaded. Port director starts functioning 27th with personnel and facilities at hand.
Arrivals: EAGER, ENSINO, REFRESH, ELYSIA, HAZARD, DOUR, ATLACON, PGH 31, LCI 651, 613, 1072, 9.5, CARLEAS. Departures: SCOURRY, SHELTER, CONESTOGA, LCI 661, LEE, GRIJES, WATTS, AQUARIUS, AUBRAI, BRAXTON, GAGE, LAIBER, R.C. LAMU, LEE, HERTH, ORIBI, MATHIEU, JENK, MILES, LEE, LST 166, 734, 705, 788, 953, 975; ROBERTS.
2021 APLING completed unloading.
2040 C.O.'s of TransDiv 34, plus TAUNIESHA, TERRILL and OTTAWA ordered to report aboard CAMERIA at 2100.
2055 C.T.G. 54.3 directed as follows:
When RFS 1900 I, 27 September LST 1073, 571, 227 proceed with LCS 104 as escort to SASEBO via points and routes as directed. SOA 9 knots; ETA 1300 I 27 September. On arrival report to C.T.G. 54.3 and ComLSTCorp 13. LCS 104 make repairs and return to MAGASAKI when directed on completion.
CONFIDENTIAL

Conventional 12

Action Report - NAGASAKI - PART (III) - CHRONOLOGY.

2103 C.T.G. 54.3 directed (in part) as follows:
When HPS 0801 1, 27 September, depart NAGASAKI with 1ST's 450, 429, 441, 463, and 448 and proceed without escort to OKINAWA via points and routes as directed. SCA 13 knots; ETA 231611 (1).

2308 WARSASH completed unloading,

27 September 1945 (Time minus NING Zone)

0747 LYCOMING completed unloading.

0805 WARSASH assigned to berth 5 east of OKINO SHELL in outer harbor.

1008 OTTAWA directed to anchor in berth 7 east of OKINO SHELL in outer harbor.

1045 Permission granted TransRon and TransDiv beachmasters for closing Fisherman's Wharf unloading area.

1135 TYRELL completed unloading.

1217 OTTAWA completed unloading and ordered to assist ANDROMEDA.

1418 TYRELL directed to proceed to berth 2 east of OKINO SHELL in outer harbor.

1533 C.T.G. 54.3 directed as follows:
When HPS Task unit no number designation assigned, consisting of LC FF 790, Captain WEIDEN, and 1ST's 827, 829, 871, 1123, and 1140. Depart NAGASAKI for HIRLANAS via points and routes directed. Upon arrival report to AmphibPac HIRLANAS for loading 5thPDCF Corps elements as directed by ComRon VP.

AmphibPac HIRLANAS requested to advise ComRon VP AmphibPac HIRLANAS final destination.

1541 C.T.G. 54.3 directed as follows:
When unloaded and ready for sea sail 1ST's 390, 828, 870 and 1072 from NAGASAKI to SASEBO via points and routes directed. Upon arrival report to ComRon Group 11.

1731 Commanding officer of ANDROMEDA ordered to report to C.T.G. 54.3 aboard CABELLA.

1756 HIKESHA completed unloading.

1826 CAPRICORNUS and TYRELL directed to turn in boats, as per boat pool order, to CABELLA prior to 2000.

1833 FREEDOM and ANDROMEDA directed to have boats for boat pool at CABELLA by 0630.

2000 C.T.G. 54.3 dispatched the following:
Situations Summary: Completed unloading all AAA's and AKA's except ANDROMEDA and CAPRICORNUS. Totals landed to date 19, 376 troops, 32,190 tons of cargo. Steady light rain, otherwise favorable. One case of multiple felony now being in-
vested, otherwise, quiet. Intend to sail remaining ships Transon 12 (temp) tomorrow morning. Port director will assume SPOA (Admir) unless otherwise directed. Arrivals: CARRIESER, TILLS, and LST 817; Departures: FIXITY, EAGER, EXECUTE, REFRESH, HAZARD, DOUR, PH 31, LTA 263, LST's 571, 387, 1073, LCI's 651, 1071, LST's 533, 439, 441, 444, 450, LCS 104.

C.T.C. 54.3 by dispatch directed attention of ComSFLot 16 and ComSFGroup 13 to typhoon advisory 270614 and directed that they seek ice of ORINOM if situation warranted.

C.T.C. 54.3 directed the following:

When RFS about 0300 I, 28 September form Transon 12 (temp) CAMBRIA (SF) Commodore KNOWLES with FREESTONE, HENARD, LYCOMING, APPLING, ANDROMEDA, CAPRICHORUS, WAUKESHA, TYRELL, OTTAWA with TILLS (DE-748) as escort. Depart NAGASAKI for MANILA via points and routes directed. SOA 13 knots making own ETA 24 hours prior arrival. Be prepared to pick up designated Army boats at LINGAYEN.

WAUKESHA directed to clear deck at daylight.

28 September 1945 (Time Minus NINT Zone)

0000 All ships unloaded except ANDROMEDA and CAPRICHORUS who were unloading with assistance of several other units.

0630 All ships completely unloaded.

1315 CAMBRIA underway from berth 1 inner harbor KAMSAKI, KYUSHU, JAPAN enroute to MANILA, P.I., ComTranson 12 in CAMBRIA with following ships in company: HENARD (APA-201), APPLING (APA-56), CAPRICHORUS (AKA-57), TYRELL (AKA-86), FREESTONE (APA-167), LYCOMING (APA-155), OTTAWA (AKA-101), WAUKESHA (AKA-84), and ANDROMEDA (AKA-15) escorted by TILLS (DE-748).
COMMANDER TRANSPORT SQUADRON TWELVE
(ComNAASAKTGroup and C.T.G. 54, 3)

ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART IV - SPECIAL REPORTS

Section (A) - Intelligence

1. General

AdComPhibsPac Intelligence (PEARL HARBOR) furnished one copy
"Port of NAGASAKI OP 16 PE 33-45" and copies of such other publica-
tions and charts which were left with them for distribution at PEARL
HARBOR. Parts of "Port of NAGASAKI" were reproduced for information
within the command and were used extensively.

Most of the intelligence material for this squadron was dis-
tributed at SAIPAN by TransDiv 60 (Temp) before our arrival. A check
showed it had been distributed promptly and intelligently.

Additional material for distribution was received at SAIPAN
and distributed. Before departure from SAIPAN a third lot of material
was received from Phiborp 4 and distributed. All materials were
checked against materials available to insure that all available
material was distributed, and V PhibCorps Intelligence Section was
contacted for the same purpose. Because of the small number of charts
of the harbor and "Beach and Dock Diagrams" furnished, all ships were
ordered to make additional sketches, diagrams, or overlays.

Recommendation: Whenever possible more copies of charts and
harbor diagrams should be furnished, since facilities for duplicating
such information aboard transports are very limited.

2. Minefield Intelligence

Information on mines and minefields was compiled from CinCPac-
CincPac Bulletin 208-45 furnished by AdComPhibsPac at PEARL HARBOR,
"G" messages, Minefield Intelligence Dispatches, Operation Orders and
Plans, Twentieth Air Force Charts and all other available sources,
and kept plotted in accordance with ComFIFTH Fleet Operation Plan No.
6-45. Information concerning a mine destroyed by the screen enroute
to NAGASAKI at Latitude 32°25' N and Longitude 128°54' E, was dissoc-
dinated. Information of an alleged minefield reported by local police
to troops ashore was dispatched to all interested in minefield
intelligence: location near Latitude 32°52' N, Longitude 128°55' E off
GOTO ISLAND.

Recommendation: due to the fact that so many garbles creep up
in dispatches and prevent accurate plotting, it is believed that place
names, latitude and longitude and H.O. chart numbers should all be
used in all dispatches when reporting important minefield information,
3. Operation Orders and Plans

One copy of ComFifthPhibFor Operation Plan No. A1501-45 was obtained from AdmComPhibsPac at PEARL HARBOR. At GUAM the Intelligence Office of COMOB supplied another together with one copy of ComCruDiv 13 Operation Plan No. 10-45; Change No. 2 to ComFifthPhibFor Operation Plan No. 1501-45; CominPac Operation Plan No. 12-45; SOP-4A.

Although each TransRon Commander is listed in the distribution list to ComFIFTHFleet Operation Plan No. 86-45 as having been sent two copies of that plan, they have not yet been received. Efforts to obtain a copy through the emergency distribution centers at GUAM and SAIPAN were without success; we were advised they had no copies to distribute. Fortunately, ComPhibGrp 4 was able to lend us one copy (which was obtained on 11 September).

After departure of ComPhibGrp 4 from SAIPAN, several requests were received, particularly from ships designated screening duties for this group, for a copy of various senior orders applicable to the operation. These ships reported that they had not received their copies and that they were unable to obtain copies of applicable orders from the emergency distribution center.

Recommendation: Since it is imperative that a command operating as required of the NAGASAKI Group should have necessary operation plans and orders of higher echelons bearing on the operation, it is recommended that such plans and orders be designated for special handling to insure that their distribution is a matter of highest priority and urgency and that ample copies be supplied the emergency distribution centers.
Section (3) - Aerography

1. Weather information.

(a) Two weather maps a day were prepared as long as radio reception was favorable. Censored maps from WFS CHIM were the main source of this information. Forecasts were prepared from information obtained from the daily maps, WFS forecasts and local observations. Submarine and aircraft reports were of minor assistance in forecasting. Typhoon information was carefully plotted twice daily.

(b) 14 to 18 – at Saipan.

Sky was partly cloudy with little shower activity.
Moderate sea swells, averaged in length, persisted throughout.

(c) 18 to 23, enroute Saipan to Nagasaki.

Departed Saipan with skies partly cloudy on the 18th, becoming broken on the 19th, with alto-cumulus and low cumulus clouds ranging between 1000 to 2000 feet. Visibility was good, being reduced some in scattered showers. A weak cold front persisted between Chichi Shima and Saipan the 20th and 21st resulting in moderate scattered showers in area. A low pressure area accompanied by frontal conditions was encountered on the 22nd resulting in overcast skies in afternoon and evening and somewhat squally conditions on the evening of the 22nd. A general clearing up of these conditions came on the 23rd, leaving the sky partly cloudy with a low short sea swell upon entrance into Nagasaki Harbor.

(d) 23 to 26 at Nagasaki.

The 23rd remained partly cloudy with low sea swell. Sky conditions were mainly broken on the 24th with light showers in the early morning period of the 25th. A high of 1014 to 1017 persisted over the 25th and 26th resulting in partly cloudy skies. Air mass showers on the evening of the 26th. A low of 997 accompanied by cold occlusion and showers on the 27th. General clearing up of skies on the 28th.

(e) Early morning fog and haze persisted each morning – dissipating entirely by 0900.
2. Reliability of daily forecasts.

The reliability of our own weather forecasts has improved steadily. From SAIPAN to MURAGAKI they were 70% correct. This increase in forecast accuracy can be attributed to more Pacific seasonal data and reports of general weather conditions, aerological bulletins, climatic charts and other authoritative sources regarding various local conditions and weather averaged by months.

3. Daily reports and tornado information.

These reports have given an accurate forecast as to possible movements of various tornadoes, typhoons and tropical storms. They have also been of value in plotting and keeping an accurate track of these storms.
1. Upon approach to the objective, a naval gunfire and air support control team was transferred to the flagship and established communication with the carrier air support and naval gunfire group assigned to the NAGASAKI landings. Their services were not employed, as no opposition was encountered.

2. The anti-small craft screen and fly catcher plan augmented by a boat patrol was established and preparations were made to execute a smoke plan, but no occasion arose requiring execution of the latter.
For the occupation of NAGASAKI the time for advance communication planning was shortened to two days; there was no opportunity for a rehearsal, barely enough time for the testing of voice circuits. The flagship, CAG "REL", had just completed a conversion of communication spaces to conform to the adopted pattern for BACC's and the new installations were untested. As senior occupation force commander and later SOD (Administrative) at NAGASAKI we had a greater traffic burden to handle than ever before. Yet despite these handicaps communications functioned with remarkable smoothness. Part of this success can be attributed to the familiarity of all participants with the basic plan from previous operations. The importance of having adopted a standard workable communication plan for amphibious operations from the time of the SAIPAN operation to the present cannot be over-emphasized. Another asset was the fact that the principals had worked together before, and knew how to cooperate effectively. ComPhilCorps provided extra officers and personnel to man the air support and naval gunfire circuits guarded the initial day of the occupation and gave us great assistance in relaying messages destined for the FOX schedule to CAG on a point-to-point circuit. ComGen 2nd MarDiv, whom we carried with us, cooperated in every way to assure the rapid and certain distribution of messages between the two staffs. From the time the Division CP was established ashore until the day of our departure the marines maintained on CAG "REL", a rear echelon composed of personnel to operate two voice circuits to their headquarters ashore and officers to stand a continuous coding watch so long as we were radio guard for the division. We assisted them by handling a considerable volume of their traffic over Navy channels, supplying them with copies of all messages we received or originated, and furnishing equipment to guard all their frequencies except those in the SCR 300 series.
Another service we performed was in assisting Commander BLAKE, Port Director, MAGASAKI, to establish communications. We provided him with a complete file of current operational dispatches, maintained radio guard for him until we departed, then arranged for another guard, and loaned him two radiomen and one signalman until such time as his own personnel arrived.

(b) Circuits

(1) Amphibious radio channels were established according to the circuit diagram in Transport Doctrine only as needed. Since there was no formal Line of Departure nor vessels for control work, the Control Vessel Common was not used. Shortage of personnel and the absence of combat conditions warranted securing the TRX ship-shore administrative circuit for transport beach parties; division and transport beachmasters as well as ships, however, continued to guard this circuit as an auxiliary channel of communications. On the third day all stations were directed to secure division ship-shore channels and common guard on the Harbor Circuit (2716 kcs). SCRA (Administrative) traffic was cleared on the latter frequency to all ships present. On the fourth day the division boat control channels were dispensed with in favor of the Landing Boat Common. The fewer boats and simpler control problem justified the consolidation of these circuits.

Recommendations: In occupation landings substitute the Harbor Circuit (2716 kcs voice) for division ship-shore administrative channels; dispense with TRX for beach parties, thereby conserving on personnel. Use the Landing Boat Common for all SCR 610's instead of assigning division boat control frequencies.

(2) The Harbor Circuit (2716 kcs voice) was also useful as a secondary means of communication with ComPDivGp 4 at SASEBO, especially at night. Our primary net, however, was the more reliable Task Group Commanders' circuit (2372 kcs C), by which we cleared most of our traffic.

(3) With the relaxation of radio silence, the primary ship-to-shore frequency (4235 kcs) became heavily overloaded. Much of this traffic could have been avoided had the planning period been longer. Eight messages, for example, were required to affect a rendezvous between an LST and her DE escort and get them both safely on their way to the objective. ECC VIW 8 did their best to handle the greatly increased volume. The
only fault we found was that the shore station had a
tendency to accept traffic of the same precedence from
stations with the best signal regardless of turn.

Recommendation: Now that conditions of radio silence can
be relaxed the feasibility of a ship to ship area circuit
should be considered. This would have the advantage of
delivery by the receipt method and reduction of traffic
on the ship-to-shore nets and FOX schedules.

(c) Circuit discipline

Circuit discipline on all of the amphibious channels
was uniformly good. This was in part attributable to those
responsible for the radio material program who have out-
fitting the transports and landing ships with reliable equipment,
thereby eliminating the menace to circuit discipline of weak
stations. It also showed an effective program of training
conducted by the individual ships. Our command channel
operated as a controlled net was again the most active cir-
cuit. About two-thirds of our voice traffic passed over
this channel. Insistence upon officer supervision of this
circuit increased the speed of transmissions and kept-
repeats to a minimum.

The small number of ships present created no problems
of circuit discipline on the Harbor Circuit and Fleet Common.
They were refreshingly free from idle chatter and endless
repeats. The Task Group Commanders' channel (2716 mcs) was a fast
well-disciplined net. The Task Force Common (457 kcs), on
the other hand, fell short of proper standards. Although
essential traffic was cleared on this channel, it tended to
be used for C2O1's. Also on September 26 and 27 there were
several instances of chit-chat between operators, direct
violations of circuit discipline.

(d) Security

During the NAGASAKI occupation security rules seemed
to be in a state of limbo. It was not uncommon to receive
two dispatches from different senior commands both on ship
movements, one in plain language, the other encrypted.
Departure reports were made in plain language for trans-
mission over the FOX schedules, listing ships by name and
by place. At the same time, we were religiously using voice calls for the identical ships on VIP voice channels. The only directive we received on the subject was one from CTF 55 ordering us to make movement reports in plain language:

"Daily summaries and sailing dispatches should be sent in plain language unless information contained therein manifestly requires classification."

Recommendation: The present confusion on security practice should be clarified by higher authority and some consistency restored. Voice calls for ships are being jeopardized by present practices and should be abolished.

(c) Material

As has already been observed above, problems of material in this operation were notable for their absence. No breakdowns seriously interrupted communications, LST's, LSM's, and LCS's were remarkably free from equipment failures.

Probably the flagship experienced more difficulties than any other ship. The yard conversion job left many things for ship's force to put in order before much of the equipment could function. For example there were half a dozen errors in wiring on the patch panels. The electrician must have been color blind who wired the HPUs, for despite color charts, only five out of sixteen were properly connected. The load of circuits required the use of every transmitter on the ship. On the first day or two we had to experiment by switching antennas before we were able to reduce local interference on our own receivers to an acceptable level. The technical force worked long hours in the process and did a commendable job in placing all this new equipment in operation in the short time available.

2. VISUAL

Whenever possible flashing light and flag hoists were used for making routine reports, calling for boats, etc. Unfortunately visual signalling was somewhat curtailed because the harbor of NAGASAKI is in the shape of a dog's leg and it was not always possible to anchor a ship in the vicinity of the turn.

At night visual silence was relaxed for the transmission of important traffic. Colored lenses fitted to adapters were mandatory on all L20 lights from sunset to sunrise. The use of red lenses was quickly discouraged because of the danger of confusing that source of red light with breakdown signals.
Recommendations: For night signalling where visual silence can safely be lifted, adapters with green, blue or amber lenses should be used, never red.

3. INTERCEPES

We guarded both RED GUAM GEORGE FOX and HONOLULU HOW FOX during the operation. Reception was frequently difficult because of man-made static (ship's own and Japanese stations) and because of the location of NAJAKI, a pocket in the midst of surrounding hills. Our own interference was partially corrected by patching different antennas to our receivers and finally arriving at the best combination. The geographical difficulties were impossible to overcome. The NAJALEIN re-broadcast of the HOW FOX made that signal as strong as that of GUAM GEORGE FOX. The only criticism we have to make of the NAJALEIN rekeying of the HOW FOX is that the HONOLULU signal is distorted when received at NAJALEIN, the automatic rekeying does nothing to eliminate the distortion but merely sends it on in amplified form.
1. Tracking

The method practiced in tracking surface targets was to search initially on the A-scope of the SG-1 radar, then switch to the VF Precision PPI when the image was clear on the latter. First contacts could be seen at greater ranges in the SG-1 radar. The extreme range of the VF was 50,000 yards; small targets were apt to show an incomplete pip on the B-scope of the VF until the range had closed considerably more. Once the image was clear on the VF B-scope, more accurate ranges and bearings were obtainable without stopping the sweep of the antenna. The DRT was used for actual plotting of the track. Little air tracking was done.

2. Air and Surface Search

For air search the 75 mile scale on the SK radar was used. Targets at 6,000 feet altitude and above were seen consistently on the scope at 70-75 miles ranges. On surface search, ranges were generally normal for the antenna height (133 feet). The maximum range of 64,000 yards was obtained on an unidentified surface contact (course 070°, speed 9 knots) 75 miles northwest of SHIP N at 2230 (I) on 18 September.

3. Fire control radar, Mark 26, was not used.

4. Navigation

On the approach to the target, initial radar contact with land mass was made about 0100 (I) on 21 September. The SK was used to obtain initial contacts on high islands. The maximum range obtained on this radar was 102 miles on YAKU SHIRI (height 6,352 feet) at 0832 (I) on 22 September. For low islands the SG-1 radar proved more perceptive than the SK. Using the 80 mile scale on the VF PPI, KUSKI SHIRI (height 574 feet) was picked up at 45 miles and KUSI SHIRI (height 2,037 feet) at 61 miles, both before the SK radar made contact. On the approach to the harbor accurate navigational fixes were obtained by ranging at 10 degree intervals on land targets and plotting the results on a transparent circular template divided into 360 degrees. This method has
long been standard practice of the flagship.

5. **Station keeping**

The SG-1 radar located in Flag Plot is used for station keeping at night. It has a 12" PPI adapted to a 5,000-yard scale on which the images of ships in the transport formation are clearly visible. Close checks of ranges and bearings on individual ships were made on the X-scope of the SG-1. For station keeping this PPI was much more useful than the VF Precision PPI. The latter PPI scope (6" diameter) is too small; the minimum range of the B-scope does not permit ranges on the close-in ships.

6. **Composition**

A valuable use for the B-scope of the VF was found in determining surface target composition and disposition. On 22 September at 0110 (I) south of KURUSU a group of ships was detected on the SG-1 radar. Both the X-scope and PPI showed a formation with one escort, number of ships and disposition undetermined. At a range of 30,000 yards the VF B-scope revealed two outside columns of four ships each and a center column of five ships with an escort in the lead. Some time later the group was identified visually as 13 LST's with 1 DE as escort. By showing the disposition of a group, the VF B-scope several times has indicated the group's course as accurately as a DMR track. The only exception to this would be when a formation of ships is travelling on a course different from the fleet axis.

7. The VC scope was used to keep a summary plot only when several surface contacts were on the scope at once. By using plexiglass rulers to the PPI scale in use, it was possible to solve maneuvering board problems on this scope.

8. The HI consistently identified aircraft at over 70 miles.

9. Rain squalls were identified at ranges of 75,000 yards on the X-scope of SG-1 radar.

(IV) (E) = 2
Control

1. The physiography of the area, and the limited facilities for unloading transport types, LST's and landing craft was such that control on a squadron scale was not possible. The troops were landed in accordance with landing directives of ComGen 2nd MarDiv: 2nd Regiment landed on the east side of NAGASAKI Harbor, on finger piers north of Dejima Wharf; 6th Regiment landed on west side of harbor near dry dock number one; 8th Regiment landed the second day over same piers as the 2nd Regiment.

2. Regiments landed in column of battalions and were under control of the boat group commanders of each ship. Wave formation and landings were satisfactory. Cargo unloading was accomplished by dock facilities and small boats with traffic control in charge of boat group commanders, under direction of beachmasters. There was much inter-ship transfer of boats to facilitate unloading of ships in the stream, but control of boats was good throughout the operation.

Beach and Shore Parties - General

3. Due to the late date of arrival at NAGASAKI of the squadron beachmaster and the advancement of the date of departure, there was no opportunity for this officer to hold any conferences with the transport beachmasters. The uncertainty as to the landing plans further handicapped detailed organization of unloading plans.

4. After arriving at NAGASAKI a survey was made of possible landing areas. It was decided that the 6th Marines would land in the CHARLIE and BRAVER areas as shown on enclosure (A), and 2nd Marines in areas 12G and 12T. Surveys were also conducted for cargo unloading spots. It was found that in area MINO an unloading beach for 3 LST's or LSM's could be prepared, and in area EASY 2 more could be beached and another in area LOVE 2. Dejima Wharf had facilities for three large APAs or AKAs, but could not be used for more than one until the hospital ships left the dock on the 24th. Area HOJ 1 was used for cargo unloading for the 2nd Marines, Area CHARLIE and BRAVER for the 6th Marines.
and area GEORGE 4 and on the 26th GEORGE 1 on east side of the slip.

5. Transport beach parties landed with assault troops, with the advance elements landing in the third wave and the remainder on an on-call basis. Two-thirds of the shore party personnel and their gear were unloaded in LST's; the other 500 were loaded on one transport. The shore party commander and the squadron beachmaster were embarked together.

Unloading

6. Difficulties in unloading were caused, in the main, by four factors:

(a) limited mooring and berthing facilities in the inner harbor and congestion on the 23rd and 24th created by ships other than those attached to the MIGASAKI Group;

(b) limited unloading areas which could handle cargo from LST's, LSM's and landing craft and lack of adequate dump spaces;

(c) ruin and destruction of the entire MIGASAKI area around the First District caused by B-29 raids (East side) and Atomic bomb (North and East side), which, coupled with an originally inadequate road system, created one-way traffic bottlenecks which continually hampered movement of supplies from the limited unloading areas and docks to the dumps;

(d) late arrival of the LST's carrying most of the shore party personnel and equipment (this was the result of the last-minute advance in the date for the landings at MIGASAKI, which left insufficient time for the LST's to arrive at MIGASAKI on the 23rd, although they sorted from SAPIAN the day the change in landing date was promulgated).

7. Enclosure (A) shows the limited berthing and docking facilities but is not an indication of the true picture as of the 23rd and 24th of September. Upon arrival of the MIGASAKI Group on the 23rd, dock space along the Bojima Wharf was occupied by the EAGLE (AH-12) and the SANCTUARY (AH-17). Occupying berths in the First and Second Districts on the 23rd were HICHTA, BLOOM, USS SPEAKER, WEDER (LPD-75) and other ABD's and BUTTICUS (LX-113). The ABD's cleared Bojima Wharf on the 26th, but one transport which had moored in the First District had to be ordered out of her berth when C.T.G.
5.7 ordered that the berth be cleared to make room for the HAVEN when she left the wharf.

8. A total of 5 LST's or LSM's was the limit of the beaching capacity on the east side of the harbor, where both RCT 2 and RCT 8 were ordered to land. While there were four additional LST-LSM beaching slots on the west side, there were only 3 LST's loaded with gear for unloading on that side. Destruction of the roads prevented unloading RCT 2 and RCT 8 equipment in the spaces available on the west side.

9. Difficulties in unloading were anticipated due to the fact that the shore party personnel and equipment were loaded in the LST's which arrived about twenty-four hours after the transports. The available shore party personnel was divided between the two combat RCT's. The 6th RCT landed on the west side and set up unloading areas taking advantage of a Japanese horizon crane for unloading of heavy lifts. Lighter cargo was man-handled off the boats. This cargo was stored in a warehouse immediately behind the unloading area, avoiding a transportation problem. Limited warehouse and storage area and lack of unloading facilities was a great handicap to the 2nd RCT. Only one small cherry picker was available for unloading of the 2nd RCT general cargo when general unloading started the afternoon of 23rd of September.

10. Despite these handicaps the unloading progressed steadily, but delays naturally occurred at times. As RCT transportation for transports and the LST's became available, it was used to unload the one AK, which docked at Beijin Wharf. On September 24 two additional AK's were docked, and LST's and LSM's were beach and unloaded as shore party equipment and personnel became available.

11. The 8th RCT was ordered to land over the same area as the 2nd RCT and a dump area in the north end of the harbor was assigned to them. In order to increase their area, another area in the slip in the north end of the harbor was developed and placed in operation on the 26th.

12. The following is a daily summary of personnel, vehicles and cargo (short tons) unloaded by the entire NAGASAKI Group:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
<th>Short Tons</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>23 Sept.</td>
<td>6501</td>
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<td>28 Sept.</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>2,936</td>
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(Grand Total) 20,051 3,285 34,984

IV (F) - 3 35
13. Unloading Table - Transport Types (by percentage).

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<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>Sept. 23</th>
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14. Unloading Table - Transport Types - Short Tons of Cargo.

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<th>SHIP</th>
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<th>Sept. 24</th>
<th>Sept. 25</th>
<th>Sept. 26</th>
<th>Sept. 27</th>
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Total: 516, 575, 502, 884, 852, 1850, 1924, 1904
**Unloading Table – Transport Types – Short Tons of Cargo**  

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
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<th>Sept. 23</th>
<th>Sept. 24</th>
<th>Sept. 25</th>
<th>Sept. 26</th>
<th>Sept. 27</th>
<th>Sept. 28</th>
<th>Total</th>
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*NOTE: Differences between scheduled loads and tons unloaded were created by last minute unscheduled additions to the cargo of some ships.*

**Daily Unloading Percentage LST's**

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<th>2400</th>
<th>2100</th>
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<td>Sept. 25</td>
<td>Sept. 26</td>
<td>Sept. 27</td>
<td>Sept. 28</td>
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(CONTINUED)
16. Daily Unloading Percentage LSM's (Original Cargo)

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<td>286</td>
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Enclosure (A) - Unloading Area - NAGASAKI Harbor.
Although no underwater demolition was found necessary, UDT personnel embarked in U.S.S. KLINE (APD-120) were most cooperative, offering their services and reporting on board CABLEA daily for assignment to any job which might have developed. Prior to the arrival of the tractor group an officer of the UDT team made a thorough survey of the harbor with an officer representative of ComSFLot 22. This resulted in the LST commander having accurate and valuable information on the available beaching spots for LSTs and LSMs.
1. The FREESTONE was designated as the Casualty Receiving Ship. A roster of medical officers attached to ships of this squadron and their specialties was prepared. Emergency medical teams to supplement the hospital staff of the Casualty Receiving Ship were organized aboard the HENLED, LANIER, and NAYNE. These teams were to board the FREESTONE on demand.

2. The medical section of the beach parties were prepared to land on immediate notice.

3. Patients were received aboard the FREESTONE from September 23-27. Those requiring treatment consisted for the great part of emergency surgery (such as acute appendicitis) or traumatic injuries (such as fractures, contusions, cuts). On September 26, the emergency teams minus medical officers were ordered from the designated ships to the FREESTONE to assist in the management of casualties. Enclosure (A) is the report of the Casualty Receiving Ship.

4. Demands for supplementary medical supplies were few and were adequately handled. D.D.T. emulsion was supplied to several units.

5. The Casualty Receiving Plan proved satisfactory and on September 28, 29 (twenty-five) of the casualties received aboard the FREESTONE were evacuated ashore in care of the Division Surgeon 2nd Marine Division. The non-evacuables consisted of 20 (twenty) ambulatory and 5 (five) litter cases.

6. There were no reports of outbreak of disease or unusual medical problems.

Enclosure (A) - Casualty Receiving Ship Report.
COMANDER TRANSPORT SQUADRON TWELVE
(ComMagASAKI Group and C.T.S. 54.3)

ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART IV - SPECIAL REPORTS

Section (1) - Logistics

1. Logistic support for TransRon 12 (Temp) was effected at SAIPAN, MARIANAS during the period 5 - 13 September 1945. ComTransDiv 60 (Temp) acted as temporary squadron commander and was responsible for logistic support from 5 September 1945 pending arrival of ComTransRon 12. At 1800 (T) 15 September 1945 ComTransRon 12 assumed responsibility for all logistic preparations.

2. All ships were found to have complete or near complete allowances of allowance list material on board. No critical shortages were found to exist. Commanding officers of all ships reported their engineering plants in good to excellent condition. No urgent repairs of any nature were required by any ship.

3. ComTransDiv 60 (Temp) at SAIPAN directed ships as they reported to draw full allowance of provisions (fresh, frozen, and dry), general stores, clothing and small stores, ship's store stock, medical supplies, spare parts, and ammunition and to fuel to capacity, each ship to make its own arrangements.

4. Upon receipt of orders to depart SAIPAN four days ahead of schedule it was found impossible for all ships to top off with fuel and provisions for the following reasons:

(a) departure of TransRon 22 from SAIPAN on 16 September 1945. This squadron spent only forty-eight hours in SAIPAN and all facilities were utilized to meet its needs during this period. TransRon 22 had critical shortages of fuel and provisions, having sailed from PEARL HARBOR to SAIPAN with troops embarked.

(b) departure of LSTFlot 23 (Temp) and LSTFlot 15 (Temp) from SAIPAN on 17 September 1945.

(c) extremely heavy swells in the outer harbor which made it impossible (except in emergencies) for ships to fuel safely or send boats for provisions until 1800, 15 September. This situation was further aggravated by the limited number of yard sawers and tankers available.

(d) strict adherence to the unit plan in issuing of provisions by NSE SAIPAN. Many ships desiring to draw allowance of fresh, frozen
ComTransRon 12
Action Report - NAGASAKI - PART (IV) - SPECIAL REPORTS - SECTION (I) - LOGISTICS.

or dry provisions as prescribed by ComFIFTHPhibFor Operation Plan No. A1501-45 and ComPhibGrp 4 Operation Plan No. A12-45 were unable to do so because they did not have adequate stowage space to take the unneeded items contained in a unit. TransDiv 60 (Temp), for example, had loaded frozen to capacity at Guam and receipt of adequate fresh and dry to bring ships up to prescribed allowances would have necessitated complete waste of frozen items.

5. All ships had on board an ample supply of provisions, and no concern was felt over the ability of TransRon 12 (Temp) to carry out its assigned mission.

6. The Port Director SAIPIAR was most cooperative in attempts to top off all ships with fuel prior to departure. By complete utilization of all resources at his command - two yard oilers, one Navy tanker, one merchant tanker, and three fueling docks - eleven transport types and the screen were topped off on 17 - 18 September. The remaining ten transport types had on board prior to departure 92 per cent or more of their fuel capacity.

7. In the objective area ships of TransRon 12 were the only sources of provisions, black fuel, ship's store stock, clothing and small stores and general stores except the U.S.S. RUTILICUS (AK-113). The RUTILICUS had on board 75 tons of dry stores, 11 tons of ship's store stock and one ton of clothing and small stores for issue when she departed for SASEBO at 0700, 25 September 1945. The RUTILICUS would have been an invaluable source of supply for LST's and LCM's which had arrived 23 and 24 September 1945 and had not completed unloading at the time of her departure and for LCI's and other small craft arriving after her departure.

8. Foreseeing the critical situation which would develop after departure of TransRon 12 and because of the heavy drain on the transports, ComTransRon 12 requested ComPhibGrp 4 on 25 September 1945 to send an AF or AK with fresh, frozen, and dry provisions and a tanker carrying both diesel and black oil to NAGASAKI. ComPhibGrp 4 replied that the U.S.S. HYADES (AF-28) would arrive NAGASAKI on 1 October 1945. The fuel situation was alleviated by the arrival of the merchant tanker SS CARLSBAD on 26 September 1945.

9. Small craft and landing craft other than LST's at NAGASAKI were directed to arrange for provisions and fuel through C.T.C. 24 (ComTransRon 12) rather than with individual ships. This method of handling was utilized; (a) to provision and fuel from unloaded and low priority ships, (b) to maintain proportionate supply among all ships and (c) to ensure even distribution to small vessels.
10. LST #838 was loaded to capacity with frozen and dry provisions, and Garrison Beach Battalion Number One was issued a supply of dry provisions sufficient to sustain 125 men for 15 days, pending arrival of the can provisions from Sasebo. Small craft were advised that provisions in an emergency would be available from LST #838 and Garrison Beach Battalion Number One prior to arrival of the U.S. NAYADES (AF-25) on 1 October 1945.

11. The APPLING (APA-58), BERNARD (APA-201) and GRUMERS (APA-172) entered pay vouchers on pay records and paid the crew of LST 1022, SCOURY (AK-301), and CAHUILLA (AFV-152) on orders from this command.

12. Logistic support in the objective area was rendered by ships of this group as indicated in the table below:
### Action Report - NAGASKI - PART (IV) - SPECIAL REPORTS - SECTION (X) - LOGISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>PROVISIONS</th>
<th>FUEL</th>
<th>WATER</th>
<th>GEN. STORE</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANTHONY (DD-515)</td>
<td>Fresh, frozen and dry provisions to capacity from ANDROMEDA (AKA-15)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Directed by CTF 55 dispatch 220522</td>
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<td>ROCKS (DD-804)</td>
<td>Fresh, frozen and dry provisions to capacity from H.M. MAINYRE (APA-123)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>do</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALLEN (DD-527)</td>
<td>Dry to capacity; 2/3 fresh frozen from AQUARIUS (AKA-16) Remainder from APPLING (APA-58)</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>do</td>
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<td>BELLE (DD-471)</td>
<td>Fresh, frozen and dry to capacity from CAPRICORNUS (AKA-57)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>do</td>
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<td>DALY (DD-519)</td>
<td>10 days supply dry provisions from MENARD (APA-201)</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>5000 gals. from G/GE (APA-168)</td>
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<td>LCS #122</td>
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<td>SHIP</td>
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**ECONOMICS**

- 10 days supply from 5000 gallons.
- 10 days supply from 5000 gallons.
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<th>GEN. STORE</th>
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<tr>
<td>LST #383</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>LST #383 loaded to capacity to serve as emergency source for small craft.</td>
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<tr>
<td>LST #355</td>
<td>Dry provisions as required to load to capacity from FREESTONE (LPA-167). 5000 lbs. from INCHIHO (LPA-155)</td>
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<td>Ship's store stock (emergency) from FREESTONE (LPA-167)</td>
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<td>LST #355</td>
<td>15 days supply dry provisions (3 apiece) from OTLEMA (LPA-101) and MUSEUM (LPA-24)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Garrison Beach Battalion 51 to serve as second emergency source for small craft.</td>
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<td>VLF #220</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>Received 10,000 gals. from LPLINN (LPA-59) Ceased fueling to stand out in accordance orders.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TULUS (DL-748)</td>
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<td>Fueled from LST #166</td>
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<td>CLEWES (DD-423)</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>Received approx. 1500 bbls. from INCHIHO (LPA-201)</td>
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<td>SHIP</td>
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<tr>
<td>POTATOES</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Ship's store stock,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>GEN. STORE</td>
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<td>(ATF-152)</td>
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Port Director: Received 105 blankets, 63 sets, 7 ensigns (various sizes), navigational equipment, general stores, and office supplies from all ships Transp. 12.
COMMANDER TRANSPORT SQUADRON THIRTEEN
(ComTransron 13 as S.O.F. and C.T.O. 3rd.)

ACTION REPORT - LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART IV - SPECIAL REPORTS

SECTION (J) - OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OF NAVAL VESSELS

1. APA's and AKA's

Although this was the first time most of the ships had been assigned to the squadron, all of them turned in a creditable performance. In only one respect can any criticism be directed to them. Despite the fact that all commanding officers were called aboard the flagship and personally directed to make certain that unauthorized naval personnel were not allowed to go ashore and that proper supervision of both parties and boat crews was maintained so as to preclude the possibility of their wandering from the immediate vicinity of the beach, several instances of violations were reported by ComNav 2nd Marine, and one of the violations resulted in an incident of the most serious character involving the alleged commission of several crimes by two Coast Guard enlisted personnel. This was the type of incident the stringent restrictions instituted by ComTransron 13 as S.O.F. (Adm.), NAGASAKI, against naval personnel going ashore were designed to prevent, and commanding officers of ships engaged in these operations must take whatever steps are necessary to see that such restrictions are not violated.

2. LST's and LSD's

The LST's and LSD's performed in a most satisfactory manner. Close relationship between the LST group commander and the beachmaster continued throughout the entire unloading period and contributed a great deal to the rapid unloading of these ships. Small use was made of LSD's to aid in the unloading of transports, since, upon the arrival of the tractor group, all available beach spots were necessary for the unloading of the cargo, particularly the shore party equipment, comprising original loads in LST's and LSD's. This factor necessarily slowed the unloading of the transports, but did not affect the speed of the overall unloading operation.
3. Pontoon Causeways and Barges

Causeways and barges played a very minor role in the initial unloading. On 28 September authority was received from ComPhibGrp 4 to launch two causeways and eight barges. This was done at the request of the port director, who indicated a desire for this equipment to facilitate the unloading of resupply shipping. The barges were actually put to use in the unloading of some initial shipping and aided materially in the last phases of unloading, particularly that of the AKA's.
COALITION TRANSPORT SQUADRON TWELVE
(ComNAGASAKI Group and C.T.G., 54.5)

ACTION REPORT — LANDINGS AT NAGASAKI

PART V — PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

1. Personnel of the U.S.S. WAYNE (APA-54) are deserving of special commendation for their performance during this operation. No transport division was assigned to one of the divisions. For operational and administrative purposes the commanding officer of the WAYNE was designated division commander of TransDiv 19 (Temp), and three members of the staff of this command were loaned to the WAYNE on temporary additional duty. Despite the lack of time for adequate planning, the obvious deficiencies in material and personnel which any transport commanding officer would suffer in attempting to take on the additional duties and responsibilities of a transport division commander, the WAYNE turned in a performance which would have been a credit to any regularly organized TransDiv commander.
PART VI - LESSONS LEARNED, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Intelligence Material

Insufficient copies of charts of the harbor, beach, and dock diagrams were received for distribution to ships for use of boat crews.

Recommendation: Whenever possible more copies of charts and harbor diagrams should be furnished, since facilities for duplicating such information aboard transports are very limited.

2. Minefield Intelligence

Recommendation: Because so many garbles appear in dispatches and prevent accurate plotting, it is recommended that place names, latitude and longitude and H.O. chart numbers be used in dispatches reporting important minefield information.

3. Operation Orders and Plans

Recommendation: Since it is imperative that a command operating as required of the NAGASAKI Group should have necessary operational plans and orders of higher echelons bearing on the operation, it is recommended that such plans and orders be designated for special handling to insure that their distribution is a matter of highest priority and urgency and that ample copies be supplied the emergency distribution centers.

4. Radio Cables

Recommendation: In occupation landings experience gained in this operation indicates that the Harbor Circuit (2716 kcs voice) should be substituted for TransDiv ship-shore administrative channels and the TIX for beacon parties can be dispensed with, thereby conserving on personnel. The Landing Boat Common should be used for all SCR 610's instead of assigning division boat control frequencies.

5. Ship-to-Shore Area Circuit

Recommendation: Now that conditions of radio silence can be relaxed
...the feasibility of a ship-to-ship area circuit should be considered. This would have the advantage of delivery by the receipt method and reduction of traffic on the ship-to-shore nets and FOX schedule.

6. Security

Movement reports are made in plain language, but voice calls are still being used on VHF Voice Channels.

Recommendation: The present confusion on security practices, of which the above practice is only one of several examples which might be cited, should be clarified by higher authority and some consistency restored. The use of voice calls for ships should be abolished, now that hostilities have ceased.

7. Visual Signalling

Recommendation: On night signalling when visual silence can safely be lifted, adapters with green, blue or yellow lenses should be used, never red, in order to avoid the possibility of confusing the red adapter signal light with breakdown signals.